Explorations in Classical Spartan property and society by Hodkinson, Stephen John
PAJJ 11670 
EXPLORATIONS IN CLASSICAL 
SPARTAN PROPE~TY AND SOCIETY 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
I 
by 
STEPHEN JOHN HODKINSON 
Wolfson College 
University of Cambridge 
July 1992 
EXPLORATIONS IN CLASSICAL SPARTAN PROPERTY AND SOCIETY: Summary 
Stephen John Hodkinson 
This dissertation explores the relationship between property 
holding in Classical Sparta (c.550-c.360 BC) and the operation 
of Spartiate society, in order to illuminate both its 
longstanding stability and its crisis in the early fourth 
century. 
Chapter 1 examines the character of the Spartiate social order 
and the tensions inherent in its value system. A complex balance 
existed between the high valuation attached to principles of 
uniformity, merit or seniority and the significant influence 
which derived from the deployment of wealth. 
Chapter 2 tack¥es the controversial issue of the nature of land 
tenure and inheritance, concluding that it was subject to only 
minimal public control. Citizens had indefinite possession of 
estates which devolved to both sons and daughters and could be 
alienated through gift or bequest. 
Chapter 3 discusses the Spartiates' exploitation of the helot 
labour force, arguing that their extraction of produce was 
organized on a sharecropping basis and that differential degrees 
of intervention by individual Spartiates on their estates were 
a critical factor in inhibiting (in Lakonia) or permitting (in 
Messenia) the emergence of an autonomous helot communal 
organization capable of sustaining revolts and (ultimately) 
independence from Spartan control. 
Chapter 4 explores the implication of Sparta's system of 
universal female inheritance. Its long-term effect was to retard 
the emergence of the most severe inequalities, but at the expense 
of continual short-term changes in land ownership. As economic 
differentiation grew in the fifth century, however, and wealth 
became the main determinant of status, citizen families 
increasingly employed a variety of marriage practices which were 
intended to minimize the dispersal of their property . These 
factors help to explain the development of Sparta's citizen 
manpower shortage, especially the failure of her leaders to 
tackle its fundamental causes. 
Chapter 5 focuses on Sparta's unprecedented involvement in 
continuous foreign warfare and empire between 431 and 371 BC . 
The claim of ancient writers that Spartan society was corrupted 
by the influx of imperial wealth is judged to be grossly 
overstated. But the emergence of independent foreign commands, 
which were acquired by a minority of leading citizens, served to 
transform Sparta ' s socio-political system by intensifying the 
deployment of family influence and patronage , thereby 
accelerating the process of property concentration. Comparison 
with the Roman Republic suggests that the underlying framework 
of Sparta's fourth-century crisis was determined by the longer-
term, structur al f act ors discussed in Chapters 1-4 ; but the 
shorter-term impact o f foreign warfare conditioned the timing , 
circumst ances and particula r form in which tha t crisis evol ved. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation has been a long time in the making. My 
graduate research commenced in 1975 under the supervision of the 
late Sir Moses Finley on the subject of 'A Systematic Study of 
Spartan Politics'. That work, however, was interrupted after two 
years by my appointment to a lectureship at the University of 
Manchester and by my involvement in other, non-doctoral research 
to which I had been urged to give more immediate priority (cf. 
Hodkinson & Hodkinson 1981). By 1981 Sparta had for so long 
taken a back seat that on the advice of Sir Moses (who was a 
consistent opponent of the 'tyranny of the compulsory Ph.D.') I 
took the decision to have my name taken off the Graduate 
Register. 
There things might have rested for good, but for the gentle 
and persistent urging of a number of colleagues (among whom I 
would single out my former Professor at Manchester, Tony Birley) 
who gradually persuaded me of the merit of reviving the 
doctorate. Of particular encouragement was the willingness of 
Dr. Paul Cartledge to take over the role of supervisor following 
Sir Moses' death in 1986. My research interest in Sparta had 
meanwhile moved on from the sphere of politics to issues of 
property and society, on which subjects I had published a number 
of articles; hence a change of title and subject-matter was 
appropriate. The Degree Committee of the Faculty of Classics 
agreed that about two-thirds of the dissertation might consist 
of already published work. Finally, in 1991 a sufficient space 
at last opened up among my research commitments to permit me to 
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apply for reinstatement as a graduate student with a realistic 
chance of completion within a reasonable period of time. 
Of the main Chapters below, earlier versions of Chapters 1, 
2 and 4, which comprise about 49,000 words or about 62% of the 
dissertation, have already appeared in print (Hodkinson 1983; 
1986a; 1989). The published versions have, however, all been 
thoroughly overhauled and updated in the light of recent work (my 
own and that of other scholars). Several sections have been 
radically revised in content and format. Consequently, the true 
proportion of already published material within the dissertation 
is probably closer to 50% than to 60%. In both the revised and 
the entirely new chapters I have sought to utilize all secondary 
works which had become available to me in Manchester before the 
end of 1991. 
During the years of my research on Sparta I have contracted 
many debts of assistance to friends and colleagues. I would 
mention in particular Sue Alcock, Graham Burton, John Davies, Lin 
Foxhall, David Harvey, Robin Osborne, Anton Powell, Bj0rn 
Qviller, John Rich, Tracey Rihll, Cosmo Rodewald, Robert 
Sallares, Richard Smith, David Whitehead and E.A. Wrigley. Sarah 
Davnall of the Manchester Computing Centre has given me 
invaluable assistance in programming the computer simulation in 
Chapter 4. 
As probably the last of Moses Finley's former graduate 
students to submit a doctoral dissertation, it is a poignant 
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pleasure to pay tribute to his unwavering academic and personal 
support which is sorely missed by many Classical scholars. His 
inspirational and enduring influence upon the overall approach 
behind this dissertation is far greater than might initially 
appear from a simple scrutiny of its specific arguments. Since 
Sir Moses' death, Paul Cartledge has been all that could be 
wished for in a supervisor as a source both of intellectual 
stimulus and criticism and of encouragement and advice during the 
final period of writing up. My wife, Hilary Hodkinson, who has 
lived with the tortuous history of this dissertation almost as 
long as myself, has consistently provided the unconditional 
conjugal support which only she can; and our children 
(Christopher, David, Rosemary and Peter) have developed a finely-
tuned sense of when to leave their father in peaceful study and 
when he requires interruption for his own and the family good! 
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Bernard and Edith 
Hodkinson, as a token of thanks for their many years of 
commitment to my academic education. 
Notwithstanding this variety of help, this dissertation is 
the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of work done in collaboration. It does not exceed 80,000 
words, including footnotes, references and appendices. 
All three-figure dates are B.C., unless otherwise stated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
My aim in this introduction is to define the subject and approach 
of this dissertation. A few words of explanation about the title 
may be a helpful starting-point. The 'explorations' referred to 
in the title represent a series of interrelated forays into some 
comparatively uncharted regions of the territory of property and 
society in Classical Sparta. By 'Classical' I mean, loosely, the 
period from c.550 to c.360; i.e. from the time for which we 
begin to get credible details of certain aspects of Spartan 
society through the enquiries of Herodotus to the termination of 
the Spartan-orientated works of Xenophon which ushers in a new 
period of ignorance about her internal affairs, by which time the 
crisis of Spartan society had resulted in her loss of hegemony 
and decline to the status of a second-rate power. I shall, 
however, sometimes have cause to consider the development of my 
subject in earlier and later periods. 
Although the concern of this study is with property in the 
hands of indi victual Spartiate men and women rather than with 
'public' property of the Spartan polis, I have refrained from 
using the description 'private property' in the title and text 
of the dissertation since, as is explained further in Chapter 2 
in the context of land tenure, it fails to convey the 
fundamentally conditional nature of property rights in ancient 
Greece. The alternative terms which I now prefer to employ are 
'individually-held property' , 'individual possession' and similar 
variant formul ations . 
F 
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My choice of subject-matter for this dissertation relates 
to the most essential problem facing the historian of Classical 
Sparta, how to explain both the extraordinary success and 
longevity of her singular socio-economic system and its 
subsequent rapid transformation and crisis in the late fifth and 
early fourth centuries. That questions of property holding were 
central to the success and crisis of the Spartan system will 
hardly be doubted. The most distinctive feature of the Spartiate 
politeia from probably the seventh century onwards was that each 
citizen was securely established as the holder of an estate, 
cultivated by a he l ot labour force, which was sufficiently large 
to provide his family's subsistence and his own mess dues, so 
that he could devote his time to the public way of l ife required 
of all Spartiates. Towards the end of our period it was the 
increasing impoverishment of poor citizens which underlay the 
Spartan crisis and the liberation of a major part of the labour 
force, the Messenian helots, which brought that crisis to its 
climax. 
The factors outlined in the p~eced,~ pA~~~~r~ have been 
noted in previous scholarship, but further study is required for 
at least two · reasons. First, as will be discussed in detail in 
the dissertation, several aspects of existing interpretations of 
Spartiate property holding are far from satisfactory. Secondly ; 
the key to understanding the Spartan property system cannot be 
confined to the realm of property holding, since developments in 
this sphere reflected and interacted with wider-ranging societal 
changes. Thucydides' statement (1.6) that, 
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"it was the Spartans who first began to dress 
simply ... , with the rich leading a life that was as 
much as possible like the life of the ordinary people" 
indicates that Sparta's arrangements for the role of property 
rested on a compact between th~ different socio-economic strata 
which had ramifications throughout Spartiate life. 
The distinctive approach of this dissertation is precisely 
its attempt to chart some central aspects of the 
interrelationship between Spartiate society and property 
( especially land) . Chapter 1 examines the character of the 
Spartiate social order and of conflicts within the prevailing 
system of values, with an especial focus upon the central 
institutions of the public way of life, the agoge, common messes 
and army. From this perspective it is possible to appreciate the 
magnitude of the attempt made by the polis to place a priority 
upon principles of uniformity and those (such as merit or 
seniority) which potentially privileged any Spartiate regardless 
of his level of property holding; but also the role that 
possession of wealth nevertheless continued to play. 
In Chapter 2 attention is turned squarely upon the most 
important aspect of Spartiate property ownership, the 
controversial question of the nature of land tenure and 
inheritance. Uncertainty over this vexed issue has bedevilled 
attempts to interpret the role of property within the wider 
society. My discussion, in seeking to establish the character 
of Spartiate land tenure as subject to only minimal public 
controls , highlights the contrast with othe.r spheres of Spartiate 
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life examined in Chapter 1 which were more heavily subject to 
state direction. 
Chapter 3 scrutinizes a further aspect of this basic 
'contradiction' and widens the perspective upon land ownership 
by examining the Spartiates' exploitation of the helot labour 
force. The interplay between citizens' relatively unfettered 
control over the utilization of their estates and the state-
imposed limitations on their rights of mastery over helot 
cultivators is examined. Light is also shed upon a fundamental 
complementary weakness and strength of the Spartan system - the 
frequency of Messenian revolts which ultimately undermined 
Sparta's external power and the comparative acquiescence of the 
Lakonian helots which enabled her society to outlast that crisis. 
Chapters 4 and 5 then return to Spartiate internal society 
and the development of its early-fourth-century crisis. The 
concern of Chapter 4 is with long- and medium-term socio-economic 
trends. It explores changing patterns of Spartiate marriage 
patterns in the context of the system of universal female 
inheritance advocated in Chapter 2 and of the increasing 
significance of wealth as the major determinant of status among 
the various competing influences discussed in Chapter 1 . 
Examination of the impact of these factors upon the processes of 
property concentration and manpower decline and the hardening of 
boundaries around a wealthy social elite is seen to be essential 
to understanding the long-term breakdown of the 'social compact' 
referred to above. 
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Chapter 5, finally, examines the shorter-term effects of 
Sparta's involvement in continual foreign warfare from 431 to 
371. It focuses upon the impact of imperial wealth and the ways 
in which new opportunities 
traditional socio-political 
for overseas posts altered the 
system sufficiently to . intensify 
existing trends towards property concentration and to strengthen 
the resistance of the elite to the possibility of radical change 
to alleviate the impoverishment of poorer citizens. A brief 
comparative analysis of the socio-political implications of the 
overseas expansion of the Roman Republic is made as a means of 
assessing the relative roles of the longer- and shorter-term 
factors discussed in the final two chapters. 
The sources upon which this dissertation draws are largely 
literary. Some , such as Thucydides and Xenophon, are 
contemporary to the late-fifth or early-fourth centuries; and 
others, like Aristotle, are near-contemporary. But several (for 
example, Polybius, Diodorus and Plutarch) are much later writers 
whose works are secondary in character. There is no extant 
literary work written by a Spartiate in the Classical period. 
Discussion of the reliability of this literary evidence loomi 
large (especially in Chapters 2 and 3), particularly owing to the 
'mirage Spartiate'. There is little Spartan epigraphy; but 
where relevant reference is made to a few private inscriptions , 
especially tombstones and victory dedications. Similarly, 
published studies of archaeological excavation or survey have as 
yet been few; but evidence for religious cult has been utilized 
in Chapter 3. Finally, the 'sociological' character of this 
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dissertation has led me to make use both of computer simulation 
and of comparative evidence from other societies which can render 
opaque aspects of Spartan society more readily transparent. 
Through these integrated approaches to Spartiate property 
and society this dissertation hopes to contribute some original 
insights into and to advance current understanding of both the 
long-term stability and ultimate crisis of the Classical Spartan 
polis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SOCIAL ORDER AND .THE CONFLICT OF VALUES 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of social 
relationships among the citizens of Classical Sparta, the 
Spartiates, by examinin~ different areas of their lives, focusing 
upon the values, principles or criteria which brought about 
either uniformity or differentiation within the citizen body. 
An important underlying concern will be the means by which 
Sparta's political and military leadership was selected. In this 
chapter I shall treat Classical Spartiate society as a static 
system without attempting at this stage to introduce the 
additional variable of social change. Spartiate society was 
continuously subject to evolution and adaptation , as is 
evidenced , for example, by the progressive decline of Spartiate 
manpower and the changes resulting from extensive involvement 
abroad from the Peloponnesian war onwards (cf. Chapters 4 & 5). 
This, however , i s not to quest ion the underlying elements of 
cont i nuity which enable one to speak with justification of a 
single social system s panni ng the fifth and earl y f our th 
centuries as a whole. 
I. The Spartiat e soc ial order a nd wa y o f life 
The details of the Spartan citize n organi zation in the Classical 
period can be summarized under t hree headings : first , a 
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political system in which power and decision-making were divided 
among the kings, ephors, elders and assembly; secondly, a 
military and economic system according to which full citizenship 
was extended to a body of several thousand men who all became 
full-time hoplites supported by produce delivered by the helots 
who worked their lands (cf. Chs. 2 and 3); thirdly, a social and 
'ritual' system as part of which every citizen (except the two 
kings and their immediate heirs) was compelled, especially during 
his upbringing, to accept a common, public way of life. It is 
the social and 'ritual' system which lies at the centre of my 
analysis in this chapter. In order to provide a clear background 
for the following discussion it is worth outlining the main 
stages of the Spartiates' life-cycle. 1 
From age seven until between his 18th and 19th birthdays a 
young Spartiate had to undergo the full-time state education, the 
ag6ge, as described in Xenophon's Polity of the Lakedaimonians 
(Xen. Lak. Pol. 2) and Plutarch's Life of Lykourgos (Plut. Lyk. 
16. 4-18) . The generic term for a boy between these ages was pais 
(pl. paides). Either straightaway, or possibly from the age of 
12 (cf. Plut. Lyk. 16.6-7), he had to sleep away from home with 
his contemporaries in the barracks, a practice which continued 
until he reached the age of 30. Between his 18th and 19th 
birthdays he completed his initial training in the ag6ge . From 
this point until his 20th birthday he remained under strict 
control and was kept fully occupied with duties (Xen. Lak. Pol. 
3), especially perhaps as a reservist for the army. (The term 
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applied to this age group was probably paidiskoi; see Section Ila 
below.) 
At 20 he became a full member of the army and, probably also 
at this time, of a common mess, or syssition, (cf. Plut. Lyk. 
12.4-7, esp. 5) in which, failing good reason, he was obliged to 
eat his evening meal (Plut. Lyk. 12.2; Antiphanes, apud Athenaios 
143A). The term for a Spartiate between his 20th and 30th 
birthdays was hebon (pl. hebontes; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 4.1-6). 
During this period of his life he could probably attend and vote 
at the assembly. But he remained under the ultimate authority 
of the paidonomos, the adult who had overall responsibility over 
the upbringing of males aged between seven and 30 (Xen. Lak. Pol. 
4.6; cf. 2.2; Plut. Lyk. 17.2). He was allowed to marry; indeed 
there were strong pressures upon him to do so (Xen. Lak. Pol. 
9,5; Plut. Lyk. 15.2-3; Mor. 228A). 2 Only when he was 30 years 
old, however, was he allowed to leave the barracks and live at 
home with his wife and family and take care of the management and 
supply of his own household (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.5-6; Plut . Lyk. 
15. 4-10; 25 .1) . He now became eligible to hold major state 
off ices ( Xen. Lak. Pol. 4. 7). Al though no longer under the 
continuous direct control of any official, he was still required 
to keep fit for military service, for example, through hunting. 
He was obliged to serve in the army until he reached the age of 
60, and to dine in his syssition. At 60 he became eligible, at 
least in theory (Ste. Croix 1972, 353-4), for election to 
lifelong membership of the gerousia, the council which consisted 
of twenty-eight elders or gerontes and the two kings (Plut. Lyk. 
10 
16; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 10.1-3; Aristotle, Politics 1270b35-41; 
Polybius 6.45.5; Plut. Ages. 4.3). Although his military service 
had ceased, he still dined in his syssition (cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 
5.7; Plut. Lyk. 26.8) and he was expected to spend most of his 
day in public with his contemporaries, instructing and correcting 
younger Spartiates (Plut. Lyk. 25.1-3). 
This way of life put into effect at least three socio-
political principles: first, uniformity, an innovation 
highlighted by Thucydides (1.6.4), who commented that it was the 
Spartans who first began to dress simply and that in general the 
rich as far as possible adopted an equal style of life with the 
many; secondly, the priority of collective interests over private 
ones, enshrined in the compulsory nature of the common way of 
life as well as in the particular regulations enforced within it; 
thirdly, an insistence upon conformity to those regulations, 
involving adherence to specified types of action and standards 
of behaviour. 3 The ideology underlying these principles is 
summed up by the term by which the Spartiates were known, the 
homoioi, variously translated as Equals , Peers or similars. 4 
The establishment of this new ideology, probably amidst the 
crises of the seventh centurY, did not, however, entirely 
undermine the significance of other, contradictory values. Part 
of the compromise which underpinned the stability of Spartiate 
society was the retention during the Classical period of several 
influences which served to distinguish one citizen from another. 
Four of these are especially worthy of attention. 
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First, wealth. There are numerous references to the 
existence of Spartiates of superior wealth in the Classical 
period. ownership of landed property was never equal and became 
more unequal over the course of time. 5 
Secondly, birth. The distinction between those Spartiates 
who were descendants of Herakles and the rest was of sufficient 
importance that it was us ed as an argument against Leotychidas' 
claim for the kingship in the succession dispute of c . 400 (Xen. 
Hell. 3. 3. 3; Plut. Ages. 3. 5); and that, according to one 
version, Lysander intended to make only the former eligible for 
his proposed elective kingship (Plut. Lys. 24.3-5). Among the 
Herakleidai the kings were especially distinguished by their 
birth (Thuc. 5.16.2; Xen. Ages. 1.2; Isokrates, .ER• 9.3). 
Sperthias and Boulis, who volunteered to atone for the murder of 
Darius' heralds, were noted as being both of good family and 
among the first in wealth (Herodotus 7.134). The privileged 
birth of certain other Spartiates is detectable in their 
connections, typically hereditary , with leading men from other 
states. 6 
Thirdly ,- personal merit. success in warfare, games, counsel 
and debate was always important among Greek aristocracies in 
establishing a man's ranking. Differences of personal ability 
were not only impossible to eradicate but were also brought into 
sharper relief in Classical Sparta by the emphasis upon 
competition from the earliest years of the ag6ge right up to the 
contest for election to the gerousia. 
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Fourthly , seniority. Sallares 1 recent study (1991, 160-92) 
has highlighted the significance of the criterion of age as a 
principle of social organization in the Greek polis . Nowhere was 
this more evident than at Sparta, as shown by the prominence of 
the gerousia, the complex system of age classes and the deference 
or leadership habitually accorded to the eldest of any group 
(e.g. Xen. Lak. Pol. 12.6; 13.7; Hell. 5.3.20). Sparta was not 
of course a 'pristine', acephalous age class society in which the 
age classes themselves are autonomous, self-regulating entities 
which set their own behavioural norms. Not only was every aspect 
of the Spartan age classes controlled by the sovereign polis, 
they were also tightly defined and all-embracing only in the 
formative years up to age 30, becoming more attenuated in adult 
life. Moreover, the functioning of the age classes was 
influenced by a variety of non-age-related principles such as the 
universal socio-political values and alternative criteria of 
ranking described above. The criterion of seniority was, 
nonetheless, a significant source of distinction, in part 
precisely because of the mixing of age classes which obtained in 
several compartments of Spartiate life, such as the common messes 
and the army. 
II. The conflict of values in Spartiate institutions 
I shall now examine the interplay between the influences which 
emphasized distinctions among the homoioi and the equalizing 
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principles of the Spartiate way of life within three different 
areas of the social system: the upbringing, the common meals and 
the army. In doing so one must take account of the fact that it 
was not merely these two sets of values that were in opposition. 
The different 'distinction-forming' values were themselves 
mutually conflicting, since each, taken on its own, would have 
produced a different order of hierarchy within the citizen body. 
Similarly, the citizen organization of the homoioi was itself not 
free from contradictions, since the social and 'ritual' system 
required a hierarchy to run it. 7 Leaders were also needed for 
the offices of the ephorate and the Council of Elders and for 
various levels of command within the army. How these leaders 
were chosen will be the subject of the final part of this 
chapter. 
(a) The upbringings 
One of the most striking features of the Spartiate upbringing was 
the effort made to assert collective over private interests 
through dissociating the boys, especially those between seven and 
18/19 years of age, from their households and socializing them 
into a peer group. Not only were they kept away from home, but 
even in public the possibility of an exclusive relationship 
between father and son was prevented. According to Xenophon, 
"Lykourgos gave each man equal authority over his own 
children and those of others" (Lak. Pol. 6.1; cf. Plut. Lyk. 
15.8; 17.1). 
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Alternative emotional relationships to the family were also 
provided in the form of institutionalized pederasty. One of the 
duties of the young adults, probably those aged 20-29, was to 
become the lovers ( erastai) an·d surrogate fathers of boys who had 
reached the age of 12. 9 These relationships were intended to be 
both close and enduring. The young adult erastes (eispnelas in 
local terminology) was responsible for the conduct of his boy 
(paidika or eromenos; locally aitas), shared his honour or 
disgrace; and, together with the latter's kinsfolk, supplied the 
material needs of his household (presumably after the latter had 
married) until the paidika reached age 30 and was allowed to go 
to the market himself (Plut. Lyk. 25.1). 10 This bond, 
consequently, cut across the marriage relationship of both 
partners. For the erastes it commenced precisely at the time 
when he became eligible to marry. Until he was 30 the erastes 
was probably able to spend more time with his paidika than with 
his wife. For the paidika, not only did his erastes initially 
supplant his father; but later, when he was married but not yet 
30, it was not he who provided for his wife and children but his 
erastes. 
The other male groupings, the age classes, the shared 
barrack life until age 30 and the common messes, also acted as 
counterweights to the household. In all this the collective 
interest was reinforced by the multiplicity of male groupings, 
each of which, as Finley (1986, 166) has rightly said, was "one 
more way of strengthening the structure as a whole against its 
individual parts" . 
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The principles of uniformity and conformity were also 
evident in the upbringing. Aristotle {Pol. 1294b22-4) cites the 
uniform rearing and education of the boys of the rich and the 
poor as (in the view of some commentators) the first democratic 
feature of the Spartiate system. Even more revealing is the 
detailed attention paid to ensuring conformity among the paides 
(7-18/19 year olds), as Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 2.10-11) records: 
"In order that the boys ( pa ides) might never be 
without a ruler even if the paidonomos was away, he [Lykourgos] laid it down that any citizen who happened 
to be present had authority to instruct the boys to do 
whatever he thought right and to punish any 
misconduct. By this means he made the boys more 
respectful; in fact the boys and men alike respect 
their rulers above everything. In order that, even if 
no adult happened to be present, the boys might never 
be without a ruler, he put the keenest of the eirens 
in charge of each company (ile). Therefore the boys 
there are never without a ruler." 
As this passage suggests, a range of different individuals or 
groups within the state had a role in ensuring that the boys 
conformed. Each eiren led a company of boys on a daily basis, 
controlling the provision of their food and commanding them in 
mock battles. He supervised them at th~ evening meal, making 
them serve him and putting them through tests and questioning 
after the meal (Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.5; Plut. Lyk. 17.2-3; 18.2-3). 
Apart from the eirens, other young adults in the 20-29 age group 
{heb6ntes) had a role in controlling the boys. The paidonomos, 
who organized the upbringing, was given . a group of heb6ntes as 
whip-bearers to provide floggings ( Xen. Lak. Pol. 2. 2). This was 
also the age group from which the boys' erastai came. Apart from 
the formal hierarchy, we have seen that any adult could take 
control when necessary. In particular, the old men were expected 
to be present, egging on the boys into fights, giving out praise 
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or censure and observing each one's merits (Plut. Lyk. 16.5; 
17.l; 25.1-2). 
This multiple supervision ·was also applied to the hebontes 
themselves. Besides being under the control of the paidonomos, 
they were subject to the scrutiny of three other adults, the 
hippagretai. The task of the hippagretai was to select the elite 
squad of 300 hippeis from among the heb6ntes. The hippeis were 
subsequently under their command (Xen. Lak. Pol. 4.3; Hesychius, 
s.v. hippagretas; cf. Xen. Hell. 3.3.8-9). 11 The hippeis could 
also be brought under control by more mature adults (Xen. Lak. 
Pol. 4.6) and no doubt the old men also kept an eye on them. 
Even the young girls exerted pressure toward conformity by 
playfully chiding wayward young men and singing the praise of 
worthy ones in the presence of the other citizens and the kings 
and gerontes during their ritual festival dances (Plut. Lyk. 
14.3). 
The pressure towards conformity was reinforced, at least for 
the paides, by the use of corporal punishment, as has already 
been mentioned (cf. also Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.2; Plut. Lyk. 17.3). 
Furthermore, ·the effect of the multiple supervision of behaviour 
was intensified by the fact that those responsible for 
supervising would be under supervision ' themselves, as Plutarch 
(Lyk. 18.3) informs us: 
"Often the eiren punished the boys in the presence of 
the old men and the magistrates, thus showing whether 
his punishments were reasonable and proper or not. 
While he was punishing them, he suffered no restraint, 
but after the boys were gone, he was brought to 
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account if his punishments were harsher than necessary 
or, on the other hand, too mild and gentle." 
This was "the noblest of all lessons", as King Agesilaos is 
reputed to have told Xenophon (Plut. Ages. 20.2), "the lesson 
most studied at Sparta, how to rule and be ruled" (Plut. Mor. 
215D). 12 Note once again the role of the old men in supervising 
the eiren. With the eirens and hebontes guiding the boys, the 
hippagretai commanding the young men and the paidonomos, the old 
men and the rest of the citizens supervising everyone, it is 
evident that the enforcement of conformity imposed its own 
hierarchy based on the criterion of seniority. 
Conformity was not always imposed from above. Plutarch 
( Lyk. 16. 8) tells us that from the earliest years of the 
upbringing outstanding individuals were chosen from among the 
boys themselves to command their contemporaries in each pack 
(agela). The rest of the boys had to obey the leader's orders 
and submit to his punishments. The spirit of rivalry among 
contemporaries could also enforce conformity, as Xenophon (Lak. 
Pol. 4. 3-6) recounts, when describing the selection of the 
hippeis from among the hebontes: 13 
"The ephors pick three men in their prime who are 
called hippagretai. Each of these selects 100 men, 
stating his reasons for choosing some and rejecting 
others. Those who do not achieve this honour are at 
odds with both those who rejected them and those 
chosen instead of them, and they keep a close watch on 
one another for any lapse from the accepted standards 
of honour each group strives separately to be 
always at its best, and if need arises, they 
individually protect the polis with all their might. 
They are compelled to keep themselves fit, for their 
strife leads to scuffles wherever they meet. But 
anyone present has the right to separate the 
combatants. If someone refuses to obey the mediator , 
the paidonomos takes him to the ephors; they punish 
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him severely, wishing to ensure that his passion never 
becomes stronger than obedience to the laws." 
This passage illustrates some of the tensions inherent in 
the Spartiates' system of values. The required standard of 
behaviour involved not just discipline but personal achievement. 
Achievement was one of the yardsticks by which one's standard of 
behaviour was measured. Conformity involved competition and 
rivalry for the good of the polis; but excessive rivalry was a 
threat to discipline and to the laws. 
The rewarding of personal merit was obviously fundamental 
to the upbringing. It was "the boy who excelled in judgment and 
was most courageous in fighting" who became the leader of his 
contemporaries in the agela ( Plut. Lyk. 16. 5). It was the 
"keenest of the eirens" who were given charge of the ilai of the 
boys (Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.11). Presumably the hippagretai had to 
use the merits of the candidates as their reasons for choosing 
some and rejecting others for the hippeis. A young Spartiate's 
personal merit was assessed and reassessed by means of continual 
tests and competitions such as trials of physical endurance (Xen. 
Lak. Pol. 2.9; Plut. Lyk. 18.1), mock battles (Plut. Lyk. 16.5; 
Pausanias 3 •. 14.8-10) and questioning to discover whether he had 
internalized the Spartiate code of honour (Plut. Lyk. 18.3-6). 
According to Agatharchides ( apud AtheJ?,aios 550C; cf. Aelian, 
Varia Historia 14.7), the ephors used to inspect the young men 
every ten days and observe their clothing and bedding every day. 
It is implicit in Xenophon's remarks upon the hippeis that there 
were possibilities for promotion or demotion depending upon one's 
subsequent performance. Presumably there was a periodic re-
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selection, perhaps annually when the hippeis who had reached age 
30 had to stand down. The continual reassessment must have been 
yet another influence strengthening the pressure towards 
conformity. 
It is clear that the assessment of merit and choice of an 
elite marked a limit to the maintenance of uniformity. It seems 
that the selection of outstanding individuals during the 
upbringing, culminating in the choice of the hippeis, was also 
an important step in the process of choosing the next generation 
of political and military leaders. 14 This appears to be 
demonstrated by the case of Sphodrias, who as harmost ( or 
governor) at Thespiai in Boiotia in 378 made an unauthorized 
attack upon the Peiraieus. He was brought to trial, but 
acquitted through the personal influence of King Agesilaos on 
grounds which Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.32) reports through the words 
of one of Agesilaos' friends, a certain Etymokles: 
"He says that it is impossible that Sphodrias is 
innocent; but, on the other hand, it is hard to put to 
death someone who as a boy, youth and young man (wai~ 
re ~v Kai wa16iaKo~ Kai ~B&v) has consistently 
performed all his duties, for Sparta needs such 
soldiers". 
The three terms pais, paidiskos and heb6n by which Etymokles 
describes the stages of Sphodrias' upbringing are especially 
significant because they are the same terms which Xenophon uses 
for young Spartiates in the three broad stages of their training 
described in Lak. Pol. 2-4.6. Chapter Two of that work deals 
with the paides, the boys in the first stage of the upbringing. 
At the start of Chapter Three (3.1) he writes, 11 &rav ye µ~v iK 
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1rai 6wv Ei i; To µn paKt ofia0cn EKBai vwa1. ". The rest of Chapter 
Three then describes the second stage of the upbringing. Because 
of the phrase Ei<; To µE1.paK1.ofia8a1. in the passage quoted above, 
several scholars have thought that Xenophon's term for youths 
undergoing this second stage was meirakia. 15 Cobet (1868, 147) 
argued that this phrase should be deleted as a latter addition, 
a view supported by Tazelaar (1967, 147) and Cartledge (1987, 
30). MacDowell (1986, 166) has pointed out that this is not 
strictly necessary, since Xenophon's reason for inserting the 
phrase was not to indicate the term for the second stage, but to 
reinforce the point that emergence out of the paides did not 
signify arrival at adulthood. Xenophon's term for youths in the 
second stage appears in fact at 3.5 when he concludes his account 
Of that stage as follows: 11 Kai. ThlV µ~v au 1fat 61 O'KWV OVTW<; 
E1TEµE;..,;011 11 ( "such then was the care he bestowed upon the 
paidiskoi"). Both this sentence and the description of 
Sphodrias' upbringing in the Hellenika have usually been passed 
over in scholarly discussion of the age classes, which often 
dismiss Xenophon's evidence as vague. 16 The occurrence of the 
words paidiskos and paidiskoi in the two passages demonstrates 
clearly, however, that this was Xenophon's consistent term for 
those in the· second stage of the upbringing. In the first 
sentence of Chapter Four (4.1) he continues: 11 7rEpi yE µ~v T&v 
~B@v Twv 1ro)..i> µ&.)..1. a Ta Ea1ro66aaE" ( "he took by far the greatest 
care of the heb6ntes"), and proceeds to describe the third stage 
of the upbringing. In both the Hellenika and the Lak. Pol ., 
therefore, Xenophon uses the same successive terms pa ides, 
paidiskoi and heb6ntes for young Spartiates aged 7-29 . This 
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consistency and the use of these terms in the directly reported 
speech of a prominent Spartiate surely indicate that they are 
drawn from technical Spartiate terminology. 17 
In this light Etymokles' words about Sphodrias take on an 
added significance. Sphodrias appears to be a clear example of 
a man whose display of merit in the upbringing marked him out as 
someone fit for the important governorship of Thespiai. His 
merit was certainly important enough for it to be used as a 
reason for his acquittal. At this point, however, one must ask 
precisely how Sphodrias gained his governorship. The answer is 
by the direct appointment of King Kleombrotos I (Xen. Hell. 
5. 4 .15). One must also note that the friends of Kleombrotos, men 
who were members of the court which tried Sphodrias' case and 
were therefore either gerontes or ephors, are said to have been 
the hetairoi of Sphodrias (ibid. 25). 18 Seven years later, in 
371, Sphodrias appears as a tent-companion of Kleombrotos at the 
battle of Leuktra (ibid. 6.4.14). These revelations of 
Sphodrias' close connections with the king and other leading 
Spartiates should not necessarily lead us to doubt that his 
success in the upbringing was important in helping him to rise 
to his high command. It is possible that the king only developed 
his connections with Sphodrias because he had already proved his 
merit throughout his youth. But the king's role in the 
appointment suggests that merit on its own may not always have 
been sufficient and makes us look towards factors outside the 
upbringing which contributed to the formation of the political 
and military leadership. 
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The evidence suggests that most young Spartiates, however 
successful they may have been, would have had to wait some years 
after the end of the upbringing before they gained a major post 
of command. 19 Sphodrias himself must have been 40 or over when 
he received his governorship in winter 379/8, since at the time 
of his trial his son, Kleonymos, had just come out of the paides 
(Xen. Hell. 5.4.25) and was therefore probably between his 18th 
and 19th birthdays. 20 There was consequently a gap of several 
years during which, on the principle of continual reassessment, 
young Spartiates would have to continue to demonstrate their 
worthiness for high positions. From the age of 20 young 
Spartiates became members both of a syssition and of the army. 
Since their behaviour in both institutions is likely to have 
affected their prospects, it is these which I shall next examine. 
(b) The common meals (syssitia) 21 
The organisation of the common meals was linked to that of the 
army, since it seems certain that the men who dined together in 
a syssition also generally fought together in the smallest unit 
of the army, the enomotia. 22 Hence one's interpretation of some 
details of its evolution in the Classical period will depend upon 
one's views of certain putative developments of the fifth-century 
Lakedaimonian army, in particular the question of the existence 
of the 'obal army' to be discussed in Section (c). If there was 
indeed such an 'obal army', organised according to the five obes 
(or villages) of the Spartiates , then it follows that each 
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syssition will have contained men from the same village, although 
it is unclear how members of the same household were distributed. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that by the year 390, and probably 
from the mid-fifth century onwards, the army was not organized 
according to the villages (Xen. Hell. 4.5.10-11). Fathers, sons 
and brothers were enrolled in different regiments (morai) and 
hence, by definition, in different syssitia. 
As this separation of members of the same household and 
village suggests, the syssition was from one angle the embodiment 
of collective interests, uniformity and conformity. If it is 
true in general, as Murray ( 1990, 7) claims, that the Greek 
symposion "became in many respects a place apart from the normal 
rules of society, with.. . its own willingness to establish 
conventions fundamentally opposed to those within the polis as 
a whole", then the Spartan syssi tion is the exception that proves 
the rule. As Bowie (1990, 225, n.16) has pointed out, "Sparta 
will have had symposia comparable to those in other Greek states 
for some generations after Tyrtaeus ... and these will have been 
refashioned [my emphasis] into messes of homoioi in the 6th 
cent." [sic] . 23 Whereas the symposion in other states was a 
voluntary ass·ociation, daily attendance at the syssi tion was 
compulsory, the only permissible reasons for absence being the 
performance of sacrifices to the gods or delay at the hunt (Plut. 
Lyk. 12.2-3). Whereas symposia were held in private houses, the 
syssitia were located along the public space of the Hyakinthian 
Way (Xen. Lak. Pol. 5.2 & 7; Demetrios of Skepsis, apud Athenaios 
173F; cf. Polemon, apud Athen. 39C). Moreover, whereas members 
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of the symposion were normally from the same age group, each 
syssition comprised Spartiates of widely differing ages (Xen. 
Lak. Pol . 5.5), thus cutting across ties established in the age 
classes. The mixing of ages instilled conformity, as Xenophon 
indicated when he explained that its purpose was "that the 
younger might learn from the experience of those older". 
Excessive drinking and the kind of hybristic behaviour 
stimulated by symposia in other Greek states were also strictly 
controlled (Fisher 1989). The food in the syssitia was the same 
for all, whether rich or poor (Arist. Pol. 1294b25-7). 
Conversely, each member, regardless of wealth, was required to 
make an equal contribution of food (Xen. Lak. Pol. 7.3; Plut. 
Lyk. 12.2; Dikaiarchos, apud Athenaios 141C). Initially each 
Spartiate household must have been given sufficient land to 
provide this contribution. By the late fifth and early fourth 
centuries, however, this strict uniformity was having harmful 
effects which undermined collective interests. Some Spartiates' 
holdings had become so reduced that they found it impossible to 
sustain the contribution. Failure to do so meant that a man lost 
his citizen rights; many poor Spartiates thereby dropped out of 
the ranks of the homoioi and the number of Spartiates declined 
dramatically (Arist. Pol. 1270al5-b6; 1271a26-37; 1272a12-16; cf. 
1330a6-8). 24 
Even if one focuses solely upon those · Spartiates who 
maintained their status, it can be seen that the procedures of 
the syssitia introduced distinctions among the homoioi . Young 
- -·--- --- - ---
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Spartiates of the requisite age were not distributed among the 
syssi tia by lot. Each had to apply for membership of a 
particular mess. The existing members voted on his entry. If 
a single vote was cast against him, he was rejected (Plut. Lyk. 
12.5-6). This procedure obviously opened up possibilities for 
ensuring that the best young men were admitted to the more 
exclusive syssitia. 25 The decision concerning which young men 
should enter which syssi tia may often in practice have been 
determined before the formal vote. We know that youths under the 
age of 20, particularly the paidiskoi, sometimes attended the 
syssitia (Xen. Lak. Pol. 3.5; Plut. Lyk. 12.4). During this 
period their suitability could be assessed. It is a pity that 
we are not better informed how it was decided which youths should 
attend which mess. One possibility is that a youth was normally 
introduced into the syssi tion of his erastes , as in fourth-
century Crete. 26 This may be the implication of Xenophon' s 
information that Kleonymos went to the mess to speak to his 
erastes, Archidamos, who was heir-apparent. 27 If this were the 
case, it will have been possible to manipulate the future 
composition of the syssi tion through the judicious choice of 
paidika. Some historians have already argued that the choice of 
paidika may often have been politically motivated. 28 
These considerations indicate that the syssition was 
probably a nucleus for political activity and the formation of 
attitudes, as Lewis (1977, 34f.) has suggested. 29 Persaios 
(apud Athen. 140F) called it "a little polity". According to 
Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 5.6), "the custom was for any citizen's 
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honourable deeds to be recounted in the messes". Plutarch 
mentions "political discussions" (Lyk. 12. 4). Already in the 
boys' messes the eirens were accustomed to test the boys with 
questions such as "Who is the best among the adults?" 
do you think of this man's conduct?" (ibid. 18.2). 
Fisher (1989, 398 n.73) is right to point out 
or "What 
Although 
that the 
opportunity to engage in such discussions may have palliated 
ordinary Spartiates' sense of exclusion from the inner counsels 
of Sparta's leadership and helped maintain a consensus, it is 
equally not difficult to envisage how such politically-oriented 
conversations might aid the formation of political groupings. 
It is important, therefore, to examine the character of 
social relationships within the syssition. There is one 
particular difficulty here: much of our evidence comes from 
post-Classical writers, many of whom are quoted briefly in an 
informative section of Athenaios' Deipnosophistai (139B-141E). 
This evidence must be used with caution, since there is reason 
to believe ( cf. Phylarchos, apud A then. 141F-142B) that the 
character of the syssitia altered somewhat as part of the general 
transformation of Spartiate society during the third century, 
taking on a new role "more as forums for luxurious display by the 
sympotic rich than as arenas of political .... solidarity for the 
citizenry as a whole" (Cartledge & Spawforth 1989, 42). To take 
one example, the contemporary evidence of Xenophon that younger 
members were supposed to be guided by their elders is a reliable 
indication that in the Classical period seniority in the 
syssi tion was as important as in the upbringing. But how, on the 
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other hand, are we to assess the account of Persaios (c.306-c.243 
B. C. ) , which suggests that the syssi tion contained its own 
hierarchy when he refers to certain persons being appointed to 
lie down in first or second place or to sit upon the couch 
(skimpodion)? 30 The differentiation between those reclining and 
sitting may relate to the longstanding contrast throughout the 
Greek world between the banqueting postures of men and boys (cf. 
Bremmer 1990, 139); but of how great antiquity is the indication 
of institutionalized differentiation of placing among the adults? 
A problem of evidence also arises concerning the question 
of extra donations to the syssi tion. The fact of equal 
compulsory contributions did not eliminate the opportunities for 
rich or talented men to gain prestige by means of extra donations 
served as part of an additional course to the meal. The 
existence of this practice is attested in the Classical period 
by Xenophon, who, writing in the early fourth century, notes that 
"many unexpected additions come from hunting and the rich in turn 
contribute wheat bread (arton)" (Lak. Pol. 5.3). 31 Dikaiarchos, 
writing towards the end of the fourth century (floruit c. 326-296 
B.C.) also indicates (apud Athen. 141B) that the messmates "may 
even get something especially added, a fish or a hare or a ring-
dove or something similar". 
In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1983, 
254) I assimilated this fourth-century evidence to several 
passages from later sources. Sphairos, the adviser of King 
Kleomenes III in the 220s , notes (apud Athen. 141 C-D) that, 
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"The messmates also contribute epaikla to them. 
Sometimes the common people (polloi) bring whatever is 
caught in the chase; but the rich contribute wheat 
bread and anything from the fields which the season 
permits". 
Polemon (apud Athen. 139B-C), writing around the beginning of the 
second century B.C., informs us about the way in which these 
extra donations were advertised, 
"In Lakedaimon the so-called 
dinner, ... being wheat breads 
a piece of meat for each. 
accompanies the distributer of 
aiklon, adding the name of the 
aiklon comes after the 
(artous) in baskets and 
The attendant who 
the meat announces the 
donor". 32 
Another Hellenistic writer, Molpis, states (apud Athen. 141 D-E) 
that, 
"they contribute (the epaiklon) ... to give evidence 
of their own pro~ess in the hunt. Many of them, too, 
who keep flocks, give a liberal share of the 
offspring. So the dish may consist of ring-doves, 
geese, turtle-doves, thrushes, blackbirds, hares, 
lambs and kids. The cooks announce to the company the 
names of thosel bring , in anything for the occasion, in 
order that all may realize the labour spent upon the 
chase and the zeal manifested for themselves". 
Finally, according to Athenaios (140D-E), drawing upon an 
unidentified, but probably late, source, whereas the epaikla 
provided for the boys consisted simply of alphita (barley meal) 
mixed with oil, that for the men's messes 
"is prepared from certain definite animals which are 
given as a present to messmates by one, sometimes even 
several ; rich members". 
Although there is much in common between the Classical and 
later evidence, there is an interesting difference concerning 
additional donations of meat for the epaiklon. In the Classical 
evidence the origin of meat donations for the epaiklon, wherever 
stated, is from hunting, fishing or trapping. 33 In contrast two 
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of the later sources depict rich men contributing meat from 
animals reared on their private estates. In the Classical period 
the prestige gained from making extra donations accrued primarily 
to men of talent at hunting, rich or poor. (Poorer citizens were 
permitted to borrow hunting-dogs belonging to rich men: Xen. Lak. 
Pol. 6.3.) Wealthy men obviously attempted to corner a share of 
this prestige by donating special wheaten bread to eat with the 
meat. Only they had sufficient land to devote some fields to 
wheat cul ti vat ion after having ensured the production of the 
basic items, especially the barley meal, required by the mess. 
There is no evidence, however, of the provision of meat dishes 
directly from private farms and there may even have been a 
prohibition against such a practice. 
clearly no such restriction and 
In later periods there was 
wealthy landowners could 
translate their animal resources into prestige in a more direct 
fashion, in keeping with the more open and explicit general use 
of animals for reinforcing social di visions which developed 
during the Hellenistic period (Hodkinson, 1990 [1992]). 
Another feature mentioned only by the later sources is the 
explicit announcement of the donor's name. In this case, 
however, the ·silence of the Classical sources, Xenophon and 
Dikaiarchos, is less significant, since neither is concerned with 
the procedures surrounding the additional . donations, merely with 
the variation in diet. In any case, whether ceremonially 
announced in the Classical period or not, the identity of the 
donor will hardly have been lost upon his messmates. 
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Before leaving this subject it remains to consider one 
distinctive and problematic piece of evidence which has already 
been mentioned. The distinct impression created by the sources 
considered above . is that contributions to the epaikla were 
voluntary additions to the meal. Persaios (apud Athen. 140F), 
however, followed by Dioskourides (possibly of Tarsus, floruit 
probably c. 100 B.C.: Jacoby 1955, 629-30), claims that the rich 
were assessed for a sum sufficient to pay for epaikla of barley 
meal (alphita) mixed with oil, while the poor were required to 
contribute a reed or rush or laurel leaves. The whole minute 
proceeding, he continues, had become a matter of governmental 
administration. The compulsory nature of the system described 
by Persaios conflicts with that depicted in the other evidence, 
both Classical and later. The date of Persaios' death c.243 
might just allow the system described to be one which may have 
come temporarily into force during the reforms of King Agis IV 
in the mid-240s (cf. Plut. Agis 8.2 for his proposed 
rearrangement of the syssition). If not, the tightly-controlled 
arrangements sound more like measures deriving from the Classical 
period than new introductions during the period when standards 
were relaxed following Sparta's mid-fourth century decline in 
internationa1 · status. One might attempt a reconciliation with 
the other evidence through the suggestion that Persaios' epaikla 
of alphita mixed with oil (not meat and wheaten bread, as in the 
other sources) could be a variant of the serving of barley cakes 
(maza) which Dikaiarchos mentions between the main course 
(deipnon) and the additional course of game. 
31 
Whatever may be the correct solution to this puzzle, the 
evidence of Persaios should not be taken to negate the evidence 
for voluntary donations of hunted game and farm produce discussed 
above. Such displays of talent or wealth must have exalted 
certain members of a syssi tion above others . They must also have 
stimulated competition among members for a high place in the 
syssi tion hierarchy, not to mention competition between different 
syssitia over the quality and quantity of their extra donations. 
Since talent at hunting did not necessarily coincide with 
possession of wealth, their respective claims will have 
conflicted with each other, and both with claims to precedence 
based upon seniority. Fisher ( 1989, esp. 38-9) has recently 
questioned whether such conflicts should be viewed as indications 
of grave tensions , suggesting that the effect might equally have 
been a "fruitful and beneficial competition for honour" (ibid. 
39) which would not seriously have upset the cohesion of the 
community. His interpretation is not incompatible with the 
approach developed here - indeed it recalls Xenophon's remarks 
concerning strife following the selection of the hippeis quoted 
earlier ( Lak. Pol. 4. 3-6) - but it should be noted that the 
r esult of such competition was the continual formation (and re-
formation) of -hierarchies among the citizen body. 
(c) The army 
There has been a great deal of controversy concerning the 
organization of the army in the Classical period , with some 
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scholars arguing for continuity while others have postulated up 
to three reorganizations, one at an unknown date in the mid-fifth 
century, another between the battle of Mantineia in 418 and the 
early fourth century and a final one after the battle of 
Leuktra. 34 Fortunately, for our purposes, orily the first of 
these putative changes would have had a significant effect upon 
the overall structure of command and the composition of the 
smallest fighting unit, the enomotia, which are the features most 
relevant to an assessment of the army's influence upon Spartiate 
social relations. Several scholars believe that the army of the 
early fifth century, as described by Herodotus at the battle of 
Plataia in 479, was an 'obal army' organised according to the 
five obes (or villages) which each furnished one regiment. 35 
Others (e.g. Kelly 1981, Lazenby 1985, 41ff.) dismiss its very 
existence. Since this is not the place to review the complex 
arguments on both sides, the following discussion will, for the 
sake of argument, assume the existence of the obal army and 
discuss the nature of its social relations; these will be seen 
in practice not to differ greatly in most respects from those 
operative during the remainder of the Classical period. 
In general, the structure of the army cut across some of the 
pre-existing groupings of Spartiate society. The most important 
exception to this principle was that in the obal army members of 
the same village fought in the same regiment. How they were 
organized into smaller units within the regiment, in particular 
whether members of each family were grouped together or separated 
at the level of the enomotia, is not known. It seems, however, 
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that the composition of each enom6tia cut across the age classes, 
containing (theoretically, at least) one man out of every age 
class from ages 20 to 59 (cf. Toynbee 1969, 263ff.). In practice 
probably only those aged 20-44 were normally called up. 
In the later army the age-structure of the enomotiai was the 
same, except that the normal levy included those aged 20-54. The 
main difference in the organization of the later army was that 
the members of each regiment no longer came from a single 
village. In 390 the men from Amyklai, one of the villages, were 
spread across the different morai (Xen. Hell. 4.5.11). 
Furthermore, the army also separated family members into the 
different regiments. The troops of the mora which suffered the 
disaster at Lechaion in the same year had sons, fathers and 
brothers in the rest of the army (ibid. 10). 
Both before and after its reorganization the Lakedaimonian 
army shared some characteristics common to hoplite armies 
throughout the Greek world. In other respects it was far from 
typical, principally because the Spartiates' full-time hoplite 
status engendered a professionalism lacking in other states in 
their approach to almost all aspects of warfare (Xen. Lak. Pol. 
13. 5; Cartledge 1977). Many of the values and influences 
pertaining to the nature of hoplite warfare in general were in 
the Lakedaimonian army particularly intensified. This is evident 
immediately in regard to what might be called the 'egalitarian' 
tendencies of hopli te warfare. Among the Spartiates, though not 
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among the perioikoi who also fought in the army, 36 preparation 
for hoplite warfare was, as we have seen, achieved through a 
uniform training from age 7 onwards possessed by no other Greek 
polis. Since their armour and weapons were probably supplied by 
the state, they were more uniform than those of other armies. 
All hoplites, regardless of rank, were also required to wear the 
standard short red cloak and hair grown long specially for the 
occasion. 37 Collective discipline was paramount. In contrast 
to their opponents the Lakedaimonians advanced into battle to the 
accompaniment of flutes in a slow, steady rhythm which enabled 
them to keep in step and avoid breaking rank (Thuc. 5.70; cf. 
Cartledge 1977, 16 &. n. 43). The penalties for abandoning one's 
shield in battle, and particularly for deserting one's rank and 
fleeing, were more severe than elsewhere (Cartledge 1977, 13 & 
n. 20; 16 n. 47). 
Once again, however, things were not quite as equal as they 
might seem. In the first place, the army had its own elite, the 
300 hippeis, who fought as a group around the king. 38 Secondly , 
although information is lacking for the obal army, the later 
Lakedaimonian army, as described by Thucydides (5.66.3-4) before 
the battle of Mantineia in 418, had a remarkably stratified 
hierarchy for a hoplite force (cf. Garlan 1975, 160): 
"When a king is leading the army, everything is 
governed by him, and he personally issues the 
necessary orders to the polemarchoi, they to the 
lochagoi, they to the pentekonteres, they again to the 
enomotarchoi and they to their enomotia ... for almost 
the whole army of the Lakedaimonians, except for a 
small part, consists of officers commanding 
subordinate officers and the executive responsibility 
is shared by many" . 
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The same structure of command, though with discrepancies of 
detail, is described in the early fourth century by Xenophon 
( Lak . Po 1 • 11. 4 ) . In the passage from Thucydides we see in 
operation the principles of multiple supervision and 'rule and 
be ruled' which were evident in the upbringing. It is 
interesting that, although Thucydides' remarks start by 
emphasizing the complete authority of the king, his final comment 
stresses the division of responsibility throughout the army which 
the stratified hierarchy produced. He also notes that each 
lochagos had some discretion concerning the depth of the phalanx 
in his part of the line (Thuc. 5.68.3). 
The enomotia, at the bottom of the chain of command 
described by Thucydides, had its own internal hierarchy. This 
arose out of the sophisticated Lakedaimonian drilling 
organization possessed by no other contemporary army: 
"At the word of command, they are drawn up from these 
regiments, with the enomotiai sometimes in ... file, 39 
sometimes in threes, sometimes in sixes. The common 
opinion that the Lakonian hoplite · drill is most 
complicated is the very reverse of the truth; for in the Lakonian drill the front-rank men are officers (archontes) (and each file is a self-contained 
unit). 40 The formation is so easy to learn that 
nobody who can recognise men could make a mistake; for it is given to some to lead and the others are ordered 
to follow" (Xen. Lak. Pol. 11.4-5). 
This passage indicates that within e~ch enomotia there were 
six men who each led a file when the enomotia was lined up six 
abreast. These six men were obviously themselves hierarchically 
ordered so that it would be known who would lead the files when 
the enomotia was lined up fewer than six abreast. These six were 
the archontes, the others in the enomotia were ordered to follow . 
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Who were these archontes? Obviously the enomotarchoi and higher 
officers fighting at the head of their units would take 
precedence. 41 Otherwise, the archontes were the best soldiers , 
hoi kratistoi, mentioned in· Lak. Pol. 11. 8, whom the 
Lakedaimonians considered so important that they devised a 
special counter-marching drill in order that these men should 
still be in the front rank even if the enemy appeared at the rear 
when they were marching in column (ibid. 8-9). This distinction 
between officers and followers according to fighting ability 
applied in every enomotia in the army and therefore throughout 
the entire body of citizens in the ranks. The precise 
information provided by Xenophon relates to the late Classical 
army, but probably the obal army also possessed a similar 
drilling organization and a similar hierarchy. 42 
This basic hierarchy was not limited to times when the army 
was assembled because it seems certain that the men who fought 
together in the enomotiai also dined together in the syssitia. 
The distinction according to fighting ability will consequently 
have been one more conflicting influence, along with those of 
seniority, wealth and talent at hunting, in the competition for 
precedence in· the syssi tion. 43 It is true that, since in the 
obal army men over 44 , and in the later army men over 54, rarely 
fought in the ranks, they will have remained largely outside the 
division into leader and followers. Nevertheless, memories of 
their past ranking within the enomotia may have influenced the 
extent of their prestige as senior members of the syssition. 44 
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A final issue relating to hierarchies embedded in the army 
structure concerns the position in which each enom6tia, and 
therefore each syssition, was placed within the phalanx. Lack 
of evidence prevents a complete discussion, but it would seem 
likely that positions on the right wing and near to the king 
would be more prestigious than those elsewhere. But how was it 
decided which regiments should have the more prestigious 
positions and which enom6tiai should be assigned to which 
regiments? Could those enom6tiai which contained the more 
exclusive syssitia somehow obtain the more prestigious positions? 
Elitism within the phalanx did not necessarily arise only 
out of the army structure. Despite the levelling influences 
discussed above, it was still possible within the ranks of any 
Greek hoplite phalanx to achieve individual glory (cf. Lonis 
1979, esp. 25ff.) and the Lakedaimonian phalanx was no 
exception. 45 Citizens who died in battle for the collective 
good were given the privilege denied to other Spartiates of 
having their names inscribed on their tombstones . 46 Spartan 
songs were mainly praises of men who had died for the polis 
(Plut. Lyk. 21.1). Some who had shown exceptional bravery were 
given even greater honours, occasionally extending even to 
heroization. 47 Hymns or paeans were sung at the festival of the 
Gymnopaidiai in honour of the 300 men who died in the 'Battle of 
the Champions' at Thyrea c.545 (Bolte 1929, 130 n.6; Wade-Gery 
1949, 80 n. 4). Prizes of valour ( aristeia) were awarded to 
outstanding Spartiates who died fighting against the Persians in 
480/79 (Pritchett 1974, 285, Table 12). Alpheios and Maron, who 
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were foremost among the 300 who died at Thermopylai, had a 
sanctuary at Sparta ( Paus. 3 .12. 9). Their commander, King 
Leonidas, also had a monument, and a stone tablet there bore t he 
names of all the 300 (ibid. 14~1). The deaths of the 300 were 
commemorated annually, probably from a date soon after the event 
(Ball 1976). Brasidas, who died at Amphipolis in 422, also had 
a monument at Sparta (Paus. 3.14.1). Heroization was the honour 
Tyrtaios had recommended for dead warriors in the seventh century 
(fr . 9.31-2 Prato; Fuqua 1981). It is not without significance 
that in the Classical period his poems were sung in the king's 
tent during campaigns and probably also in the syssitia 
(Lykourgos, Against Leokrates 107 & Philochoros FGrH 328F216, 
apud Athen. 640F, as interpreted by Bowie 1990). 
Dead warriors also brought prestige to their relatives and 
erastai. The prestige gained by the lineage of a dead warrior 
is emphasized already by Tyrtaios (fr. 9. 29-30 Prato) . After the 
defeat at Lechaion the relatives of the dead went about "like 
prizewinners" (v t K~~6pot : Xen . Hell . 4 . 5 . 10) . That compari son 
is revealing about Spartiate mentality , evoking as it does the 
atmosphere of a contest. The relatives of the dead at Leuktra 
in 371 r e acted in a simi l arly joyf u l manne r ( ibid . 6 .4.16; Pl ut. 
Ages. 29.4-5) . The noble death of Kleonymos in the same batt le 
brought honour t o his erastes , Archidamos (Xen. Hell. 5 .4. 33 ). 
The r e were a lso rewa r ds f o r t he warr ior who perfo r med 
outstanding deeds and surv i ved. Hi s deeds were not only t alked 
about in the syssitia , but might also be officially commended. 
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Brasidas, who saved the town of Methane in s.w. Messenia from the 
Athenians in 431 when in command of a small detachment of troops, 
became the first person during the Peloponnesian war to be 
commended by the state (Thuc. 2.25.2). Thucydides' words imply 
that other Spartiates later received this honour. 48 Isadas 
received a wreath for his personal exploits in defence of Sparta 
in 362 (Plut. Ages. 34.6-8; Aelian, VH 6.3; cf. Polyainos 2.9). 
In the same year Antikrates, the man who killed Epaminondas in 
the battle of Mantineia, was voted honours, gifts and exemption 
from taxes for his descendants (Plut. Ages. 35.1-2). The 
rewarding of personal merit in the upbringing was thus continued 
into the lives of adults in the army. 49 
(d) Promotion to high office 
Military distinction could lead to promotion to higher posts. 
The most outstanding case would appear to be the career of 
Brasidas. Shortly after his exploit at Methane and official 
commendation he was elected eponymous ephor for the year 431/0, 
presumably on the strength of his prestige. 50 In 429 he was 
sent as the second of three advisers to the undistinguished 
nauarchos (or admiral), Knemos (Thuc. 2.85.1). In 427 he was 
sent as sole adviser to the even more incompetent nauarchos, 
Alkidas (ibid. 3.69.1). In 425 he was in command of a trireme 
in the fleet making an assault on the Athenians at Pylos, again 
distinguishing himself in the action (ibid. 4.11.4-12.1; Diod . 
12.62). Then in 424 he was given the major command in Thrace 
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which lasted until his death in 422 (Thuc. 4.70 - 5.11 passim). 
At the time of his appointment to this command Thucydides records 
that he was "a man who in Sparta had a reputation for being 
energetic in everything" (ibid. 4.81.1). 
The case of Brasidas, like that of Sphodrias, would seem to 
be an excellent illustration of the significance attached to 
personal merit in the choice of Spartiate leaders. 51 His 
advancement was, however, rather cautious and gradual, and after 
431 it took place, as far as we are informed, outside the normal 
ranks of the army. He was chosen for the Thracian campaign more 
because it was his own wish and because the Chalkidians wanted 
him than through the positive choice of the Spartiates. An 
examination of the careers of other Spartiate leaders in the 
Peloponnesian war suggests that Brasidas' advancement may not 
have been typical. 
The clearest example is that of the nauarchos Alkidas. It 
hardly seems likely that Alkidas was appointed for displaying the 
same sort of merit as Brasidas since his performance as nauarchos 
(Thuc. 3.26-33, 69-81) was so lacking in distinction. His fleet 
was despatched in 
fleet dawdled on 
Mytilene's revolt 
spring 427 to bring help to Mytilene. The 
the journey and failed to arrive before 
had been ended. Rejecting alternative 
stratagems for harming Athenian interests in eastern Greece, 
Alkidas retreated hastily to the Peloponnese in fear of pursuit. 
It was then that Brasidas was sent to direct him to Kerkyra. In 
the ensuing operations Alkidas this time had to commit his fleet 
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to battle. It was partly victorious but, overruling Brasidas' 
advice, Alkidas failed to follow this up by attacking the town 
of Kerkyra and the episode concluded with another hasty and 
ignominious retreat as a large Athenian fleet approached. This 
was not the only time in Spartan history when a man of ability 
was thwarted by someone with a superior constitutional 
position. 52 
Alkidas' career has an interesting sequel. His poor 
performance must have been noted in Sparta for Brasidas to have 
been sent out as adviser, and upon his return Brasidas is likely 
to have made an unfavourable report. Nevertheless, in the 
following year Alkidas was chosen as one of the founders of the 
colony of Herakleia Trachinia (Thuc. 3.92.5). A few years later 
there is another example of the reappointment of a failed 
commander. In summer 419 Agesippidas, a harmost at Herakleia, 
was expelled by the Boiotians for misgovernment (ibid. 
5.52.1). 53 Within a few months he was given command in winter 
419/8 of the garrison installed at Epidauros (ibid. 56.1). 
It seems that merit was only one of the factors which could 
influence a inan's career. Considering the paucity of our 
information about individual Spartiate magistrates, commanders 
and ambassadors, it is remarkable how many examples there are of 
members of the same lineage holding high positions in different , 
often successive, generations. 54 For example, several men who 
were prominent immediately before or during the Archidamian war 
had sons who gained important posts during the Ionian war or soon 
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afterwards. Sthenelaidas (PB 664), ephor in 435, was the father 
of Alkamenes ( PB 57) , who was selected by King Agis for a 
governorship in 413/2. Sthenelaos (PB 665), whom Lysander 
appointed harmost of Byzantiori and Chalkedon in 405, may have 
been another son of Sthenelaidas (or grandson, according to Rahe 
1977, 168 n.125). Ramphias (PB 654), who was diplomat in winter 
432/1 and commander in 422, was the father of Klearchos (PB 425), 
who exercised important commands in the Ionian war from 412 
onwards. This family had foreign connections, since Klearchos 
was proxenos of the Byzantines. The fact that he was twice 
appointed harmost of Byzantion was surely influenced by his 
proxeny. One of Ramphias' colleagues as diplomat in winter 432/1 
was Agesandros (PB 6) whose son, Agesandridas (PB 5), was also 
commander during the Ionian war. If, as Poralla suggests, this 
Agesandros is the same man as the Hegesandros mentioned elsewhere 
by Thucydides ( 4. 13 2. 3) , he had another son who had already 
achieved high command, Pasitelidas (PB 592), who in 423 had 
become harmost of Torone while still a h&b6n. 
Another example, though more complex, is that involving 
Pedaritos (PB 599), the harmost of Chios in 412, and Antalkidas 
(PB 97), who was four times envoy to Persia, nauarchos and ephor 
in the early fourth century. (For the following details, Lewis 
1977, 35 n.65; Whitehead 1979, 92f.; Gomme et al. 1945-81, V.69; 
Cartledge 1987, 145f.) Both men had a father named Leon. Leon 
is also the name (PB 482) of an Olympic victor of 440 or 424, a 
founder of Herakleia in 426, an envoy to Athens in 420, an ephor 
of 419/ 8 and the successor to Pedaritos at Chios. It is probably 
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excessive to believe that these were all the same man; but 
Antalkidas is likely to have been the son of the Olympic victor, 
since the latter's father was named Antikleidas (PB 98). The 
founder of Herakleia was probably also the same man because 
Antalkidas' name was probably designed as a variant on 
Antikleidas in order to honour Leon's co-founder, Alkidas 
(Whitehead 1979, 193). Pedaritos may well have been the brother 
of Antalkidas. The fact that Pedaritos achieved high command is 
interesting because, according to Plutarch (Lyk. 25.4; Mor. 191F; 
231B), he had earlier failed to gain selection to the 300 
hippeis. Indeed, the name of his mother, Teleutia (PB 688), 
suggests a connection by marriage with Teleutias (PB 689), the 
prominent commander of the late 390s and 380s, who was himself 
linked to the Eurypontid royal house through his mother's second 
marriage to King Archidamos II which made him the half-brother 
of King Agesilaos II. 
146.) 
(For a possible stemma, Cartledge 1987, 
Several other instances could be cited from different 
periods, particularly in connection with Spartan diplomacy. For 
example, Perikleidas (PB 608), the envoy to Athens in 464, was 
the father of -Athenaios (PB 32), who had an important role in the 
armistice of 423 and later conducted negotiations during the 
Ionian war. Kleandridas (PB 420), the adviser to the young King 
Pleistoanax in 446, was the father of Gylippos (PB 196), who was 
sent to Syracuse in winter 415/4 and was later an officer under 
Lysander. Naukleidas (PB 548), son of Polybiades, one of the 
ephors who accompanied King Pausanias ' Athenian expedition i n 
44 
403, was probably the father of the Polybiades (PB 625) who was 
commander against Olynthos in 380/79. Timokrates (PB 699), who 
was the leading adviser sent to Knemos in 429, may well be an 
ancestor of the Timokrates (PB 700) who was envoy to Athens in 
369. Euthykles (PB 301), envoy to Persia in 367, was probably 
the father of the Euthykles {PB 302) who was also envoy in 333; 
(cf. Mosley 1972). Mosley (1973, 51ff.) also notes that in their 
selection of envoys the Spartiates usually picked men from 
distinguished families, especially those whose ancestors had 
previously conducted diplomatic relations with the state in 
question. 
In the light of this evidence it is worth noting that even 
Brasidas' advancement may have depended partly upon hereditary 
factors. It may be unwise to draw a conclusion about his 
family's social status solely from the appearance of his father, 
Tellis, on the board of ten Spartiates who negotiated the peace 
of Niki as and subsequent alliance with Athens in 421 ( Thuc. 
5 .19.2 , 24.1; Andrewes & Lewis 1957). One's suspicions are, 
however, aroused by the fact that Brasidas had xenoi in Pharsalos 
in Thessaly in 424 (ibid. 4.78 . 1, 4). 
Although most of the examples above concern non-royal 
military commands, which developed in number only from the 420s 
onwards and stimulated (as I shall argue in Ch. 5) additional 
oligarchic tendencies within Spartiate society, the principles 
by which these commanders were selected were traditional. As 
Finley has pointed out , the primary principles used for selecting 
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leaders both in the upbringing and later on in life were those 
of appointment and co-optation, never selection by lot and, apart 
from the ephorate and gerousia, not even (as at Athens) election 
in open competition (Finley 1986, 166). Within the traditional 
army hierarchy, for example, leading officers such as the kings 
and polemarchoi could no doubt influence the appointment of lower 
ranking officers. The primacy of appointment and co-optation 
obviously provided opportunities for the dispensation of 
patronage. 
Patronage probably exercised a profound influence upon 
Spartiate society (cf. recently, Cartledge 1987, 139ff.). As 
usual, most of the evidence comes from Xenophon and therefore 
concerns King Agesilaos, who built up his following by means of 
calculated generosity (Xen. Ages. 4-5.1; 11.8; Plut. Ages. 4.3; 
Mor. 482D). He took pleasure in being accessible to all and in 
granting the requests of all his suitors, both friends and 
enemies (Xen. Ages. 8.1; 9.1-2; cf. 1.17-18; Plut. Ages. 5.1-2; 
20.4). Xenophon depicts a seemingly typical day in the life of 
the king when he went down to the River Eurotas and made himself 
available to speak first with any Spartiate, then with any 
foreigner arid finally with any servant (Hell. 5.4.28). 
Agesilaos, however, was not the only person who dispensed such 
patronage, as is evident from what Archidamos had earlier told 
Sphodrias: "If I want to get something done in the polis, I go 
with my request to anyone rather than my father" (ibid. 27). 
Sparta then was a place where those with influence arranged 
things upon request . 
1 1 
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Patronage might of course sometimes raise a promising young 
Spartiate from an ordinary background to a high position and thus 
preserve some level of social mobility within the society. What 
influential men could do for potential supporters, however, they 
could also do for their own younger relatives. Finley (1986, 
169f.) has already suggested that "there were families who were 
able to influence the appointment procedures in favour of their 
own members, beginning at the first opportunity, among the 
children". There was probably scope for favouritism even in the 
assessment of an individual's abilities. The system was one in 
which the existing generation of leaders chose the men who were 
going to replace them. In this context it is perfectly 
intelligible that Aristotle should have characterized the 
election of the gerontes as dynasteutik~ ("favouring the 
interests of a narrow range of families").= Although there was 
fierce rivalry for vacancies to the gerousia (Xen. Lak. Pol. 
10.1-3; Plut. Lyk. 26), it will surely have been mostly among men 
from distinguished lineages who had already held major positions 
in their earlier careers (cf. Arist. Pol. 1270b24). It seems 
therefore that these distinguished lineages were able to turn to 
their own advantage all the factors which contributed towards 
establishing an order of precedence among Spartiates. High birth 
and wealth were inherited. Seniority was controlled through 
their monopoly of the gerousia and merit through manipulation of 
the appointment procedures. Only the ephorate continued to be 
open to a majority of poor Spartiates (Arist. Pol. 1270b7-10; 
1272a27-33). 
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None of this should really surprise us for, despite the 
various devices to distract Spartiates from the interests of the 
household, they still remained strong, rooted (as will be argued 
in Ch. 2) in a system of individual land tenure and inheritance. 
As Redfield (1977/78, 158) has noted, the Spartan polity, 
including the upbringing and the Spartiate way of life, was "a 
super-structure built on the normal Greek sub-structure of 
private property" based upon the household. A revealing comment 
by Xenophon links the household's interest in property, 
inheritance and power, when he is explaining why Spartiate men 
were in favour of certain wife-sharing arrangements which were 
encouraged by the state (Lak. Pol. 1.7-9; Plut. Lyk. 15.7; Mor. 
242B). At first glance these might seem to have been another set 
of relationships cutting across those of the household; but 
Xenophon explains that 11the men want to get brothers for their 
sons, brothers who are part of the kin and share in its power, 
but claim no part of its property" (Lak. Pol. 1.9). Wife-sharing 
consequently extended the household's sphere of relationships; 
and so probably did institutionalized pederasty, which brought 
the erastes into a relationship with the kin of his paidika and 
with the latter's household, when they jointly provided its 
material needs. Xenophon 's casual assumption in the passage 
quoted above that a prime concern of a Spartiate was to increase 
the size and power of his lineage and to preserve its property 
is a measure of the influence which the household retained. The 
following chapters will focus more closely upon the nature of 
individual property ownership, its socio-political impact and its 
role both in sustaining Sparta's longstanding stability and 
48 
success and in leading to her early-fourth-century crisis and 
international decline. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 1 
1. For the different stages of the Spartiate upbringing in the 
following paragraph I have foll6wed the most satisfactory scheme 
advocated to date, that of Tazelaar (1967), who discusses and 
gives references to previous studies. Cf. also, more recently, 
MacDowell (1986, 159ff.), though his procedure of fitting the 
contemporary evidence of Xenophon into a scheme derived from 
later sources is faulty historical method. I have supplemented 
Tazelaar's account with direct references to the ancient sources, 
including Plutarch's Life of Lykourgos which occasionally both 
here and elsewhere in this thesis provides our sole evidence. 
On the intractable problems posed by this work as a historical 
source, see especially Kessler (1910), Tigerstedt (1965-78, 
II.77ff., 89ff. & 231ff.), Piccirilli in Manfredini & Piccirilli 
eds. (1980, esp. XLff.). As these studies indicate, it is rarely 
possible to discern the source, and therefore the reliability, 
of information which is original to the work, except when it 
derives from the excerpts of the Apophthegmata Lycurgi = Moralia 
225F-229A (in which case it is suspect because of the taint of 
third-century revolutionary propaganda) or when Plutarch names 
his authority: When neither of these circumstances applies, as 
is often the case with the original Plutarchean information used 
in this study, rather than decline to consider the information, 
it seems better to attempt to make cautious use of it with due 
regard to its general degree of plausibility and its consonance 
with other relevant evidence. Sometimes, as in Chapter 2, this 
procedure will lead to Plutarch's evidence being rejected. I 
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have attempted to follow the same procedure with other late 
sources whose reliability is uncertain. 
2. White (1964, 142 n.11) claims that Plut. Lyk. 25, which 
states that Spartiates under 30 could not enter the market-place 
to purchase items needed for the household, proves that such 
young men were not allowed to marry and establish a household. 
This goes beyond the text which proves only that such necessities 
were provided by others. The clear implication of Plut. Lyk. 
15.2-3 and Mor. 228A is that Spartiates could marry at a time 
when they still slept at night in the barracks and were therefore 
under the age of 30. 
3. Cf. the comments of Perikles ( Thuc. 2. 3 7. 2) that the 
Athenians did not interfere in one another's private lives, 
obviously directed against the opposite practice of the 
Spartiates. On the all-pervasive sanctions in Spartiate life, 
see Lewis (1977, 30f., with refs.). 
4. For ancient testimony to the term, Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 
659 n.4). 
5. On differences in wealth and growing inequalities, cf. the 
evidence collected by Ste. Croix (1972, 137f. and Appendix XVI). 
The wealthiest men were the kings (Ps.-Plato, Alkibiades I 122C-
123A; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 15.3). 
6. Spartiate xeniai feature prominently in the. recent study of 
ritualized friendship by Herman (1987, esp. 143ff. & the cases 
catalogued in his Appendices A & C). Leaving aside the numerous 
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guest friendships of Spartan kings or regents, note, for example, 
Thucydides' reference to the friends of the Boiotians and 
Corinthians (5.37.1, 3-4; 38.3). For the close links of 
spartiates with leading men from Samos, see Cartledge (1982). 
The clearest individual example, however, is the hereditary 
f riendship between the lineages of the Spartiate Endios and the 
Athenian Alkibiades mentioned by Thucydides (8.6.3; cf. Herman 
1987, 146ff.). Since the Athenian lineage received the name 
Alkibiades from the Spartiate lineage, this friendship must go 
back at least to 550 or even earlier, the time when the earliest 
known Athenian Alkibiades, attested by Isokrates (16.25), 
r eceived his name (Davies 1971, 12 & 15f.). The inscription IG 
12 p. 272, 90, a dedication to Apollo at Delphi ( 525-500?), 
possibly for a chariot-race victory, which was also thought to 
attest to this Alkibiades, is now realized to be Lakonian (Daux 
1977, 5lff.; cf. Jeffery 1990, 447 no.47a & 448). 
restores the name of the dedicator as Alkibiadgs. 
Daux now 
He is 
therefore possibly an ancestor of Endios. Another indicator is 
the proxenies held by certain Spartiates, listed in Mosley 
( 1971). Cf. also Spartiates with names suggesting foreign links: 
Poralla and Bradford (1985, nos. 32, 47, 141, 175, 367, 490, 658 , 
659, 743). 
7. Finley (1986, 166). 
8. The main accounts are Nilsson (1912); Busolt and Swoboda 
(1926 , 694ff.); Jeanmaire (1939, 419ff. ); Den Boer (1954, 
233ff.); Michell (1964, 165ff.); Marrou (1965, 45ff.); Brelich 
(1969 , 317ff.); Toynbee (1969, 317ff.); MacDowell (1986, 52ff. ); 
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Cartledge (1987, 20ff.). I have omitted works which deal only 
with the nomenclature of the age classes. 
9. Plut. Lyk. 17.1; Aelian, Varia Historia 3.10.2; cf. Xen. 
Lak. Pol. 2.13-14. On Spartan pederasty, see Cartledge (1981a) 
with reference to earlier studies. Both Plutarch and Aelian 
appear to claim that only young men who were "reputable" 
(Plutarch) or "fine and upstanding" (Aelian) could become 
erastai; Aelian adds that only boys "of fine character" received 
erastai. Cartledge, on the contrary, argues cogently ( 2lf. ) that 
the relationship was compulsory for every young man and boy. 
Plutarch's statement may in fact support this view. If one were 
to accept the suggestion of Den Boer (1954, 284ff.), that the 
word Plutarch uses ( eudokimos) means in effect "one who has 
passed the tests of the ag6g~", it would follow that Plutarch 
intends to signify that all those who had successfully reached 
the status of young Spartiates became erastai, not just the 
better sort. (I agree with Den Boer (246 & 286) that Plutarch's 
eudokimoi neoi refers to the young men, not to the boys as 
Cartledge (21) suggests.) MacDowell (1986, 65) argues against 
the idea that pederasty was institutionalized on the grounds that 
Xenophon and. Plutarch refrain from saying so; but this is to 
place too heavy a reliance upon the wording of these writers and 
upon the degree of their concern to provi~e a systematic analysis 
of the subject. As Fisher (1989, 46 n.37) points out , "even if 
it may be correct that there was not a law or strict allocation 
system assigning a lover to each youth, ... this is not necessary 
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for it to be the norm, or a crucial part of the educational 
structure". 
10 . MacDowell ( 1986, 64-5), arguing that an erastes was not 
legally responsible for the conduct of his paidika, is inclined 
to dismiss entirely the evidence of Plutarch and Aelian 
concerning the sharing of honour and disgrace. The phenomenon, 
however, was not dependent upon legal enactment and is attested 
by the contemporary evidence of Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.33) when he 
remarks that Kleonymos brought Archidamos honour not shame 
through the manner of his death at Leuktra. 
11. It is uncertain whether the hippagretai had any direct 
responsibility for those who were not selected for the hippeis; 
but they may well have maintained some supervision if those not 
selected were eligible for selection in subsequent annual 
appointments of hippeis. It is normally thought that the 
ne6teroi and neoi of Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 8-9 ref er solely to the 
hippeis: e.g. Pareti (1958, 156 f.); Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 706 
and n.4). Cozzoli (1979, 95ff.) argues that they should be 
equated solely with the ne6teroi of Thuc. 5.64 .3, 75.1, who are 
normally thought to be 18 and 19 year olds: e.g. Toynbee (1913, 
263); Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1944-81, IV 93); Tazelaar (1967, 
148). Cozzoli 's view, however, is bound up with his unacceptable 
opinion that the hippeis comprised Spartiates of all ages between 
20 and 60 (cf. n.14 below); but there is a different way in which 
Xenophon' s ne6teroi and neoi might overlap but not coincide 
entirely with the hippeis. In a military context he neotes may 
be the Spartan technical term for men aged 20-44 (Hdt. 9.12.2 
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with Wade-Gery 1958, 73 & 82; Cartledge 1987, 21). Hence in the 
episode related by Xenophon the ephors and gerontes decided to 
send Kinadon to Aulon with some of the neoteroi (i.e. 20-44 year 
olds); and when Kinadon asked which of the neoi he should take, 
the ephors directed him to the senior hippagretes, who had been 
primed to assign him a number of men under his command who will 
have come from the 20-29 year-old hippeis. 
12. Cf. Xen. Ages. 2.16; Anab. 1.3.15; but note ibid. 2.6.15. 
See the illuminating remarks of Redfield (1977/78, 154). 
13. Cozzoli (1979, 86) believes that the hippeis comprised not 
just hebontes but men up to the maximum age for military service, 
i.e. age 60. He argues this on the basis of Hdt. 1.67, which 
states that the five eldest men who retired from the hippeis each 
year became agathoergoi, men who spent the subsequent year in 
special service of the state in whatever employment was required 
of them. Cozzoli's view, however, is unacceptable, since there 
is nothing in Herodotus' account or elsewhere to suggest that the 
agathoergoi were aged 60 rather than 30, as is normally thought. 
It runs counter to the careful sequence of Lak. Pol. 2-5.1 in 
which Xenophon describes separately the institutional 
arrangements peculiar to each age group and which he concludes 
with the statement that now he will describe those arrangements 
which applied to everyone. Cozzoli's view also compels him to 
argue that the purpose of the selection process described by 
Xenophon was to choose not the entire squad of hippeis but only 
those places which had become available through retirements (he 
accepts that this choice was made among only the hebontes). This 
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contradicts Xenophon's clear statement that each of the 
hippagretai chose 100 men. 
14. It is uncertain whether the 18-19 year olds who participated 
in the krypteia (Plato, Laws 633B-C; Aristotelian Lak. Pol. fr. 
538, apud Plut. Lyk. 28) were a select group or represented every 
member of these age classes (Cartledge 1987, 30-2, with 
references to earlier studies). If the former, it will have 
marked an important preliminary choice of an elite in advance of 
the selection of hippeis; if the latter, it will have formed the 
most significant test of merit in determining which young men 
were fit for selection for the hippeis. 
15. E.g. Ollier (1934, 32); Diller (1941, 501); Marrou (1946, 
217); Brelich (1969, 119). 
16. E.g. Marrou (1946, 217); Den Boer (1954, 260). Even 
Tazelaar (1967) fails to notice both pieces of evidence. Den 
Boer noticed the sentence in the Lak. Pol. , but he drew the 
erroneous conclusion that the term paidiskoi referred jointly to 
both the paides in the first stage and those in the second stage. 
He did not notice the passage in the Hellenika. Since my 
argument was originally published (Hodkinson 1983, 250), it has 
been endorsed by Cartledge (1987, 30). 
17. My suspicion is strengthened by the emendation to IG V 1,213 
suggested by Schwartz (1976, 177f.) In line 39 he restores kai 
heb6n in place of Woodward's earlier restoration kai epheb6n. 
Xenophon often .uses technical Spartan terms without properly 
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explaining their meaning, e.g. eirens, hypomeiones (Hell. 3.3.6), 
syntetagmenoi (ibid.7) and mikra ekklesia (ibid. 8). 
18. On the restricted composition of courts which tried major 
cases, Ste. Croix (1972, 132ff. with Appendix XXVI); the contrary 
view is expressed by Lewis (1977, 39) & David (1985). 
19. Lysander, as the erastes of Agesilaos ( Plut. Lys. 2 2. 3; 
Ages. 2.1), will have been over 40 when he became nauarchos in 
408 or 407, since he must have been several years older than 
Agesilaos, who himself was born probably in 444 (Plut. Ages. 
40.2; Cartledge 1987, 21). Klearchos, who was about 50 when he 
was killed in 401 (Xen. Anab. 2.6.15), will have been about 39 
when he was appointed to his command in the Hellespont in 412 
(Thuc. 8.8.2). If Klearchos was born c.451, his father, 
Ramphias , will have been over 40 when he makes his first 
appearance in the historical record as an envoy to Athens in 
432/1 (ibid. 1.139.3). Antalkidas was perhaps 34 or 35 when he 
was envoy to Tiribazos in 392/1 (Xen. Hell. 4.8. 12-16; Whitehead 
1979 , 193). Thucydides (4.132.3) stresses how exceptional were 
the appointments of Klearidas and Pasitelidas as harmosts of 
Amphipolis and Torone in 423 at a time when they were still 
heb6ntes. Diodorus' claim (13.76.2) that Kallikratidas was a 
neos when he became nauarchos in 407 or 406 need mean no more 
than that he was not over age 44 (cf. n.11 above). 
20. The reasons for placing the transition out of the paides at 
this age are given by Tazelaar (1967, 139f. & 147f.); Cartledge 
... 
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(1987, 30). Note also that Xenophon calls Kleonymos 
eudokim6tatos (see n.9 above). 
21. See esp. Bielschowsky (1869); Nilsson ( 1912, 315ff.); 
Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 698ff.); Michell (1964, 281ff.); Figueira 
(1983); MacDowell (1986, lllff.). 
22. The abundant evidence for this link is cited and discussed 
by Bielschowsky (1869, 32ff.); cf. also Nilsson (1912, 315f.); 
Toynbee (1913, 267f.); Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 698f.). 
23. Bowie's account of the development of the Classical 
syssition is preferable to that of Bremmer (1990, 136), who, as 
part of his argument that the symposion proper was the successor 
of the common meals of archaic warrior clubs, claims that "we can 
still observe these meals as a living institution in Doric Sparta 
and Crete" . Bremmer's account over-emphasizes the degree of 
survival and continuity from early forms of social organization 
at the expense of the massive changes and institutional 
restructuring which took place during the development of the 
Spartan polis in the Archaic period. 
24. On the Spartiate manpower decline ( oliganthropia) , see 
recently Ste. · Croix (1972, 331,f.); Cartledge (1979, 307ff.); 
(1987, 37ff.); Forrest (1980, 131ff.); also chs. 2 & 4, below. 
25. In addition the kings had their own syssition in which they 
dined together. Each king had the right to choose two mess 
companions called Pythioi who conducted Sparta's relations with 
Delphi (Hdt. 6.57; Xen. Lak. Pol. 15.5). It is not certain 
I: 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
58 
whether the three tent-companions of a king on campaign (Xen. 
Lak. Pol. 13.1) also messed with him at home. The six 
polemarchoi would appear to have done so, if the evidence of 
Plutarch's excerpt in the Apophthegmata Lycurgi can be trusted 
(Plut. Mor. 226F; Lyk. 12.5; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 13.1). The kings 
could also invite other Spartiates to their mess to share the 
double portion of food which was one of their privileges (Hdt. 
6.57; Xen. Lak. Pol. 15.4; cf. Ages. 5.1). 
26. Ephorus, FGrH 70F149, apud Strabo 483C; that this also 
applied in Sparta is hinted at by Cartledge (1981a, 36 n. 78). 
On the general Greek connection between pederasty and the 
symposion, Bremmer (1990, esp. 142ff.). 
27. Hell. 5.4.26-8. One might have doubts about the typicality 
of this instance involving an immediate heir to the kingship, but 
the context does suggest that Archidamos belonged to an ordinary 
mess not that of the kings. The implication of ibid. 29 is that 
Kleonymos did not attend the mess every day. The evidence of 
Xen. Symn. 8.35, according to which a youth might be stationed 
next to xenoi and not in the same battle-line as his erastes, 
does not prove that they were not in the same syssition, since 
even though ·members of a syssi tion fought within the same 
enomotia any two given members might be stationed in different 
ranks or files. 
28. See esp. Cartledge (1981, 27ff.). The only two 
relationships which we can document, those between Lysander and 
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Agesilaos and between Archidamos and Kleonymos, lend themselves 
naturally to this interpretation. 
29. Cf. the remarks of Plato on the potential factional dangers 
of common messes (Laws 636B-C). 
30. Persaios, FGrH 584F3, apud Athen. 140F; cf. Dioskourides , 
FGrH 594F3. Nilsson (1912, 317) attempts to equate the leader 
implied in this passage with the kreodaites (carver of meat) whom 
Pollux 6. 34 and Plut. Mor. 644B designate as an important 
official, the latter on the basis that Lysander was once 
appointed to the post by Agesilaos. The importance of this 
office could be called into doubt, on the grounds that Plut. 
Ages. 8.1 and Lys . 23.7, neither of which is cited by Nilsson, 
claim that Agesilaos' appointment of Lysander to this post was 
intended as an insult. The point here, however, might be not 
that the post was shameful in itself, but that it represented a 
'come-down' for the previously influential Lysander. 
31. Wheat was a superior cereal to the barley supplied in the 
normal syssitia contributions (Plut. Lyk. 12.2; Dikaiarchos, apud 
A then. 141C) . 
32. The other authors cited by Athenaios call this dessert 
course epaiklon, but this seems to be no more than a difference 
of terminology (cf. Athen. 140C). 
33. The term phatta used by Dikaiarchos in the passage quoted 
above signifies a ring-dove or wood pigeon, usually a wild bird 
(Thompson 1895, 177-9; Pollard 1977, 57). 
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34. References to the main modern accounts are given at the 
start of Andrewes' judicious discussion in Gemme et al. (1945-81, 
IV. lllff.), to which add Toynbee (1969, 365ff.); Anderson (1970, 
225ff.); Welwei (1974, 128ff. & 138ff.); Cartledge (1979, 
254ff.); Kelly (1981); Lazenby (1985); Tuplin (1986). 
35. For the details of the 'obal army' below, see Wade-Gery 
(1958). 
36. For criticism of the argument of Lazenby (1985) that until 
after Leuktra perioikoi were not included in Spartan regiments 
and not used against Peloponnesian enemies, see Hodkinson (1986b) 
and Tuplin (1986, 27f.). 
37. On uniform equipment, see the discussion and refs. in 
Cartledge (1977, esp. 13, 15 and 27). It included a standard 
shield faced with bronze which was introduced by 425 at the 
latest. It was, however, permitted for this to bear a personal 
emblem in addition to the official and compulsory initial Lambda 
(Anderson 1970, 18ff.). On the role of dress more generally in 
Spartan society, David (1989). 
38. Cf. esp. Thuc. 5.72.4 and the discussion by Anderson (1970, 
245ff.). Olympic victors also had the right to fight around the 
king (Plut. Lyk. 22.4; Mor. 639E), but perhaps not those winners 
of chariot-races who did not actually compete personally. The 
three Spartiate tent-companions of the king (Xen. Lak. Pol. 13.1) 
may also have fought around him, to judge from Xen. Hell. 6.4.14. 
This last passage suggests that the polemarchoi also had their 
special aides. 
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39. A number is missing from the text; either single or double 
file must be meant. 
40. The text and exact translation of the last clause of this 
sentence are doubtful. 
41. Anderson ( 1970, 299 n. 37) is surely correct in thinking that 
these officers will have fought at the head of their units, 
rather than in 'blank files' on the right as suggested by Ollier 
(1934, 59). 
42. Unfortunately, it is not easy to draw more precise 
conclusions about the impact of this hierarchy. To do so it 
would be necessary to know how many Spartiates there were in an 
enomotia, and thereby out of what number the leaders were 
selected. In practice there may have been 25 Spartiates in the 
enomotia of the obal army, but the number of leaders is 
uncertain. The figures for the later army are more intractable 
still because from the late fifth century various non-Spartiate 
elements, especially perioikoi, were brigaded into the Spartiate 
regiments in the army. Since the number of Spartiates was 
rapidly declining, the ratio of Spartiates to others in the army 
must have been constantly changing. Only for the period c.425, 
when Thucydides' figures (4.38.5) for the numbers captured on 
Sphakteria may make it possible to extrapolate a rough ratio of 
two Spartiates to three non-Spartiates, and for Leuktra in 371, 
when Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.15; cf. 17) says that . there were 700 
Spartiates at the battle, is there any indication of Spartiate 
numbers. But even then calculations of the number of Spartiates 
II I 
62 
in an enomotia are obstructed by uncertainty over two basic 
questions: first, whether the number of enomotiai in the army 
was 96 or 192; secondly, whether non-Spartiates were brigaded 
into the army by dividing them more or less evenly among all the 
enomotiai or by concentrating them together and thereby 
attempting to keep certain enomotiai as purely Spartiate as 
possible. 
43. In view of the close connections between hunting and hoplite 
warfare discussed by Lonis (1979, 31ff.), it seems that the 
criteria of fighting ability and talent at hunting may have been 
more complementary than conflicting. The evidence of Xen. Hell. 
4.5.16 suggests that the best soldiers were among those aged 20-
34. 
44. Again a more precise assessment is difficult because of our 
ignorance of the exact numerical relationship between the 
syssition and the enomotia. Plutarch's figure (Lyk. 12.2) of 
about 15 men in the syssition fits badly with that of 40 in the 
enomotia. Plutarch's number may, moreover, include men of 60 or 
over who were not in the army. The problem of the ratio of 
Spartiates to non-Spartiates within the enomotia is also 
relevant. For the figure of 25 men in the enomotia given by 
Suidas, s.v. enomotia, see Wade-Gery (1958, 84 n.2). 
45. The issue of the nature of hoplite warfare is of course 
extremely controversial. The possibility of individual glory , 
however, remains whether one adopts the view of those scholars 
(e.g. Krentz 1985; Cawkwell 1989) who argue for a considerable 
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degree of fighting in open order; or the account of someone like 
Hanson (1989, 152ff.) which, although it adopts the alternative 
view of a tight scrum of dense en masse fighting, indicates the 
requirement and opportunities for the display of indi victual 
qualities (cf. esp. 166f.). 
46. Plut. Lyk. 27.2; Moralia 238D. Some of these inscriptions 
survive, e.g. IG V 1, 701-3 and 706-7. 
4 7. On the subject of the Spartan noble death, see Loraux 
(1977). 
48. According to Lewis (1977, 42 n.102), Thucydides' language 
suggests some formal institutionalized commendation. Cf. the 
prize of valour earlier given to Eurybiades, the victorious 
admiral at Salamis in 480 (Hdt. 8.124). 
49. Lonis ( 1979, 31ff.) demonstrates how this practice was 
consistent with the duty imposed on Spartiates over 30 to 
maintain their fitness in peace-time by engaging in hunting (Xen. 
Lak. Pol. 4.7; 6.3), an activity which emphasized individual 
performance. 
50. Xen. Hel_l. 2.3.10; cf. Lewis (1977, 42). 
Methane took place in late June or July 431. 
The action at 
The Athenian 
expedition probably set sail between June , 2 and 15 (Thuc. 2.23.2; 
Gemme et al. 1945-81, II.79f.) and the action took place before 
the solar eclipse of August 3 (Thuc. 2.28). The date on which 
Brasidas was commended in Sparta is not known. It is likely that 
the ephoral elections took place in the late summer; the ephors 
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probably entered office in late September or early October (cf. 
Ste. Croix 1972, 320f.). It is not known how it was decided 
which of the ephors became the eponymous ephor . May it have been 
the man elected with the loudes~ acclaim? Rahe (1980) has argued 
that the ephors were not elected directly by the assembly but 
chosen by lot out of an elected pool of candidates; note, 
however, the cogent criticisms of Rhodes who concludes (1981, 
502) that "the method of appointment was direct election and 
there is no need to suppose that the electing body was any other 
than the assembly". 
51. Cf. also the case of Arimnestos (or Aeimnestos) who killed 
the Persian general Mardonios at Plataia in 479. He is later 
found in command of an elite contingent of 300 men which fought 
against the entire forces of the Messenians, probably during the 
Messenian revolt of the late 460s (Hdt. 9.64; Plut. Aristeides 
19.1). 
52. The obvious examples are the thwarting of Lysander's 
policies by King Pausanias in Athens in 403 and by King Agesilaos 
in Asia Minor in 396. 
53. Cf. Thucydides' remarks (3.93.2) on the harsh and unjust 
government of Spartiate harmosts at Herakleia. 
54. To avoid excessive citation of references in what follows 
I have given after each name the number accorded to that person 
in the prosopography of Poralla & Bradford (1985; henceforth PB) 
which provides exhaustive references to the ancient sources. 
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55. Pol. 1306al8-19. on the meaning of dynasteutike, cf. 
1292a39-bl0; Thuc. 3.62.3. On eligibility for the gerousia, see 
Ste. Croix (1972, Appendix XXVII). 
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CHAPTER 2 
LAND TENURE AND INHERITANCE 
"The problem of Spartan land tenure is one of the most vexed in 
the obscure field of Spartan institutions." Walbank's remark 
(1957, 728) is as true today as when it was written thirty five 
years ago. Controversy surrounding this subject has a long 
tradition going back to the nineteenth century and the last 
thirty years have witnessed no diminution in the level of 
disagreement, as is demonstrated by a comparison of the differing 
approaches in the recent works by Cartledge ( 1979), Cozzoli 
( 1979), David ( 1981), Marasco ( 1981) and MacDowell ( 1986) . 1 
Although another study runs the risk of merely adding one more 
hypothesis to the general state of uncertainty, a fundamental 
reassessment of the question is required, not least because of 
its significance for the historian's interpretation of the 
overall character of Spartiate society. Through the introduction 
of a new perspective it may be possible to advance our 
understanding of the subject. 
In Section I of this chapter I shall attempt to review 
several influential scholarly theories and to examine their 
feasibility and the reliability of the evidence upon which they 
are based. Section II will begin to construct a more plausible 
alternative account which is based upon more trustworthy 
evidence. Finally, Section III will discuss a comparatively 
underemphasized aspect of the topic, the property rights of 
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spartiate women, which suggests a rather different interpretation 
of the character of land tenure and inheritance from those more 
usually adopted. 
r. Some standard views of land tenure and inheritance: a cri tigue 
Before entering into the detailed controversies surrounding 
spartiate land tenure it is worth placing them briefly within a 
wider context. Rihll (1991, 104ff.) has recently reminded us of 
the dangers of anachronism in our approach to the issues of land 
ownership in ancient Greece. In her words, "the Greeks' 
attitudes to rights over land were much closer to the social, 
conditional rights common to 'primitive' societies than they were 
to Roman dominium" (p.104). Greek thought and practice assumed 
that all land within . the territory of a polis belonged in 
principle to the social group, the whole body of politai. The 
tenure of land by individual citizens was always potentially 
subject to the polis' ultimate ownership or control; although 
the actual degree of public intervention varied from minimal to 
maximal at different times and places. 
Much of the controversy surrounding Spartiate land tenure 
concerns this last issue, the extent to which public control was 
exercised over landholdings in the hands of individual citizens. 
What rights of use did the individual Spartiate have in practice 
over the estates which supported his family and provided his 
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means of paying the contributions to the common meals necessary 
for the maintenance of his citizen status? 
Until recently at least, the majority opinion has argued in 
favour of a considerable degree of public control over Spartiate 
landholdings. This view usually gives prominence to the late 
evidence of Plutarch, who in his biography of Lykourgos (8.3-6) 
claims that the mythical Spartan lawgiver 
"persuaded his fellow citizens to make one parcel of all their territory and divide it up anew, and to live with one another on a basis of entire uniformity and equality in their means of subsistence .... Suiting the deed to the word, he distributed the rest of the Lakonian land to the perioikoi thirty thousand lots, and that which belonged to the city of Sparta, in nine thousand lots (kleroi), to as many Spartiates. Some say, however, that Lykourgos distributed six thousand and that afterwards Polydoros added three thousand; others, that Polydoros assigned half of the nine thousand and Lykourgos the other half". 
Later he adds that 
"a child was not reared at the will of the father, but was taken and carried by him to a place called Lesche, where the elders of the tribes officially examined the infant; and, if it was well-built and sturdy, they ordered the father to rear it, and assigned it one of the nine thousand lots of land" (16.1). 
In his biography of King Agis IV, the third-century 
reforming king, however, Plutarch gives a somewhat different 
account when writing of the decline of Sparta in the early fourth 
century. 
"Since, however, the number of households instituted by Lykourgos was still preserved in the transmission of lots (kleroi), and father left to son his inheritance, to some extent the continuation of this order and equality sustained the state in spite of its errors in other respects. But when a certain powerful man , Epitadeus by name, who was headstrong and of a violent temper , came to be ephor, he had a quarrel 
, 
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with his son and introduced a law permitting a man during his lifetime to give his household (oikos) and lot (kleros) to any one he wished, or in his will and testament so to leave it" (5.2-3). 
Those scholars · who emphasize this Plutarchean evidence 
differ among themselves concerning the degree of reliance to be 
placed upon one or other of the above passages. Some, stressing 
the evidence of Lykourgos 16, envisage a Spartiate as being 
merely the life tenant of his kleros which reverted to the state 
on his death. 2 Others follow Agis 5 in arguing that the kleros 
passed down hereditarily from a man to his eldest son. Some of 
those who hold the latter view (e.g. Ziehen 1933, 218ff.; Asheri 
1961 & 1963) incorporate the evidence of Lykourgos 16 to the 
extent of postulating a state controlled reserve of kleroi 
available for distribution to younger sons who did not inherit 
their fathers' lots. Others (e.g. Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 633ff.; 
Hooker 1980, 116ff.; David 1981, 46ff.) dismiss Lykourgos 16 and 
the notion of the state endowing a young Spartiate with a kleros, 
except as an occasional measure when a citizen died heirless or 
needed to adopt an heir before his death, in which case, 
according to this hypothesis, a landless younger son could be 
nominated to succeed. Despite their differences, common to all 
these views is the belief that the transmission of land on a 
Spartiate's death was governed by (variously defined) strict 
state-enforced rules which were designed to ensure that the 
estate remained undivided and which denied . the individual 
landholder any power of testament. Common also is the belief 
that the landholder had no right to alienate the estate during 
his lifetime by gift or sale . 
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Those scholars who adopt the view that the kleros was 
transmitted hereditarily and that there was no regular reserve 
of land do, it is true, sometimes distinguish two types of land, 
drawing upon a passage in the second-century B.C. writer, 
Herakleides Lembos (fr. 373.12 Dilts), which probably derives 
from the Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians (fr. 611.12 
Rose): 3 
"It is shameful for the Lakedaimonians to sell land; and it is illegal to sell the ancient portion (archaia moira)". 4 
Some of these scholars (e.g. Pareti 1917, 197ff.; David, 1981, 
46ff.) attempt to identify this 'ancient portion' with land in 
the politike chora which appears in a passage from the 
second-century B. C. historian, Polybius. 
constitution of Crete, he remarks 
Referring to the 
"How was it that the most learned of the ancient writers - Ephorus, Xenophon, Kallisthenes and Plato -first, state that it is one and the same with that of the Lakedaimonians .... ? As to its dissimilarity, the peculiar features of the Lakedaimonian constitution are . said to be, first, the land laws by which no citizen may own more than another, but all must possess an equal share of the politike chora ... 11 • 5 
It is suggested that the rule concerning the indivisibility of 
a Spartiate' s - estate applied only to the ancient portions, 
identified with the kleroi allotted in the Lykourgan 
redistribution, and that many Spartiates held other land less 
subject to state interference which might be divided up among all 
a man's sons. Even on this view, however, the more important 
category of land was still subject to strict regulation. 
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The above views can be criticized on a variety of counts. 
One general weakness is the reliance placed upon the evidence of 
later writers like Polybius and Plutarch at the expense of 
alternative earlier accounts, particularly that of Aristotle's 
Poli ties, consideration of which is often relegated to the 
tail-end of modern discussions. 6 A related problem is that the 
sources of information upon which these later writers drew are 
not such as to inspire confidence. In these late accounts there 
are three main elements: first, the ascription of an equal 
redistribution of kleroi to Lykourgos (sometimes also to King 
Polydoros), which is common to all accounts; 7 secondly, the 
claim that this equality was maintained into Classical times, 
explicitly stated in the life of Agis and implicit in that of 
Lykourgos and in Polybius; thirdly, the description of a system 
of land tenure and inheritance which was supposedly responsible 
for the maintenance of this equality. As has already been seen, 
two different versions of such a system are found in the lives 
of Agis and Lykourgos. Although it is the last of the above 
elements which is of most concern to our discussion, it is also 
necessary to investigate the sources of the other two elements 
because all three are closely interlinked. 
The first element, the idea of an equal redistribution of 
kleroi by Lykourgos, is clearly the basis upon which the other 
elements rest; yet all the evidence suggests that it did not 
originate before the late Classical period. There is no sign of 
it in fifth-century writers. It was not known to Hellanikos, who 
attributed the whole Spartan polity to Kings Eurysthenes and 
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Prokles (fr.91, apud Strabo 8.5.5, 366C); nor is it mentioned in 
Herodotus' account of Lykourgos' reforms (1.65-6). In the fourth 
century, it is absent from Xenophon's Polity of the 
Lakedaimonians, which claimed instead that Lykourgos' measures 
were designed to ensure that the poor were not in want and the 
rich not able to employ their wealth (6.4-7.6). Plato (Laws 
6~~D) and Isokrates (Archidamos 20) wrote of an equal 
distribution of land in a much earlier era after the original 
Dorian conquest of Lakonia, but never hinted at any later similar 
measure. 8 Indeed, Isokrates (Panathenaikos 259) denied that 
there had been any subsequent redistribution in Spartan history. 
Aristotle not only does not mention the idea in connection with 
Sparta, but states (Pol. 1266a39-40) that Phaleas of Chalkedon 
was the first to propose equality of landholding, thereby 
excluding Lykourgos. 
Consequently, when Polybius in the passage quoted above 
attributes the idea of landed equality to Ephorus, Xenophon, 
Kallisthenes and Plato, there is considerable reason to doubt his 
evidence. David (1981, 69; 1982/83, 82 n.52) has claimed that 
the unanimity of these writers affords proof of the authenticity 
of the idea of equal kleroi. This supposed unanimity, however, 
is specious. This is not the only occasion when Polybius 
ascribes a certain view erroneously to earlier writers; and in 
this instance it appears to be the view of Ephorus alone which 
he is describing. 9 Of Kallisthenes' work little is known; but, 
as we have already seen, there is no trace in the wor ks of 
Xenophon or Plato of any belief in an equal distribution of 
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kleroi in historical times and good reason to doubt that they 
shared such a belief.w 
The evidence suggests that Ephorus, who ascribed all 
Sparta's institutions to Lykourgos, was either the first writer 
to transfer the idea of an equal redistribution of land from the 
time of the Dorian conquest to that of Lykourgos or at least the 
first to popularize this new ascription. 11 It is possible that 
he took the idea from the pamphlet which the exiled Spartan king, 
Pausanias, wrote in the early fourth century; 12 but even if 
this were so, the likelihood of its authenticity would not be 
increased. An exile bent upon discrediting his opponents, whose 
pamphlet constituted, in David's words, "an important stage in 
the idealisation of 'Lycurgan' Sparta", is not to be depended 
upon as a trustworthy source. 13 The notion in later writers of 
an equal redistribution of kleroi by Lykourgos is, consequently, 
to be regarded not as historical reality but as a product of 
fourth-century invention and as an idea. which even in that 
century was far from generally accepted. 
It is far from clear whether the views of Ephorus had any 
direct influence upon the only detailed account of the supposed 
Lykourgan redistribution of land, that in Plutarch, Lykourgos 8 
quoted above. Recent studies by Marasco (1978b; 1979; 1981, i. 
248ff., ii. 584ff.; cf. Manfredini & Piccirilli 1980, 246ff.) 
have suggested that none of the three versions which Plutarch 
cites antedate the third century B. c. He argues that the 
supposed Lykourgan distributions of 4,500 and 6,000 lots reflect 
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the attempts of propagandists of the late-third-century Spartan 
revolution to justify, respectively, the numbers involved in the 
projected reform of King Agis IV and the size of the citizen body 
finally achieved by King Kleomenes III (Plut. Kleom. 11.2, 23.1, 
28. 8) . The inventors of both versions added a subsequent 
Polydoran distribution to bring the figures into line with the 
8,000 and 10,000 Spartiates mentioned by Herodotus (7.234) and 
Aristotle (Politics 1270a36-8) . 14 Finally, it seems from 
Plutarch's wording that his account of the different versions 
came from a single source, possibly the third-century writer, 
Hermippos of Smyrna, who, noting the agreement on the total 
figure of 9,000 kleroi, simplified matters by ascribing them all 
to Lykourgos. 15 He probably also doubled the number of 15,000 
perioikic kleroi projected by Agis IV, in order to bring them 
into apparent agreement with the 30,000 potential hoplite 
population referred to by Aristotle (Politics 1270a29-30). 
The other two ideas identified above, the belief that 
equality in land was maintained into the Classical period and, 
closely linked to it, the description of a system of tenure and 
inheritance supposedly responsible for the maintenance of this 
equality, are -similarly the products of later invention. There 
is of course no suggestion of equality of landholding in any of 
the historical sources from the sixth century down to Aristotle; 
they all testify to marked differences in wealth (refs. in Grote 
1854, ii. 549f.; ste. Croix 1972, 137f.). 
antedates the third century is uncertain. 
Whether the idea 
Polybius seems to 
imply that Ephorus believed that landed equality survived into 
1 / 
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the Classical period, to judge from the fact that landed equality 
is mentioned immediately before such longstanding elements of 
Spartiate life as denigration of money-making and the offices of 
kings and gerontes; but, as Cozzoli (1979, 21) has pointed out, 
there is no independent means of demonstrating that this really 
was Ephorus' view. It is possible that, since the system of life 
tenancy of the kleros described in Plutarch' s Lykourgos 16, which 
implicitly assumes the maintenance of equality, appears in a 
different context from the account of the Lykourga:n and Polydoran 
redistributions in Chapter 8, it may derive from a different 
source from the third-century ones behind the latter account 
(Cozzoli 1979, 23). It has been suggested independently that 
much of Plutarch's information in the Lykourgos may have derived 
from the early Peripatetic writers of the late fourth and early /1 
third centuries; such a source could lie behind the passage in 
question. Even if this is correct, however, the general 
character of the Peripatetics' approach to Sparta is not such as 
to inspire confidence in the reliability of their evidence. 16 
Whatever antecedents there may have been, the most notable 
source of the view that landed equality was preserved into the 
Classical period was the third-century Spartan revolution, 
chronicled by its supporter and propagandist, the historian 
Phylarchos. 17 In order to validate their attempts to sweep away 
the existing system of land tenure and replace it with a scheme 
of equal kleroi, the revolutionaries claimed that it was a return 
to the landed equality established by Lykourgos which had been 
maintained throughout the era of Spartan eminence until it was 
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ruined by the rhetra of the ephor, Epitadeus, sometime after the 
end of the Peloponnesian war. This is the historical 
reconstruction given in the passage cited earlier from Plutarch's 
Agis which probably reflects the ideology of the revolution as 
described by the partisan Phylarchos. 1 8 
This view has been disputed by Marasco (1978a), who claims 
that Plutarch derived his account of land tenure in the lives of 
Agis and Kleomenes from information in the largely lost 
Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians whose contents are 
reflected in Aristotle's Poli ties ( 1270a15-b6). The supposed 
similarities between the Politics and the two lives (Marasco 
1978a, 174) do not, however, stand up to scrutiny . 19 Despite 
the oft-repeated assertion that the wording of Plutarch's 
description of freedom of gift and bequest (Agis 5.3: "e~Etvat 
rov oiKOV aurou Kai rov KA~pov ~ rte E0€A0t Kai (&vra 6ouvat Kai 
KaraA t 7rEt v 6t art 0€µEvov") resembles that of Aristotle (Pol. 
1270a21: "6t66vat 6E Kai KaraAEi7rEtv e~ouaiav EOhlKE rote 
BouAoµivo tc''),= there is no real correspondence in terminology 
between the two passages, apart from their unsurprising common 
use of the verbs 6t66vat and KaraAEt7rEtv. Above all, there is 
little similarity between the sophisticated analysis in the 
Poli ties, in which the concentration of land and decline in 
manpower are explained in terms of a variety of contributory 
factors, and the simplistic account in the life of Agis which 
ascribes the bulk of the responsibility to a single person. 
Schi.itrumpf ( 1987) has indeed argued cogently that the Phylarchan-
Plutarchean tradition derives not from Aristotle but from a 
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fictional account (possibly that of Sphairos) based on Plato's 
theoretical discussion of the breakdown and overthrow of 
oligarchy in the Republic (esp. 555C-E; cf., in more detail, 
Section II below). 21 
An integral part of Plutarch's account is his description 
of a system of land tenure and inheritance, according to which 
each father passed down his kleros intact to a single son over 
a period of centuries. This system, designed to explain the 
maintenance of equality over such a long period, is an integral 
part of the reconstruction of Spartan history effected by the 
revolutionaries. As Cozzoli (1979, 22) has pointed out, there 
was little precise information in the works of earlier writers 
to justify this historical reconstruction, although there were 
sufficient general ideas about an earlier equality in land to 
lend it some degree of superficial credibility when combined with 
the traditional belief in the stability of the Spartan 
constitution. 
The sources of these late accounts are therefore not of the 
highest quality. One's misgivings about their reliability are 
not allayed when one examines the inherent practicability of the 
systems of tenure and inheritance which they describe or which 
scholars have constructed upon the basis of their evidence. 
First of all, it is highly improbable that the Spartan state 
possessed the bureaucratic machinery necessary to keep records 
of all the kleroi in order to administer a system of continuous 
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reallocation of land or a state-controlled reserve as envisaged 
above (Toynbee 1969, 302; Buckler 1977, 258). 
Secondly, the property systems described in Plutarch 's 
separate accounts in Agis and Lykourgos are, as they stand, 
incompatible (Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 636 n.3; pace Fustel de 
Coulanges 1888, 85lff. = 1891, 62ff.). According to the former, 
one son inherited the kleros of his father; according to the 
latter, each son was assigned a kleros by the state. The 
accounts are reconciled only by the sort of modern invention 
mentioned above, such as the claim that state allocation applied 
to younger sons whom the inheritance system in Agis leaves out. 
This supposed reconciliation distorts the evidence of both 
accounts. Since Plutarch either did not appreciate or was 
unconcerned that his accounts were incompatible, a saner approach 
would be to doubt the reliability of his evidence. 
Taken separately, however, both systems are impracticable. 
Cozzoli (1979, 28) has already indicated the weakness of the 
system postulated in the life of Lykourgos, namely, that from the 
very start it would have meant either a continual need for young 
men to wait for kleroi to become available before they could 
exercise citizen rights or that there were consistently far fewer 
warriors than the available number of kleroi. The difficulty 
with the account in the life of Agis is that, although Plutarch 
insists that landed equality was maintained for several 
centuries, he does not explain how younger sons were catered for 
or what arrangements were made under a regime of hereditary 
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transmission to prevent accumulation of land by kinsmen or others 
when there was no son to inherit. The system is made workable 
only through the liberal application of modern conjecture 
outlined above: by the forced 'reconciliation' with the account 
in the life of Lykourgos, by the unsupported speculation that 
uninheri ted estates were always diverted to landless younger 
sons, or by the claim that, although he fails to say so, Plutarch 
is referring only to one of the two categories of land mentioned 
by Herakleides Lembos. 22 
This last conjecture illustrates clearly the problems of 
relying upon the life of Agis. On the one hand, modern studies 
are compelled to modify Plutarch's evidence in order to remedy 
the fact noted above that the complete equality of landholding 
assumed in his account is inconsistent with the testimony of all 
the historical sources from the sixth to the fourth centuries. 
On the other hand, their claim that besides the ancient portion 
there was other land of a more private nature which was owned 
unequally contradicts the idea of strict equality in Plutarch's 
account. 23 Furthermore, one of the main supporting arguments 
for this view, the suggestion that the ancient portions of 
Herakleides and Plutarch's equal inheritances are identical with 
the equal shares in the politike chora referred to by Polybius, 
involves a misrepresentation of Polybius' evidence. Unlike 
Herakleides, he does not distinguish two types of land. The 
implication of his equal shares in the politike chora is that 
this meant complete equality in landholding, a point repeated 
shortly afterwards (6.48.3), and that the politike chora was the 
Ill 
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only type of land held by citizens. The poli tike chora means not 
"civic land" in contrast to another type of citizen-held land 
more private in character, but simply the "land divided among the 
citizens" (Walbank 1957, 728ff.; Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 634 n.2; 
Cartledge 1979, 166). Polybius, therefore, is not describing the 
same system as that referred to by Herakleides Lembos or as that 
which some scholars have conjecturally extrapolated from the 
account in Plutarch' s Agis. 24 His remarks do not offer any 
support for their attempts to rescue its evidence. Polybius' own 
account is merely one of complete equality, itself offered 
without explanation as to how that equality was sustained. 
The final major weakness of these late accounts and of 
modern studies which accept their evidence is that they do not 
adequately explain the serious decline in Spartiate numbers in 
the Classical period which, whatever one's precise explanation 
of its causes, was in some way connected with the increasing 
concentration of land in a few hands and the impoverishment of 
many citizen households. Although the exact rate of the decline 
in different periods is the subject of debate, there is 
sufficiently wide agreement that it was a long-term process which 
had begun by the mid-fifth century at the latest (e.g. Andreades 
1933, 53ff.; Jones 1967, 134ff.; Toynbee 1969, 297ff.; Ste. 
Croix 1972, 33lf.; Cartledge, 1979, 307ff.; Forrest 1980, 
134ff.; cawkwell 1983, 385ff.; Lane Fox 1985, 22lf.) . 
Plutarch's Lykourgos provides no framework at all for explaining 
these developments. Those studies which rely upon its evidence , 
since they cannot explain the decline in terms of inherited 
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poverty, are forced, rather implausibly, to account for it in 
terms of either widespread personal mismanagement and misfortune 
or a general increase in luxurious living which supposedly led 
to extensive poverty and consequent failure to reproduce (Michell 
1964, 207ff. & 228ff.; Forrest 1980, 136). Plutarch' s Agis 
provides an explanation of widespread poverty only from some 
unspecified date after the end of the Peloponnesian War when the 
supposed rhetra of Epitadeus wrecked the system of equal kleroi 
which had prevailed until then. 25 Those studies which follow 
this version, in so far as they do not simply ignore the earlier 
decline in the number of Spartiates, are able to explain it only 
by the poverty of deprived younger sons who then supposedly 
became a drain on the kleros of the eldest son or by the natural 
extinction of citizen families. 26 The manifest inadequacy of 
these explanations has already been pointed out by Buckler (1977, 
259) . It is indeed impossible to reconcile the evidence for 
citizen population decline with the testimony of the life of 
Agis, since Plutarch insists that until the law of Epitadeus the 
number of households instituted by Lykourgos remained 
undiminished. 
II. Towards an alternative account 
It is possible to provide a more satisfactory explanation of the 
decline in citizen numbers upon the basis of a different system 
of land tenure and inheritance according to which the rights of 
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individual Spartiates over their landholdings were considerably 
more exclusive, indefinite and inheritable. This point of view 
has been argued in the past by a number of scholars, 27 but in 
the light of the continuing debate it is necessary to develop the 
argument somewhat further than has previously been attempted. 
This alternative system can be founded more securely upon the 
evidence of reliable sources than the theories already discussed. 
It relies first and foremost upon the evidence of Aristotle, who 
in Book II of his Politics provides our earliest detailed account 
of Spartiate land tenure: 
"one might next go on to attack the inequality of property-ownership. For we find that some have come to have far too many possessions, others very few indeed; hence the land has fallen into the hands of a small number. Here there have been errors in the legal provisions too. For he [the lawgiver] quite rightly made it dishonourable to buy or sell land in someone's possession, but allowed those who wished to give and bequeath it; and yet this inevitably leads to the same result. Moreover, approximately [or 
"nearly"] two-fifths of all the land is possessed by women. There are two reasons for this: heiresses ( epikleroi) are numerous and dowries ( proikes) are large. It would have been better to have regulated dowries, prohibiting them altogether or making them small or at any rate moderate in size. But, as it is, an epikleros may be given in marriage to any person whatsoever; and, if a man dies without making a will, the man who is left as kleronomos gives her to whom he likes. So although the land is sufficient to support 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the number fell to below 1,000. The sheer facts have shown that these arrangements were bad: one single blow was too much for the polis and she succumbed owing to the shortage of men. It is said that in the time of their early kings they gave others a share in their constitution, so that in spite of long continuous wars there was not then any shortage of men. It is also said that at one time the Spartiates had as many as 10 ,000 . However, whether these statements are true or false, it is far better to keep up the numbers of males in a state by a levelling out of property. But the law on the begetting of children tends to militate against this reform. For the lawgiver, intending that the Spartiates should be as numerous as possible, encourages the citizens to beget many children; for 
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they have a law by which the father of three sons is exempt from military service, and the father of four from all taxes. But it is obvious that, if many are born and the land distributed accordingly, many must inevitably become poor" (1270al5-b6). 
Aristotle's evidence offers a reasoned account of the causes 
of the concentration of land and of widespread impoverishment 
which, when linked with his further remark ( 127la26-36) that 
those who were too poor to contribute their syssitia dues were 
excluded from citizenship, explains the long-term decline in 
Spartiate numbers. Unlike the account in Plutarch's Agis, it 
does not rely on a single cause but provides a sophisticated 
analysis which lays stress on a variety of contributory factors: 
the rights of gift and bequest, the number of heiresses and lack 
of controls over their marriages, the size of dowries, the 
. failure to extend citizen rights to outsiders, the law on 
procreation and the system of partible inheritance. 
Above all, Aristotle presents an account of the Classical 
Spartiate system of land tenure and inheritance which differs 
significantly from those in Plutarch or Polybius or in modern 
accounts which follow them. This has been denied by David (1982/83), who . argues that Aristotle's criticisms of Sparta are 
mainly directed not against the Lykourgan regime as such but 
against contemporary corruptions of Lykourgan institutions, 
including the system of land tenure and inheritance which he 
describes. David claims that this system, in particular such 
elements as freedom of gift and bequest, partible inheritance, 
the absence of strict control over the marriage of heiresses and 
the role of large dowries, resulted from the law of Epitadeus and 
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other associated changes in the early fourth century. Full 
discussion of his arguments concerning Aristotle's general 
approach to Sparta lies outside the scope of this 
dissertation; 28 and is indeed unnecessary, since Schiltrumpf's 
recent critique of David's argument (1991, 295f. & forthcoming) 
has demonstrated that the notion that Aristotle intended to 
differentiate between the original character of the Spartan 
constitution and its contemporary condition is incompatible with 
the text of the Politics (cf. esp. 1260b29; 1269a30ff.; 1270bll 
& 127la26ff.). The subject of Aristotle's enquiry was "die G(t,Se.Ue..., bestehende Gesetzgebung .. ;L-die einmal erlassen wurden und noch 
gilltig sind" (1991, 295). I hope to show below that none of the 
elements specified above were the result of fourth-century 
innovations, but constituted fundamental aspects of the system 
of land tenure and inheritance in operation throughout the 
Classical period. 
Although Aristotle provides the most penetrating analysis 
of all our sources, his is by no means a complete account of the 
practices of land tenure and inheritance, the operation of which 
is discussed only in so far as they shed light upon the failings 
which Aristotle identifies, and then only in the briefest of 
terms. Consequently, there remain several points which require 
elucidation. 
The first point concerns his remarks about purchase, sale, 
gift and bequest . 29 The regulations on these subjects are 
included within the same sentence and are all ascribed, through 
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the use of the verbs E~oi~a€v and 
€O@K€ without any corresponding 
subject, to an individual whose identity is not specified. (This 
will be discussed below.) Aristotle states that he made it 
dishonourable to buy or sell land. This testimony is not 
incompatible with the passage of Herakleides Lembos quoted above, 
which derives from the Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians. 
Although the Politics does not distinguish two types of land, its 
statement that the purchase or sale of land was dishonourable can 
be interpreted, in keeping with the nature of this tightly argued 
work, as a compressed account corresponding to the Lak. Pol.'s 
more detailed elaboration that the sale of any land was shameful 
and the sale of the ancient portion illegal. 
In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1986, 
388 n.45) I cited as comparison Politics 1263a35-7 (a summary of 
the details in Xenophon, Polity of the Lakedaimonians 6.3-4) 
which might seem to suggest, if only by implication, that I 
viewed the account in the Politics, Book 2, as postdating that 
in the Aristotelian Lak. Pol. Recently Schutrumpf (1991, 296-7) 
has cogently restated the case (for which see earlier Keaney 
1980) for the reverse sequence of composition, on the grounds 
that the imprecision of some of Aristotle's comments about 
Spartan institutions in Book 2 compared with those in later books 
is a sign that it predates the completion of the detailed 
research for the composition of the Lak. Pol . Arguing against 
the compatibility of the descriptions of land tenure in the 
Politics and the Lak . Pol., Schutrumpf (1991, 311) finds it 
problematic to treat the information in the former as covering 
I 
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a category of land (the ancient portions) of whose existence 
Aristotle shows no knowledge in the passage. 
This is, however, to beg the question. That Book 2 predated 
the Lak. Pol. does not mean that it was written in total 
ignorance of specific details about Spartan society, which may 
either have been part of a pre-existing fund of knowledge within 
the Aristotelian school - Schiltrumpf himself notes elsewhere 
(1987, 448-9) that Book 2 was "based on some source material, 
probably local chronicles" - or have been acquired from the 
initial stages of research for the Lak. Pol. which may have begun 
before the composition of Book 2. Aristotle's statement that 
"nearly", or "approximately'~ two-fifths of the land lay in female 
hands and his knowledge of the rules that applied concerning the 
marriage of heiresses are testimony to some body of exact 
information in the field of Spartiate landownership. 
It seems more likely that at the time of writing Book 2 
Aristotle was already aware of the existence of such a basic 
element of landownership as the ancient portions, but chose ( just 
as in the comparison of Pol. 1263a35-7 with Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-4) 
to give a more generalized summary of the state of affairs. An 
all-embracing statement about the dishonour attached to the sale 
of any land was sufficient (without adding distracting 
qualifications about the ancient portions) for the main point of 
contrast which he wanted to make, namely, that the legality of 
gift and bequest 
restrictions on sale. 
undermined the effect of 
Hence Aristotle is not ignoring the 
I 
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ancient portion and "discussing only one category of land, 
legally alienable property", as Cartledge suggests (1979, 
166). 30 Rather, for the sake of brevity and the effectiveness 
of a simple, direct contrast he stresses the dishonour attached 
to the purchase or sale of any land. 
Acceptance of Aristotle's testimony regarding sale is, 
therefore, consistent with the belief that there were two 
categories of Spartiate land, one of which was termed the 
'ancient portion', precisely as the Lak. Pol. states. The 
significance of the distinction between them, however, is 
unclear. Older studies have typically viewed the ancient 
portions as kleroi in the original Spartiate heartland of the 
Eurotas valley distributed among the whole citizen-body, as 
distinct from land which some citizens acquired elsewhere; 31 
and, as noted in Section I, they have often been equated with the 
poli tike ch6ra of Polybius and the equal kleroi of Plutarch. The 
error of this identification with such fictional entities of land 
has, however, already been demonstrated. This does not exclude 
the possibility that the distinction between the two categories 
may have originated at a time of a distribution of land; but 
precise historical situations need to be found for such an 
occurrence. Obvious possibilities are the late eighth century, 
after the initial conquest of part of Messenia, or during the 
seventh century, when it is likely that there was some fresh 
allocation of land, whether a partial redistribution of older 
land or a distribution of new land acquired after the second 
Messenian War, in order to bring poor Spartiates up to the level 
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required to maintain themselves as full-time hoplites (Cartledge 
1979, 135 & 168). These contexts are of course very different 
from that of the wholesale equal redistribution of land described 
by Plutarch and do not imply the kind of state control over the 
distributed land envisaged in his accounts (Toynbee 1969, 301 
n .1). 
If one is correct in seeking the origin of the ancient 
portion in such a context, it is still uncertain whether the term 
refers to the land thus allocated, which might later have been 
regarded as the original citizen portions of newly-established 
Spartiates, or, as Cartledge (1979, 168) has argued, to ancestral 
private estates mostly in the possession of wealthy citizens. 
Some scholars, however, would disassociate the distinction 
between the ancient portion and other land from the context of 
a past distribution. They view it largely in contemporary terms, 
with the ancient portion being merely land thought of as having 
passed down within the family from of old as opposed to land 
recently acquired by various means (Jones 1967, 43; Cozzoli 1979, 
8). Owing to these prevailing uncertainties, it is impossible 
to make any reliable judgment on precise issues regarding the 
ancient portions, such as their likely extent relative to other 
land or the proportion of the citizen body which owned them. The 
best that can be achieved is to form some general impression of 
their nature and significance through consideration below of 
other aspects of Spartiate land tenure. 
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In the second part of the sentence referred to above 
Aristotle states that those who wished to give or bequeath land 
were allowed to do so. The identity of the unspecified 
individual who permitted these actions has been hotly disputed. 
Many scholars believe that the person in question here, and also 
when he refers to "the lawgiver" elsewhere in this chapter, is 
Lykourgos and that this passage provides clear evidence against 
the historical reconstruction in Plutarch's Agis, according to 
which free gift and bequest were introduced only in the early 
fourth century by the ephor, Epi tadeus. 32 • Others have 
maintained that Epi tadeus himself is the person to whom Aristotle 
is referring and that the passage reinforces Plutarch's 
account. 33 
If one is to make a choice between these two putative 
individual lawgivers; on the basis of Aristotle's text the 
balance of argument favours Lykourgos. Since the person's 
identity is not specified in the sentence in question, one can 
reasonably expect that it is to be found earlier. There are two 
relevant earlier contexts in this section, 1269bl9-22 and 
1270a6-8. The former passage states that "the lawgiver" 
neglected to control the women; the latter reports the tradition 
that Lykourgos tried to bring them under control but abandoned 
his attempt, an obvious reference to a statement in Plato's Laws 
( 779E ff. , 804E ff.). It seems that Lykourgos and "the lawgiver" 
are to be equated; and it would therefore appear to follow that 
the unspecified individual responsible for the regulations 
II 
II 
j 
90 
concerning purchase, sale, gift and bequest, in what is the next 
comparable context, must also be Lykourgos. 34 
consideration of other parts of Aristotle's account also 
favours this conclusion. Throughout the remainder of the section 
devoted to Sparta he refers to "the lawgiver" on seven different 
occasions, at least four of which refer to Lykourgos, since they 
concern fundamental aspects of the Spartan system which all 
ancient traditions attributed to him." The only apparent 
contrary example is 1270bl9 where "the lawgiver" responsible for 
the ephorate may be King Theopompos, to whom the creation of the 
office is ascribed in Book 5, at 1313a25-33. The latter passage 
may well represent a change of opinion from that in Book 2, 
reflecting the fruits of subsequent research for the Lak. Pol.; 
but even if one grants this exception, it concerns an institution 
founded several hundred years previously. It therefore 
constitutes no parallel to the supposed reference to Epitadeus' 
recent law - a point also made by Schutrumpf (1987, 447 n.37), 
who rightly adds that Epi tadeus, who merely proposed a bill 
passed by the Spartans, could hardly be regarded as a nomothetes 
in the Lykourgan sense. That Aristotle has Lykourgos in mind as 
the Spartan lawgiver is suggested by his remark at 1273b32-5 that 
Lykourgos framed the Spartan laws and constitution of which he 
has already spoken. 36 His normal practice of avoiding 
mentioning the lawgiver by name seems to follow that of Plato 
(Laws 806C; cf. 692A) and carries no implication that he is 
thinking of anyone other than Lykourgos. 
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A more effective counter-argument against a positive 
identification of the lawgiver responsible for freedom of gift 
and bequest as Lykourgos is to be made not by asserting the 
claims of Epitadeus, but through the argument that the phrase 
"the lawgiver" is used not to specify a particular individual but 
more generically to denote simply the author, whoever it may be, 
of whatever law Aristotle is discussing at the time. 37 However, 
although this formulation does not formally exclude the 
possibility that in discussing gift and bequest Aristotle may be 
referring to a recent law, equally it does nothing to advance 
that possibility. In particular, it does not alter the cardinal 
point that, since Aristotle ascribes the disapproval of purchase 
or sale and the freedom of gift and bequest to the same 
unspecified subject (within a sentence whose two halves are 
deliberately paired), they must both in his view be either 
longstanding Lykourgan rules or recent innovations. Since the 
disapproval of purchase and sale of land was for Aristotle a 
characteristic of archaic states (Pol. 1266bl7-21; 1319al0-ll), 
it is unlikely that he believed it was a recent innovation in 
Sparta. It is impossible to maintain, as David (1982/83, 82) 
tries to do, that the law ort purchase and sale was an archaic 
attitude but that the law on gift and bequest was a product of 
an early-fourth-century change of law. 38 As Schutrumpf (1987, 
448) points out, the idea of decadence and corruption with which 
freedom of gift and bequest is associated in Plutarch's Agis is 
unknown to Aristotle, who does not contrast the fourth century 
with an earlier period when Sparta enjoyed sounder conditions but 
praises the stability o f the Spar tan system . Consequently, 
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whether or not he intended to attribute it specifically to 
Lykourgos, Aristotle must have regarded freedom of gift and 
bequest as a traditional right. 
Given the amount of detailed knowledge about Spartiate 
property rights which Aristotle displays, it is unlikely that he 
was mistaken and was somehow ignorant of Epitadeus' supposed 
recent law. In fact there is positive evidence for the legality 
of gift at the very beginning of the fourth century. We learn of 
King Agesilaos II that at the start of his reign, 
"when the polis pronounced him heir to all the property of Agis, he gave half to his mother's kinsfolk because he saw that they were in want" (Xen. Ages. 4.5; cf. Plut. Ages. 4.1). 
This passage disproves the historical reconstruction in 
Plutarch's Agis. According to the chronology of that account, 
the Spartan state began to suffer corruption soon after the end 
of the Peloponnesian War in 404 and then there was a period of 
length unspecified during which the traditional system of land 
inheritance preserved the social order before it was ruined by 
Epitadeus' law introducing free gift and bequest. It is hardly 
possible for all this to have happened before Agesilaos' 
accession, which took place most probably in 400 (Funke 1980, 36 
n.31). 39 This evidence refutes the idea . that it was the law of 
Epi tadeus which instituted freedom of gift. 40 The combined 
testimony of Aristotle and Xenophon indicates that this supposed 
law is as fictional as the account of land tenure and inheritance 
with which it is associated. 
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Since the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 
1986), the argument above has been further strengthened by 
Schutrumpf's demonstration (1987; cf. 1991, 312) that Plutarch, 
Agis 5 derives from a fictional account adapted, possibly by 
Sphairos, from Plato's Republic (especially 555C-E) . This is 
clear from the almost exact parallelism in motifs ( conflict 
between father and son, legally conceded rights, voluntary 
alienation of land and opposition between rich and poor), in 
psychological qualities, in the technique of individualization 
and even in the order of exposition. In one respect only does 
Plutarch's account depart significantly from its ultimate model, 
in that rights of gift and bequest are substituted for Plato's 
emphasis on rights of purchase and sale. The artificiality of 
this substitution is indicated by the fact that the Laws (922E-
923A) shows that Plato viewed the concession of the right of 
bequest as a failing not of recent lawgivers but of those of 
earlier times (Schutrumpf 1987, 449). The substitution should 
also dispel any thoughts that the relevant section of Plato's 
account might itself constitute a sound basis for authentic 
comment on Sparta's decline, since there has never been any 
question of ascribing that decline solely to rights of purchase 
and sale. Indeed, Plutarch, Agis 5 derives not from the portion 
of the Republic Book 8 which may genuinely be modelled on Sparta, 
the discussion of timarchy and its decline (547C-552E), but from 
Plato's theoretical account of the breakdown and overthrow of 
oligarchy in its transition to democracy. The chosen model is 
singularly inappropriate to the conditions of early-fourth-
century Sparta in which oligarchy was becoming more entrenched. 
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As Schiltrumpf (1987, 447) rightly remarks, "the account in Agis 
5 is a mere fiction in a Platonic spirit and is therefore 
historically useless". 
It seems clear then that freedom of gift, and probably also 
of bequest, had long been an established practice. Just as 
Aristotle's remarks concerning purchase and sale were seen to 
apply to all land, so logically should those of gift and bequest. 
In other words, there is no indication of restrictions on gift 
and bequest of the ancient portion (Cartledge 1979, 166). This 
view has recently been challenged by Schiltrumpf (1991, 311), who 
suggests that we should conclude from Aristotle's remarks that 
the rights of gift and bequest may have applied only to land 
whose sale was dishonourable, not the ancient portions for which 
sale was for bidden. His opinion, however, depends upon the 
assumption criticized above that Aristotle was ignorant of the 
ancient portions when he wrote Poli ties, Book 2. Given the 
forthright manner in which Aristotle's remarks are made and the 
fact that he gives the rights of gift and bequest as the first 
reason for huge disparities in landed wealth, it seems improbable 
that there was any significant proportion of Spartiate land to 
which those r1ghts did not apply. Moreover, the very fact of a 
legal prohibition on sale of the ancient portion may presuppose 
the principle that other forms of alienation were permissible 
(Finley 1968, 28). 
This suggestion that the extent of public control over the 
Spartiates' capacity to dispose of their landholdings was 
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relatively limited is supported by the evidence for adoption. 
The role envisaged for the procedure of adoption by scholars who 
follow the account in Plutarch's Agis is one whereby the state 
ensured that the person adopted was a landless younger son 
without an inheritance, with apparently little attention being 
paid to the wishes of the person who was to adopt him. The 
evidence, however, lends no weight to this interpretation. Our 
only source, Herodotus ( 6. 57. 5), reports that "if anyone 
wishes (~v ri~ ••• E0Eln) to adopt a child, he must do it in the 
kings' presence". Although the precise implication of the verb 
E0EATI is uncertain, the passage does not suggest state 
intervention of the sort envisaged above. It affords no grounds 
for assuming that the kings determined whom the man was to adopt, 
as Grote pointed out long ago. 41 It is natural that such 
adoptions should take place before official witnesses such the 
kings and there is no necessary implication that they interfered 
with the choice of adoptee. on the contrary, the primary 
emphasis here is upon the voluntary nature of the adoption and 
the kings' role as witnesses suggests simply state confirmation 
of an otherwise private transaction. As Lacey (1968, 201) has 
remarked, "the right to adopt a son is. . . characteristic of a 
family-based society, a society which thinks in terms of 
inheritance through the family". The right to choose a successor 
through adoption is a further indication of the control of the 
individual Spartiate over the disposal of his own estate. 42 
A further respect in which the character of Spartiate land 
tenure was not markedly different in quality from that of 
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individually-held property in other Greek states is that land was 
hereditarily transmitted from one generation to the next by means 
of partible inheritance. 43 Aristotle states that, "if · many are 
born and the land divided accordingly, many must inevitably 
become poor". His remarks are confirmed by Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 
1.9) when he explains that the reason why Spartiate men were 
willing to lend their wives to produce children for other men who 
did not want permanent wives of their own was that they "want to 
get brothers for their sons, brothers who are part of the kin and 
share in its power, but claim no part of its property ( ton 
chrematon)". 44 The implication is that the property would be 
divided among the recognized sons. 
This custom of wife-sharing, mentioned in addition by 
Plutarch (Lyk. 15.13; Comp. Lyk.-Numa 3.3; Mor. 242B) and 
Polybius (12.6b.8), should be interpreted as a method of reducing 
the excessive di vision of estates inherent in · the system of 
partible inheritance. Polybius implies as much in his remark 
that it was when a man had begotten enough children by his wife 
that he would give her to a friend. The man who borrowed the 
wife could also of course use this custom as means of limiting 
the number of his heirs. In the light of the evidence of the 
first-century A.D. Jewish scholar, Philo (On Special Laws 
3.4.22), that the Spartiates allowed marriage between uterine 
half-siblings (homometrioi, i.e. children of the same mother but 
different fathers), it has been noted that this cooperation could 
then be continued through the intermarriage of the sons and 
daughters of the two men, thus concentrating their properties for 
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the benefit of the succeeding generation. 45 In the passage 
above Polybius mentions another practice, polyandry, which had 
the same purpose, saying that it was a longstanding custom and 
quite usual for three, four or even more brothers to have one 
wife. 46 The practices of wife-sharing, uterine half-sibling 
marriage and polyandry (on which see further Chapter 4 below) all 
make sense on the supposition that land was transmitted 
hereditarily by means of partible inheritance. 
It has been claimed that the system of partible inheritance 
applied only from the fourth century after the supposed law of 
Epitadeus annulled a previous system of 'single heir' inheritance 
(Asheri 1961, 66; 1963, 5; David 1981, 102 & 221f. n.49; 1982/83, 
87). The arguments for the existence of such a previous system, 
however, are not strong: the evidence of Plutarch's Lykourgos 
criticized above and the use of the terms despotes, desposynos 
and hestiopam6n by various writers with reference to Sparta.~ 
Most of these passages tell us nothing about land tenure or 
inheritance. The passages cited from Tyrtaios (fr.5 Prato) and 
Plutarch (Lyk. 28.6) refer only to Spartiate mastership over the 
helots. Those from Pollux (1.74, 10.20) show only that each 
household had just one master. Finally, the reference in 
Xenophon (Hell . 3.3.5) indicates no more than that on each estate 
there was only one master, which would equally be the case under 
a system of partible inheritance; the other persons on each 
estate will have been helots. 48 It is also hard to see how the 
change allegedly introduced by Epitadeus would have brought such 
a 'single heir' system to an end, since the purpose of the law 
----~-----------·-
98 
was, according to Plutarch, to permit free gift and bequest, 
which is totally different from a change to partible 
inheritance. 49 Finally, it is implausible to believe that 
Xenophon, Aristotle, Polybius and Philo, who directly attest, or 
describe practices associated with, the system of partible 
inheritance, are all referring to some period after the early 
fourth century rather than to the period of Sparta's Classical 
eminence. It is perhaps indicative that when Plato ( Laws 
740A-741A) set forth his system of indivisible kleroi, he did not 
point to a Spartan precedent. 
There is, consequently, no reason to doubt that the common 
Greek practice of partible inheritance was the basic system which 
operated in Sparta throughout the Archaic and Classical 
periods. 50 Moreover, Aristotle's evidence has 
implications for the nature of the ancient portions. 
important 
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be difficult to make sense of his remarks, and to explain the 
severe decline in Spartiate numbers, if a significant proportion 
of the land remained i ndivisible . Accordingly , either the 
ancient portions must have been subject to partible inheritance 
or they must have comprised so small fraction of citizen land 
that they did not affect Ar istotle ' s generalizations. 
III . The property r ights of Spartiate women 
The final r espect in which Aristotle's analysis differs markedly 
from later accounts concerns the ownership of lande d prope rty by 
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women. This factor is absent from Polybi us' and Pl utarch ' s 
account of Classical land tenure, appearing only in the 
description of the supposedly degenerate third-century system 
described in the life of Agis. For Aristotle, however, the role 
of women as landowners, both as heiresses and as the recipients 
of landed dowries, was a crucial part of the traditional system , 
as is shown by the fact he portrays it as an important factor in 
the decline in the number of citizens to below 1,000 shortly 
after the battle of Leuktra. Since the property rights of women 
are an important touchstone for assessing the character of 
Spartan land tenure and inheritance in the Classical period, they 
are worth considering in detail. 
(a) Women as heiresses 
In many Greek states in the Classical period the position of a 
daughter (or daughters) whose father had died without male issue 
was governed by special regulations speci f y i ng who had the right 
to marry her (Schaps 1979 , ch . 3). Three texts inform us about 
the position of such women in Sparta . The earliest forms part 
o f Herodotus' )ist o f r oyal pr erogat i v es (6.5 7 .4): 
"The kings are the sole judges of these cases only : concerning an unmarried heiress to whom it pertains to have [her] , if her father has not betrothed her . .. " (wa rp OVXOO T€ Wap 0
€VOU W€pt 1 €~ TOV iKV€€TQt ! X€ lV, ~V µ~ W
€p b war~p a6r~v 
€yyu~an) . 
Herodotus ' sourc e for this list of prerogatives has recently 
been illuminated by earlier ( 1984, 250ff.). Its s tyle a nd 
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vocabulary suggest that it probably derived directly from a more 
or less official Spartiate list. Its manner of presentation 
implies unchanging prerogatives, accorded definitively in the 
distant past, which the kings continued to exercise in Herodotus' 
own day. These prerogatives are, however, described with extreme 
conciseness, sometimes to the point of ambiguity - a perhaps 
deliberate obscurity which allowed constitutional practice to 
alter without the kings' rights seeming to be infringed. 51 
These points should be borne in mind below, especially when we 
compare Herodotus' evidence with that of Aristotle. 
Three points in the above passage require attention. First, 
the heiress is called by the term patrouchos, meaning "holder of 
the patrimony", a combination of warp~a and EX€LV. It seems to 
correspond to the term patroiokos in the law code of Gortyn. 52 
A patr6i6kos in Gortyn, as long as she conformed to the laws 
specifying whom she was to marry, remained the legal owner of her 
father's property throughout her life, in contrast with the 
Athenian heiress, the epikleros, whose rights over her father's 
estate were considerably fewer and whose sons became its owners 
when they came of age. The similarity of terms suggests that the 
Spartiate patrouchos enjoyed legal rights of ownership over the 
patrimony comparable to those of her Gortynian counterpart. 53 
This is illustrated by the case of Lysander's daughters (Plut. 
Lys. 30.6; Mor. 230A; Aelian, V.H. 6.4; 10.15). The fact that 
they were courted when their father was thought rich, but 
deserted when on his death in 395 his poverty was revealed, 
suggests that they were heirs to whatever wealth Lysander 
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possessed. 54 Accordingly, when Herodotus gives Leonidas' 
marriage to Kleomenes I's only child, his daughter Gorgo, as one 
reason why he succeeded to the throne c.490 (7.205.1; cf.5.48.7, 
7. 239. 4) , the most likely explanation is that the marriage 
bolstered Leonidas' claim because Gorgo had inherited Kleomenes' 
property. 
Secondly, there is the question of the nature of the kings' 
jurisdiction. It is sometimes assumed (e.g. Asheri 1961, 61; 
1963, 18; Cozzoli 1979, 7) that their role was to allocate the 
heiress to a landless citizen. On the contrary, however, the 
verb iKV€cra1 denotes that the potential husband had some right 
to the heiress' hand and was not selected upon the arbitrary 
initiative of the kings." It seems likely that, as in other 
Greek states (cf. Schaps 1979, 44), the right to marry an heiress. 
who came within the kings' jurisdiction belonged to the nearest 
male relative. The circumstance of an old man with a young wife 
described by Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 1.7) and Plutarch (Lyk. 15.12) 
may often have been the outcome of just such a situation. 56 The 
kings' role was probably to adjudicate between the competing 
claims of different kinsmen, as did the dikasterion of the 
eponymous arch6n at Athens (Harrison 1968-71, i. lOf.). 
Finally, the kings' jurisdiction applied only to the case 
of an unmarried patrouchos not betrothed by her father. One 
already married or even merely betrothed was apparently permitted 
to retain her existing or intended spouse instead of having to 
marry her next-of-kin. 57 This is confirmed by the case of 
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Lysander's daughters. On their father's death the men to whom 
they were betrothed, far from being expected to give way to the 
next-of-kin, were fined when they disowned the girls. This 
contrasts with the law in both Athens and Gortyn where the next-
of-kin had the right to marry the heiress unless she was married 
and already had a son (in Athens) or child of either sex (in 
Gortyn). 58 There was evidently less control in Sparta over the 
possibility of the property passing to descendants who were not 
kinsmen and over the father's right to alienate his estate by 
marrying his heiress outside the kin. 
Aristotle's testimony quoted in Section II refers to the 
heiress by the Athenian term epikleros and mentions a person 
called the kleronomos who had control over her marriage when her 
father died intestate. The word kleronomos often means 
"heir" ; 59 but Aristotle clearly believed that the heiress 
herself was the legal owner of (at least most of) her father's 
estates, since he specifies the number of heiresses as one reason 
why approximately two-fifths of the land was owned by women. 60 
Aristotle's use of the term epikleros appears, therefore, to be 
a case of loose, untechnical phraseology {Wolff 1957, 166f.; 
Cartledge 1981, 97). 
As for the kleronomos, since the father had died intestate , 
he must logically be the heiress' male next-of-kin; but to 
interpret his position more fully is difficult. In the original 
version of this chapter {Hodkinson 1986 , 396) I suggested that 
the term kleronomos should strictly mean the "taker of the lot" -
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or "he to whom the lot is distributed" ( from nemein) . One 
possible interpretation of his position - which in the original 
publication I did not discuss at this point but mooted later in 
the concluding section (Hodkinson 1986, 405 n.120) - is that he 
was the person who inherited the ancient portion with the rest 
of the estate going to the heiress. (This idea would imply that 
the ancient portion was a symbolically important but relatively 
small plot of land; cf. Section IV below.) 
The problem with such strict readings is that, since 
Aristotle's use of the term epikleros does not reflect Spartan 
reality, there seems little reason to accept that the literal 
meaning of the word kleronomos accurately describes his role. 
Moreover, even on a strict reading, weaker interpretations of the 
phrase are also possible . It could mean "he who has the 
management of the lot" (from nemesthai) or, on analogy with the 
official called the paidonomos, "he who ( shep) herds the lot" . 
Either of these meanings would tie in with Aristotle's statement 
that the kleronomos decided whom the unbetrothed heiress should 
marry, and thus into which lineage the parental property would 
ultimately descend. This would be compatible with the view that 
the heiress retained all the property in question. 
In my original version I also followed Newman's suggestion 
(1887-1902, ii. 329; cf. Asheri 1961, 55 n.29) that as next-of-
kin the kleronomos did inherit the right to marry the heiress, 
if he wished. This interpretation has recently been questioned 
by Schutrumpf (1991 , 313), who states, without supporting 
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argumentation, that Aristotle's phraseology makes the notion that 
the kleronomos could himself marry the heiress very unlikely. 
I remain unconvinced by this argument. I can see nothing in 
Aristotle's phraseology to forbid the possibility of marriage 
between kleronomos and heiress; and it is in any case short-
sighted to consider the wording alone outside its context. 
Aristotle's subject is the concentration of land. His remarks 
focus on how the marriages of heiresses could bring this about 
and it is in this connection that he refers to the giving of the 
heiress outside the kin by the kleronomos. Aristotle is not, in 
his tightly-compressed exposition, attempting to give a full 
statement concerning who has the right to marry the heiress. 
Nothing in his account excludes the possibility that the 
kleronomos might marry the heiress himself. Aristotle does not 
mention it because it is not the concern of his argument. 
It would often of course be expedient for a kleronomos to 
choose not to wed the heiress but to pass her outside the kin, 
particularly if he himself was already advantageously married. 
But on other occasions matters will have been different. Such 
liaisons between an heiress and her father's brother (the most 
common next-o·f-kin) are the most natural explanation of the 
phenomenon of marriages between older men and younger women 
recorded by Xenophon ( Lak. Pol . 1 . 7) . 61 The phenomenon was 
indeed sufficiently significant for the state to permit the 
introduction of a younger man for reproductive purposes. None 
of this should seem surprising given how common such uncle-niece 
marriages were elsewhere in Greece; and the comparative 
...., 
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perspective also supports my argument in another respect. 
MacDowell (1986, 108) notes that the only Athenian instance known 
to him of a man called a kleronomos in a case in which a woman 
is an epikleros concerns a re l ative who expected to marry the 
girl himself. Since Aristotle appears to be drawing upon 
Athenian terms in his exposition, the parallel is a further 
indication that the Spartiate kleronomos was able, if he chose, 
to marry the heiress. 
Aristotle's statement that an heiress could be given in 
marriage to anyone (in the context this means by her father) 
agrees with the evidence of Herodotus. His following remark 
that, if a man died intestate, the person left as kleronomos gave 
the heiress to whom he likes, appears to indicate that a father 
could validly betroth his heiress not only during his lifetime 
but also in his will. 62 This right may already be implicit in 
the evidence of Herodotus, although it is not specific enough to 
permit certainty. A man's right to pass on his property in this 
way to descendants outside the kin, certainly during his lifetime 
(attested by both Herodotus and Aristotle), and perhaps also in 
his will, fits perfectly with his freedom to alienate his 
property by gift or bequest discussed in Section II. 
Aristotle's remarks concerning the kleronomos have usually 
led scholars to conclude that he is reporting important changes 
in law and practice since the time of Herodotus. It is argued, 
first, that the kings had lost their jurisdiction over the 
unbetrothed heiress, who now automatically came under the 
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guardianship of her male next-of-kin; secondly, that the rules 
governing the marriage of the heiress had been relaxed so that 
the next-of-kin could, and usually did, freely give her in 
marriage outside the kin. 63 
The procedures described by Herodotus and Aristotle may not, 
however, be as different as these views suggest. 64 Aristotle's 
testimony does not necessitate the conclusion that the kings' 
jurisdiction had disappeared or that it differed greatly from the 
adjudicatory role recorded by Herodotus. He does not specify the 
precise procedures followed when the father died intestate. The 
kings may well have adjudicated between competing claimants to 
the position of kleronomos, which was probably much sought after 
because of the potential for personal advantage and patronage 
afforded by control over the marriage of the heiress. 
It is not even certain that the role of the kleronomos 
differs significantly between the two passages. In comparing 
their testimony one must take into account the different nature 
of their evidence. Herodotus is recording the legal prerogatives 
of the kings, drawing without comment upon a Spartiate source 
which portrayed the law as traditional and uncontroversial 
without detailed reference to its practical application. 
Aristotle's sharp criticisms, on the other hand, are intended to 
highlight controversial aspects of Spartiate practice whose 
effects he judged to have been radical. It is not impossible 
therefore that their seemingly divergent evidence results as much 
from their totally opposite standpoints as from significant 
11 
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differences in either law or practice. Herodotus' brief 
statement of the official procedure does not specify the exact 
obligations upon the man to whom an heiress was adjudicated. Was 
he obliged to marry her himself? If not, did the right of 
marriage pass to the next nearest male kinsman as at Athens and 
Gortyn? 65 Or was he at liberty to betroth her to any citizen, 
as at the time to which Aristotle refers? Equally, I have 
already argued that Aristotle's kleronomos, although free to 
dispose of the heiress' hand, could also choose to marry her 
himself. The most that one can reasonably say about the process 
of change, if any, between the time of Herodotus and that of 
Aristotle is that it was considerably more subtle than has 
usually been thought. 
The final piece of evidence is Plutarch's description of 
King Leonidas' treatment of Agiatis, widow of King Agis IV whom 
he had executed in the year 241: 
"Leonidas took his [Agis'] wife, who had a new-born chi.ld ( paidion), from her home and compelled her to marry his son, Kleomenes, who was not quite at the age of marriage . He did not want to give the woman to anyone else because Agiatis was an epikleros of the large estate of her father, Gylippos" (Kleomenes 1.1-2). 
Two points deserve attention. First, if Plutarch is to be 
believed, the fact that Agiatis had a new-born child, a son 
probably named Eurydamidas (Pausanias 2.9.1, 3.10.5), did not 
alter her status as an heiress. 66 It is uncertain, however, 
whether Leonidas was using, and of course abusing, the kings' 
traditional role of adjudication (an interpretation which would 
lend support to the suggestion that the evidence of Aristotle 
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does not necessarily prove its demise) or simply acting 
arbitrarily. Secondly, there is the question of inheritance. 
The episode suggests that any sons born of Agiatis' remarriage 
would have had an equal claim ~o the inheritance as the son of 
her first marriage. The interests of his potential grandchildren 
will therefore have been an important reason why Leonidas was 
determined to marry Agiatis to his son. 
(b) Dowry. marriage-settlements and inheritance 
Next we must consider Aristotle's statement concerning the 
existence of large dowries (proikes), which he saw as partly 
responsible for the fact that women possessed about two-fifths 
of the land. Some later writers claimed that there were no 
dowries in Sparta. 
great reliability. 
None of their evidence is, however, of any 
The earliest reference, by Hermippos (fr.87, 
apud Athen. 555C), is associated with his . incredible portrayal 
of the supposed custom of marriage by capture in a dark room . 67 
Justin's evidence (3.3.8) is connected with the false notion of 
Lykourgan landed equality. Plutarch had no consistent view about 
dowries . Although one of his Lakonian Sayings (Mor. 227F) 
attributes a prohibition of dowries to Lykourgos, elsewhere he 
recounts a saying and a love story which imply their existence 
(Mor. 242B, a passage which, though sometimes cited as evidence 
against dowries, indicates the opposite; 775C-E). Finally, it 
is unlikely that Aelian (V.H. 6.6) was drawing upon a tradition 
independent of the above writers. 
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The testimony of Aristotle is sufficient evidence for some 
kind of transfer of land at the time of marriage by the parents 
of the bride. 68 This need not, however, have been the same as 
the institution of dowry as it operated in Classical Athens. 
Aristotle may be using the term proix in a loose, untechnical 
sense to describe an analogous but not identical social practice 
(cf. Schaps 1979, 85ff. & Appendix II). It is not necessary, 
therefore, to believe that any property thus transferred came 
under the management of the bride's husband as at Athens 
(Harrison 1968-71, 52ff.; Schaps 1979, 75). The fact that 
Aristotle saw dowries as partly responsible for female possession 
of two-fifths of the land suggests that the bride retained 
control of the gift just as the patrouchos did of her 
inheritance. This is the interpretation of Cartledge, who argues 
that "what Aristotle calls 'large dowries' were really ... 
marriage-settlements consisting of landed property together with 
any movables that a rich father (or mother) saw fit to bestow on 
a daughter" (1981, 98). 
The issue raised by this formulation is whether the amount 
of property transferred was · solely at the discretion of the 
bride's parents or whether it was predetermined in any way. The 
Gortyn Code, for example, also refers to the transfer of property 
to a bride by her father and indicates that, as in Sparta, it 
remained under her control (6.9-12; cf. Willetts 1967, 20; Schaps 
1979, 88). The property in question, however, was not merely a 
voluntary gift but the daughter's rightful inheritance which, if 
it was not given at marriage, she would receive ultimately on her 
----------------·· 
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father's death (4.37-5.9). A daughter was entitled to share in 
the inheritance of all her father's (and mother's) property, 
apart from certain specified items (town houses, the contents of 
untenanted country houses and livestock), even when there were 
surviving brothers, her portion being half that of a son. This 
was the maximum amount that could be given to her on marriage, 
to judge from the evidence of the Gortyn Code (4.48-51) that "if 
the father, while living, should wish to give to a daughter upon 
her marriage, let him give as prescribed, but no more" and 
Ephorus' statement (FGrH 70F149, apud Strabo 10.4.20) that "the 
dowry, if there are brothers, is half of a brother's portion". 
The question is whether a Spartiate daughter had the same rights 
of (anticipated) inheritance as her Gortynian counterpart. If 
she was not a patrouchos, was the amount of property transferred 
to her on marriage dependent solely upon the generosity of her 
parents and the strength of their desire to secure a desirable 
husband for her? Or did the settlement reflect her right to 
inherit a portion of the parental estates even in the presence 
of surviving brothers? 
The normal assumption has been that Spartiate women did not 
have any rights of inheritance in the presence of brothers. 69 
There is, however, some evidence which suggests the contrary. 
Aristotle states that approximately ( or nearly) two-fifths of the 
land was in the possession of women. 70 This statement has to my 
knowledge never been satisfactorily explained. There are two 
aspects to the problem. First, how did Aristotle discover the 
proportion of land in female hands? His use of the verb 
€art 
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suggests that it was obtained empirically rather than by a 
theoretical calculation based upon knowledge of the rules of 
Spartiate inheritance. Yet it is unlikely to be derived from a 
register of Spartiate landholdings, since Greek states typically 
did not keep such records (Finley 1952, 13f. & 207f. nn.18f.). 
More probably, it reflects the kind of informal local knowledge 
about property-ownership which circulated orally in Sparta as in 
modern small-scale village communities. 71 
Secondly, is it possible to explain how or why this 
particular proportion of land should have been in female hands? 
Now, a system of inheritance like that at Gortyn, according to 
which a daughter is entitled to a landed inheritance half that 
of her brother will tend to produce a distribution of land 
between the sexes such that the proportion owned by women is 
about 40%. The reason is that the 33.3% of land inherited by 
females in households with both surviving sons and daughters (on 
the assumption of an equal sex ratio across the population as a 
whole) is increased by several per cent by the fact that in 
households with surviving daughters only, the female inheritance 
is treble the normal share, whereas in those with only surviving 
sons, the male share is increased only one and a half times. 72 
The existence of such an inheritance system at Sparta would, 
consequently, explain Aristotle's figure. 
Furthermore, Aristotle's remarks concerning partible 
inheritance (Politics 1270bl-6) are not incompatible with the 
thesis that all children inherited, daughters as well as sons. 
II' 
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His statement (lines 5-6) that, "if many are born (~o11~v 
y1voµtvhlv) and the land distributed accordingly .... ", appears to 
refer back to lines 2-3, where he comments that the lawgiver 
encouraged the citizens "to beget many children" (on ~1€iaroui; 
~01€ia0a1 ~aioai;). There is no indication here that only sons 
inherited. It may be significant that Aristotle uses terms which 
carry no obvious differentiation between the sexes when he writes 
about division of the inheritance, despite the fact that he could 
easily have indicated such a differentiation. Al though in lines 
3-4 he mentions the alleviation of public duties which was 
granted to fathers of three or more sons, he does so only in 
order to illustrate his general remark about the lawgiver's 
intentions. He does not continue this explicit reference to sons 
into the following sentence in which he discusses division of the 
inheritance. 
There are also several historical instances which suggest 
female inheritance in the presence of brothers. Some concern 
marriages to close consanguineous kin contracted by members of 
the royal houses, unions which Cartledge (1981, 99) has already 
interpreted as having been made with the aim of concentration of 
property. 73 One is the mid-sixth-century marriage between King 
Anaxandridas II and his sister's daughter, a union which the king 
refused to dissolve despite his wife's initial childlessness and 
the insistence of the ephors that he send her away and marry 
again to perpetuate the royal lineage (Hdt. 5.39-41). Although 
Herodotus indicates that Anaxandridas was devoted to his niece, 
it is likely that material considerations were also involved . 
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Had he sent her away, her property would have gone with her and 
would almost certainly have been lost to his descendants . 74 
Only when he was permitted to retain her as well, did 
Anaxandridas agree to take another wife; and even after his 
second wife had borne him a son, he still ensured that his niece 
subsequently bore him children ( three sons) to inherit her 
property. All this suggests that she was of some wealth. There 
are several aspects of this case which we should like to know 
about, in particular her father's level of wealth (probably 
considerable for him to have married a king's daughter) and how 
much of it she received ( we do not know whether she was a 
patrouchos). Under the hypothesis suggested above, however, her 
wealth would be explicable on the grounds that her mother, 
Anaxandridas' sister, would have inherited a portion of the 
estates of her father, King Leon, and his wife, to which she 
would then have been sole or joint heiress in addition to 
inheriting from her own father . This episode makes more sense 
on the view that daughters inherited in the presence of brothers 
than otherwise . 
A s e cond example is the early-fifth- cent ur y marr iage between 
the future King Archidamos II and his step-aunt , Lampito (Hdt. 
6 . 71 ). This match originated from the fact that King Leotychidas 
II had marri ed t wice . His first marriage produc ed on ly a s on, 
zeuxidamos , who i n tur n fa t hered Ar chidamos before dying 
pre maturely without f urthe r issue . Lampito wa s the only child 
of Leotychidas' second marriage to a certain Eurydame, sister of 
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Menios and daughter of Diaktoridas. Since Archidamos' position 
as heir to the throne would not seem to have been in doubt, it 
seems likely that the purpose of the match, which was arranged 
by Leotychidas himself, was to concentrate the royal property for 
the benefit of his descendants. Now, if daughters did inherit 
in the presence of brothers, this marital manoeuvre would be very 
understandable: first, because Lampito, having only one 
step-brother, would be due to inherit one-third of Leotychidas' 
estates; secondly, because there would also be a probably 
substantial property due to her from her mother, Eurydame, who 
would herself have inherited possibly as much as a third of the 
estates of her father, Diaktoridas, and his wife. Such an 
inheritance would also explain why Leotychidas chose Eurydame as 
his second wife.= 
A third example concerns Kyniska, daughter of Archidamos II. 
Although she was not a patrouchos, she owned sufficient land and 
other resources to breed horses of a guali ty to gain two 
victories in the four-horse chariot race at Olympia. 76 It seems 
more likely that her great wealth stemmed from a right to inherit 
a portion of the estates of Archidamos and her mother than that 
she was voluntarily given a dowry of such great proportions. 77 
Nor was Kyniska alone. Pausanias (3.8.1, 17.6) informs us that 
Olympic chariot-race victories were subsequently won by several 
other Spartiate women, such as Euryleonis, victrix in the 
two-horse chariot race, probably in 368 (Moretti 1957, no. 418). 
In view of the evidence regarding Kyniska's position, it would 
be special pleading to claim that these other women must all have 
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been patrouchoi. The fact that such considerable amounts of land 
could come into the hands of these women adds further strength 
to the proposition that they possessed inheritance rights to a 
significant portion of their parents' property. 
In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1986, 
402f.) I also discussed one further case, that of Agesistrata and 
Archidamia, respectively the mother and maternal grandmother of 
the mid-third-century king, Agis IV. According to Plutarch (Agis 
4. 1) , Agesistrata and Archidamia owned the most property of 
anyone in Sparta. Taken at its face value, this statement would 
mean that the two women were richer not only than Agesilaos, 
Archidamia 's son and Agesistrata' s brother, who, al though in 
debt, was a large landowner (ibid. 6.6 & 13.1-2), but also than 
Agis himself. Plutarch does not specify that they were richer 
in land than their two male relatives; but their landed estates 
must have been not too much smaller for them to be wealthier 
overall. I argued that this seemingly improbable situation would 
in fact be possible under a system according to which a daughter 
could inherit half a son's portion on marriage, especially if a 
son might have to wait until his mother's death to gain her 
property. 78 Utilizing a family tree of the Eurypontid royal 
house from the reign of King Eudamidas I onwards based upon the 
prosopography of Bradford (1977, Appendix 6), I hazarded a set 
of hypothetical calculations of the relative number of units of 
land in the hands of each of the relevant persons, according to 
which the landed property of the two women was indeed greater or 
not significantly smaller than that of their male relatives. 79 
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Recently, however, McQueen (1990, 163ff.) has argued the 
case for a different configuration of Eurypontid family 
relationships, adoption of which would alter the calculations 
such as to deflate the landholdings of Archidamia and Agesistrata 
in relation to those of Agesilaos and Agis. 80 What the 
disagreement seems to show is that a definitive reconstruction 
of the family tree lies beyond our reach. McQueen's arguments 
against Bradford's reconstruction - the improbability of the 
cross-generational marriages of Kings Eudamidas I and II to 
Archidamia and Agesistrata, respectively - are plausible but by 
no means certain given the evidence discussed above for similar 
royal marriages in earlier periods. 81 There may indeed have 
been other members of the Eurypontid royal house unknown to us 
whose existence would further alter the calculations in either 
direction. In any case, even the deflated calculations of the 
women's landed estates based upon McQueen's family tree are not 
so unfavourable (at a time when the relative importance of non-
landed property was evidently greater than in earlier periods) 
as to exclude compatibility with Plutarch's statement about their 
overall property holdings, even if we take his evidence at face 
value rather than as understandable hyperbole. 
In spite of some uncertainties surrounding each of these 
examples, cumulatively they lend support to the proposition that 
a daughter could normally expect to receive a portion of her 
parents' property as an inheritance even in the presence of 
surviving brothers. In a society without a written law code the 
application of the convention that daughters inherited half the 
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amount of property that went to a son need not have been rigid, 
especially as it affected the size of marriage-settlements. 
Under a property regime which permitted transfer of land through 
gift or bequest, the size of the parental estate might frequently 
have differed at the time when a son succeeded on the death of 
one or both parents from the earlier time of his sister's 
marriage. Similarly, one should not assume either that 
marriage-settlements were compulsory (they were not at Gortyn) 
or that they had to be to the full value of a daughter's 
inheritance entitlement. No doubt rich households could better 
afford to make such settlements than could poor ones for whom 
every scrap of land needed to be retained for as long as possible 
to sustain the syssitia contributions of its adult male members. 
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the knowledge that a daughter 
would ultimately expect to receive a significant portion of her 
parents' estates by way of inheritance exercised a pronounced 
influence upon the size of marriage-settlements offered by those 
families which could afford them. That was why Aristotle named 
large dowries as one of the two reasons for the ownership by 
women of approximately two-fifths of the land. 
Whether or not one accepts this hypothesis, it is apparent 
that among the richer families marriage-settlements were often 
large. They were obviously designed not merely to provide 
support for the bride in her new household, but to settle either 
the whole or the bulk of her claim to her parents' estates, thus 
ensuring that a significant part of the parental property was 
ultimately passed on to her own children. 82 It is clear that 
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the Spartiate inheritance system operated on the basis of a 
diverging pattern of devolution, according to which the property 
of an individual (in the Spartiate case, either male or female) 
was distributed to children of both sexes and hence diffused 
outside the kin (Goody 1973; 1976b, 6f.). Indeed, the 
characteristics of Spartiate marriage patterns (such as uterine 
half-sibling marriage and royal unions with other close blood 
relations) closely parallel those found in other societies in 
which diverging devolution operates. Such societies often have 
a high level of endogamy and other forms of in-marriage as a 
means of restricting diffusion of property outside the kin (Goody 
1973, 27). Adelphic polyandry, another practice evidenced in 
Sparta, is also associated in many societies with property 
ownership by women as well as by men (Leach 1955 = 1971). This 
combination of ethnographic parallels with the evidence of royal 
marriage manoeuvres going back to the mid-sixth century provides 
a firm indication that the system of diverging devolution and the 
significant amount of female land ownership to which it gave rise 
were basic aspects of Spartiate land tenure and inheritance from 
at least the late Archaic period onwards, if not before. 
IV. Implications 
The picture of Spartiate land tenure and inheritance suggested 
in this chapter is markedly different from those postulated by 
Plutarch and his modern followers. In place of a schema governed 
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by public controls and dominated by indivisible, inalienable, 
male-owned and equal kleroi, with reversion back to the state at 
death or succession by primogeniture, we have witnessed a system 
in which individual citizens· had indefinite possession of 
landholdings which were transmissible by partible inheritance and 
diverging devolution and open to alienation through lifetime 
gifts, testamentary bequests and the betrothal of heiresses. 
Inevitably, some uncertainties remain, especially concerning 
the enigmatic 'ancient portions'. Yet even here some advancement 
of our understanding has been possible. It was noted in Section I 
II that, apart from the legal prohibition on purchase or sale, 
the ancient portions must either have been subject to the same 
rules as the rest of Spartiate land (namely, freedom of gift and 
bequest, partible inheritance and - if one accepts the arguments 
of Section III - inheritance by women) or they cannot have 
comprised more than a small fraction of Spartiate estates. 83 It 
seems clear that the ancient portions are either no exception, 
or no significant exception , to the character of land tenure 
advocated above. 
Given the paucity of evidence, we have been able to view the 
system of tenure and inheritance only in its crudest outlines, 
without the possibility of considering the many subtleties and 
complexities of law and practice to which the variety of 
individual circumstances no doubt gave rise in everyday life. 
Moreover, this study has focused solely upon rights of ownership, 
alienation and transmission, to the exclusion of rights and 
I 
I 
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duties concerning the use of land and its produce, as well as 
consideration of other forms of property. 
Nevertheless, the interpretations suggested in this essay 
have important implications for our understanding of the 
character of Classical Spartiate society. Anthropologists have 
emphasized the significant repercussions of female tenure of 
land, whether gained through inheritance or dowry, in particular 
the drastic reorganization of ownership every generation and the 
accentuation of demographically-induced inequalities (Goody 1976; 
Leach 1955 = 1971). Demographic studies of pre-industrial 
societies marked by high mortality rates have stressed the 
dangers and difficulties inherent in strategies of heirship by 
which individuals might attempt to ensure the survival of a male 
heir whilst avoiding excessive division of the inheritance 
(Wrigley 1978; cf. Lane Fox 1985 , 214). The fragility of such 
heirship strategies must have been significantly greater when 
daughters could inherit portions of the parental landholdings 
even in the presence of sons. Finally, the evidence from 
Classical Athens, in which women possessed considerably fewer 
property rights than in Sparta, indicates, nevertheless, the 
covert household influence of the dowried wife and the potential 
dominance of the wealthy epikleros. 8 4 The evidence from 
Hellenistic Sparta (Plut. Agis 6.7, 7.6) demonstrates the 
pervasive influence of women whose property rights were similar 
to those of their Classical counterparts. It m~y be significant 
that Aristotle, the single writer properly to emphasize the role 
of women as owners of land , is also the one who takes pains to 
1 J 
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point out the important influence they exercised within the 
Spartiate state (Politics 1269bl2-1270a33; cf. Redfield 1977/78, 
160; Kunstler 1983, ch.13). 
Thus the conclusions of this chapter direct us to two basic 
and related contradictions within Spartiate society: first, 
between the facade of a seemingly stable society marked by an 
unchanging system of government and the reality of an unceasing 
movement of significant tracts of landed property and continual 
shifts in the fortunes of a declining number of citizen 
households; and, secondly, between the narrowly political 
demands of the male-centred hoplite polis, which overtly 
minimized the importance of material considerations, and the 
fundamental economic needs of female-influenced households upon 
whose survival the polis depended. These insights into the 
nature of Spartiate society which are gained from a study of its 
system of land tenure and inheritance will be explored further 
in Chapter 4 in an examination of some important aspects of the 
success and decline of Spartiate society. Before undertaking 
that exploration, however, I shall attempt in the following 
chapter to widen the perspective on Spartan landholding by 
considering the relationships between Spartiate landowners and 
their helot cultivators. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 2 
1. For an example of 19th-century controversy, Grote (1854, ii. 
530ff.) with refs. to earlier views. For refs. to other 
discussions, cf. Walbank (1957, 731); Michell (1964, 205ff.); 
Oliva (1971, 32ff., 48ff. and 188ff.). 
2. E.g. Michell (1964, 205ff.); Oliva (1971, 36ff.); Forrest 
(1980, 135ff.); Figueira (1984, 96f). Both Michell and Oliva, 
however, waver somewhat in their accounts, saying that a man's 
kleros must often have been passed on by the state to his eldest 
son. 
3. Dilts (1971); see also the works cited by Tigerstedt 
(1965-78, i. 566 n.412). 
4. Cf. also Plut. Mor. 238E-F, which refers to "the anciently 
established portion, which it is illegal to sell". 
5. 6.45.1-3; cf. 6.48.3, where this equality is attributed to 
Lykourgos. 
6. This procedure, denounced by Grote (1854, ii. 555f. note) 
in the last century, is most obvious with regard to belief in the 
indivisibility of the Spartiate kleros. Some examples: i) 
Michell (1964) accepts the evidence . of Plut. Lyk. 16 on 
pp.207ff., without mentioning Aristotle's account, which is not 
introduced until p.219. Aristotle's crucial . comment on the 
divisibility of Spartiate estates (Polities 1270b4-6) is not 
quoted until p. 229 and is then ignored in the subsequent 
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discussion. ii) Hooker (1980) pronounces on p.116 that estates 
were indivisible, does not quote Aristotle until p.142 f. and 
ends the quotation one sentence before the comment upon 
divisibility. iii) David (1981, 46ff.) conducts his discussion 
without a reference to Aristotle in the main text, mentioning his 
testimony only in later sections (68f., 102ff.) as evidence for 
the new system supposedly introduced by the law of Epitadeus. 
His earlier discussion ( 50ff.) of a number of other 
fourth-century sources does not include any precise evidence 
about the nature of land tenure and inheritance. 
7. In addition to those cited above, cf. Plut. Comp. Lyk.-Num. 
2.6; Solon 16.1-2; Kleom. 18.2; Mor. 226B; Justin 3.3.3. 
8. MacDowell (1986, 89) makes the incredible claim that, when 
Plato says that of the three Dorian states Argos and Messene 
later destroyed their constitution and laws, and only Sparta 
persisted with the arrangement , "this appears to imply that 
equality of landholdings in Sparta still obtained in Plato's 
time"; but Plato's phraseology gives no indication how long he 
thought it persisted. MacDowell is equally cavalier in his 
assertion (1986, 92) that the idea that equality of landholding 
was invented in the late fourth or third century "can be 
dismissed at once, because we have already seen that it goes back 
as early as the time of Plato". He ignores the fact that Plato's 
equal distribution, unlike that ascribed to Lykourgos, is not 
located in the historical period. 
9. Walbank (1957, 727); cf. his comment on Plb. 6.5.1 , where 
II 
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"the anacyclosis, which is probably the work of some writer of 
the third or second century, is said to have been set forth by 
'Plato and certain other philosophers'"· See also Gabba (1957, 
205). 
10. Walbank ibid.; cf. Jones ( 1967, 40f.); Cozzoli ( 1979, 
18ff.). Xenophon' s view that the Lykourgan reforms were approved 
by Delphi and that they were unique (refs. in Cozzoli 1979, 20) 
further demonstrates the inaccuracy of Polybius' claim that he 
identified the Lakedaimonian constitution with that of Crete. 
11. Walbank (1957, 728); Barber (1935, 116). Cf. the judgment 
of Tigerstedt (1965-78, i. 210) that Ephorus' biography of 
Lykourgos "has no historical value, but. . . . shows how 
quasi-scientific history in combination with political propaganda 
fashioned a consistent picture of the organization of the Spartan 
state and its mythical lawgiver". 
12. A hypothesis discounted by Kessler (1910, 38); but for the 
considerable influence of this pamphlet on Ephorus, cf. Barber 
(1935); David (1979, 109ff. ). 
13. David, (1979, 116); I accept his thesis, following Ed. 
Meyer (1892, 233ff.), that Pausanias' pamphlet contained not an 
attack on Lykourgos' laws but a eulogy aimed at convicting his 
opponents, who he claimed had violated those laws. 
14. And possibly also with the 9,000 strong citizen body 
achieved in Athens in 322 by a limitation of the franchise which 
was portrayed as a return to the ancestral constitution (Diod . 
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18.18.5; Plut. Phokion 27.5) and may have been viewed as the 
archetype of a balanced constitution. 
15. This explanation of Plutarch's first version seems 
preferable to the alternative argument that the 9,000 citizen 
kleroi represent an arbitrary doubling of the kleroi in Agis' 
projected reform designed to reflect Sparta's former control of 
Messenia (see the refs in Marasco 1981, i. 115 n.1, to which add 
Cartledge 1979, 169f.), because the tradition about Lykourgos 
uniformly places him before the conquest of Messenia. The 
opposite theory that Plutarch's first version was in existence 
before the third century and was halved by the revolutionaries 
( Ehrenberg 1924, 44; Ziehen 1933, 223) fails to explain the 
30,000 perioikic kleroi. Since there is no reason to believe 
that the Spartiates (re)distributed, or were thought to have 
(re)distributed, perioikic land before the third century, the 
revolutionaries' figure for the perioikic, and therefore also for 
the Spartiate, kleroi must have existed first (Cartledge ibid.; 
Jones 1967, 40). MacDowell's assertion (1986, 28) that 
Plutarch's statement about the perioikic kleroi does not imply 
a systematic distribution is hard to credit, since their 
allotment is covered by the same verb (eneime) as the allotment 
of citizen kleroi. In addition, Marasco's studies show that 
MacDowell 's conclusion ( 1986, 91) that "Plutarch had several 
sources of information available to him, and they agreed that the 
total number of lots ... was 9,000" is altogether too ingenuous. 
16. For the suggested influence of the Peripatetics on Plutarch 
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and their unreliability, Tigerstedt (1965-78, i. 304ff.); 
Aalders (1982, 64). 
17. On the effect of the revolution in propagating an idealized 
vision of Lykourgan Sparta, Africa (1961); Starr (1965/1979); 
Tigerstedt (1965-78, ii. 49ff.). 
18. For Plutarch's dependence upon Phylarchos, cf. the refs. in 
David (1981, 211 n.86), esp. Gabba (1957). 
19. E.g. 1) the reference to conflict between kings and ephors 
in Plut. Agis 12.2 goes far beyond Arist. Pol. 1271a 24-6, esp. 
the idea that the two kings together could outweigh the ephors; 
2) in Agis 9 .1, 11.1, despite the fact that an assembly was 
called when the Gerousia was divided, it was still the Gerousia 
which made the final decision, not the assembly as in Pol. 
1273a6ff. whichever one prefers of the two possible 
interpretations suggested by T.J. Saunders (in Sinclair, trans. 
1981, 156 n.3); 3) in Kleom. 10.2-3 the ephors gradually usurp 
power after initially being assistants to the kings, whereas in 
Pol. 1313a25ff. and in Plut. Lyk. 7.2 they are a check on royal 
authority from the start. This last example demonstrates the 
error of Maras_co's general assumption that Plutarch's sources for 
the lives of Agis and Kleomenes were the same as those for the 
life of Lykourgos. Plutarch's use of Aristotle in the Lykourgos 
does not prove that he was a significant source for the other two 
lives. 
20. Marasco (1978a, 179, with refs. to earlier works); David 
(1982/83 , 80) . 
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21. This contradicts David's implicit claim (1981, 59ff., esp. 
66) that the remarks of Plato, Republic 547D-552E on the decline 
of (Spartan) timarchy and the evils of oligarchy corroborate the 
account of Phylarchos. The link which Schutrumpf has established 
between Plutarch, Agis and Plato's Republic does not indeed 
relate to this part of Plato's work, in which he says nothing of 
changes in the nature of land tenure. His general statement that 
under an oligarchy a man is allowed to sell all he has to another 
and become a pauper (552A-B) is unlikely to be a reference to 
such a measure as the supposed law of Epitadeus, which concerned 
not sale but gift and bequest. 
22. The most recent example of arbitrary conjecture is that of 
MacDowell ( 1986, 94ff.), who is compelled to postulate the 
existence of no fewer than three different unattested laws in 
order to explain how Plutarch's lots were passed on in 
approximately the same number over the generations. 
23. For this claim, see e.g. Michell (1964, 207ff.); David 
(1981 , 46ff.); Marasco (1981, i. 211); MacDowell (1986, 93f.). 
Marasco attempts to avoid this contradiction by claiming that 
Plutarch's account is not one of complete equality. He argues 
that the phrase a.µw(, yE 'ff<,)(, in Agis 5. 2 indicates that the 
equality was only partial. For this to be so , however, one would 
expect the phrase to be placed either before or after oiaµEvouaa. 
As it stands, the more natural interpretation of the meaning of 
the sentence is that other defects in the state were partially 
corrected by the complete equality. 
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24. Hence MacDowell's attempt (1986, 91) to use Plut. Agis 8 to 
clarify the meaning of the politike ch6ra must be ruled out of 
court. 
25. Cf. von Pohlmann, (1906, 275 n.1). It is no defence to 
argue, as does Marasco ( 1981, i. 209f.), that Plutarch was 
concerned not with the concentration of land but with the freedom 
to alienate the kleros which led the poor into destitution. 
Plutarch himself states that equality existed before Epitadeus' 
law and that concentration of land and widespread poverty were 
its consequences. 
26. Poverty of younger sons: David, (1981, 48); both he (at 92) 
and Hooker (1980, 143) fail to discuss the question of manpower 
decline before the battle of Mantineia in 418. Natural 
extinction: Marasco (1981, i. 211); the implausibility of this 
explanation is increased by the fact that it is supposed to 
account for the entire manpower decline down to the 360s, since 
Marasco believes that each Spartiate possessed by right of birth 
a lot sufficient for his maintenance until the law of Epitadeus , 
which he dates after the loss of Messenia (214). 
27. Refs. to older works in Toynbee (1969, 301 n.1); cf. more 
recently Cartledge (1979, 165ff.); Cozzoli (1979, lff) . 
28. Note, however, that Rhetoric 1398b17-18, which David cites 
to underpin his argument (1982/83, 85ff.; 1979, 69 with 213 nn.98 
& lOOf.) that the objects of Aristotle's criticisms were 
departures from Lykourgos' laws, not the laws themselves , will 
hardly bear the weight placed upon it. The statement that the 
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Spartans were happy as long as they obeyed the laws of Lykourgos 
appears merely as a commonplace saying cited as an example of 
argument by induction, a counterpart to the vague statement that 
the Athenians were happy as 16ng as they observed Salon's laws 
and the ascription of Theban success to their leaders' becoming 
philosophers. It is not even certain that the statement is by 
Aristotle himself, rather than a continuation of the quotation 
from Alkidamas which precedes it (Cope 1877, II. 233). 
29. 1270al8-21: rof> TO o E K'.Q\ 01. a f@V v6µ.hlV r € fQK'. fat. (pQl)A,(i)(; · 
iliveia0a1. µ.Ev yap~ ff(i)A€1V f~V uffapxouaav 
€ff0t~a€v OU Ka.A6v, 6p0@t; 
ffo1.11aat; 01.06vm. 
B0uloµtv01. t;. 
Karald ff€1. v E~ouai av EoWK'.€ roi t; 
30. The argument of Michell ( 1964, 220f.), that Aristotle 
ignores the Spartan prohibition against sale of the ancient 
portion, on the grounds that at 1319al0-19 he gives examples of 
such prohibitions without mentioning Sparta, is incorrect. The 
cases of Oxylos and the Aphytaians to which Michell refers are 
not examples of prohibition against sale, nor did Aristotle 
intend them as such; he gives no such examples at all. 
31. See es~. Pareti (1917, 197ff.); Ehrenberg (1924, 45ff.); 
further refs. in David (1981, 200f. n.13). 
32. Ed. Meyer 
( 1887-1902, ii. 
(1892, 
325f.); 
258 n.3); Busolt (1893, 523); Newman 
Meier ( 1939, 56); Jones ( 1967, 41); 
Cartledge (1979, 165ff.); Cozzoli (1979, 6); Forrest (1980, 137); 
Schutrumpf (1987 & 1991, 312). 
130 
33. Ehrenberg (1929, col. 1402); Asheri (1961, 45ff.; 1963, 12); 
Fuks (1962, 251 = 1984, 237); Oliva (1971, 191); Christien (1974, 
20lf.); David ( 1981, 68f.; 1982/83, 8lff.); Marasco ( 1979, i. 
l 79f) . 
34. Cf. also Schiltrumpf (1987, 447; 1991, 312). Marasco (1981, 
i.179) claims that the phrase c5t a r&v v6µ@v indicates that 
Aristotle is referring not to the original Lykourgan constitution 
but to the contemporary situation. This is far from clear, 
however, especially since at 1270a7 he uses the phrase u~o rou~ 
v6µou~ with reference to Lykourgos' attempt to control the women. 
(I owe this last point to Dr. J.F. Lazenby.) 
35. The four references are: 1270b42, concerning the elders; 
127lal3, ambition; 127la32 (cf. 26-8), the common meals; 
127lbl3, intention to instil disdain for money. The other refs. 
are: 1270bl; b19; 127la22. 
36. Although the authenticity of the whole chapter from 1273b27 
to 1274b26 has long been the subject of debate (refs. in Susemihl 
and Hicks 1894, 318), one should distinguish 1273b27-1274a21, 
which seems to be a genuine Aristotelian account of Solon' s 
legislation, from the more dubious section on other lawgivers 
which follows: cf. Newman (1887-1902, ii. 372f.). The fragment 
from the Lak. Pol. (Dilts 1971, fr.9), which implicitly 
criticizes those who attributed the whole Spartan politeia to 
Lykourgos, bears no necessary implications for Aristotle's view 
in the Poli ties ( pace David 1982/83, 81), since it could be 
another instance of a change of opinion (Keaney 1980 , 52). 
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37. Von Holzinger (1894, 61); Weil (1960, 244); MacDowell (1986, 
103f.). 
38. His attempt (1982/83, 86) to evade this point by arguing 
that, because the law was passed several decades before the 
Poli ties was written, Aristotle already regarded it as an 
integral part of the Spartan law code is unconvincing. For an 
almost identical argument to that in the text, Schutrumpf (1987, 
447 n.37). 
39. The earliest date at which most scholars who accept the 
authenticity of Epitadeus would place his law is the mid-390s; 
e.g. David (1981, 67), who supposes that it was enacted towards 
the end of Pausanias' reign in 395, or shortly afterwards. Other 
scholars place Epi tadeus after the battle of Leuktra: e.g. 
Marasco (1980, 132). Attempts, such as that of MacDowell (1986, 
105), to date his law before 404 or to equate Epitadeus with the 
Epitadas who died on Sphakteria in 425 violate the chronology of 
Plutarch's account upon which they rely and are justly criticized 
by David ( 1981, 211 n. 88). The irreconcilably contradictory 
views of those scholars who have attempted to pinpoint a 
chronological location for Epi tadeus' law are criticized by 
Schlitrumpf (1987, 449-52). 
40. The fact that Xenophon 's evidence concerning Agesilaos' gift 
was repeated by Plutarch in his own biography of the king (Ages. 
4 .1), further demonstrates the latter's lack qf awareness of 
contradictions between his accounts in different biographies and 
casts additional doubt upon the veracity of the account in the 
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life of Agis. Note that Agesilaos' freedom to alienate this land 
was not restricted by the fact that his son, Archidamos, must 
already have been alive at the time. Since Archidamos' paidika, 
Kleonymos, was about 18 in the year 378 (he had just come out of 
the paides: Xen. Hell. 5.4.25; cf. Tazelaar 1967, 139f. & 147f.), 
he must himself have been then in his late twenties or early 
thirties (there was probably normally at least 8 years between 
erastes and paidika: Hodkinson 1983, 245 & 251 n.28) and will 
therefore have been born several years at least before the 
incident in question. 
41. Grote (1854, ii. 558f. n.1). The verb E0EATI could imply 
either the initiative of the adopter or his consent to what 
someone else has requested or proposed; cf. the usages in LSJ9 • 
The majority of Herodotus' uses of ( E )0EA(l) in hypothetical 
conditional clauses are of the former type (2.11.4, 13.3, 14.1, 
99.3, 173.4, 3.12.1; cf. Powell 1960, s.v., Section 7) and this 
meaning is also frequent in other contexts (e.g. 1.141.1, 2.2.1, 
3.1, 6.52.6, 56). Since, however, the p~ssage in question is 
part of a list which may derive directly from a more or less 
official Spartan source (Section III, below), it may be that 
normal Herodotean usage is not relevant. The clause is perhaps 
deliberately imprecise, but it need imply no more than that a man 
with too many sons might approach another man to request 
adoption. 
42. Plutarch (Lyk. 15.12) refers to adoption when describing the 
custom whereby an old man with a young wife procured the services 
of a younger man to beget children by her, a passage clearly 
,I 
133 
derived from Xenophon, Lak. Pol. 1.7. Plutarch claims that the 
older man would then adopt the offspring; but, since this is not 
mentioned by Xenophon, it is possible that he is mistaken. Since 
some of the occasions when the custom applied may have been 
marriages between an heiress and her next-of-kin (see Section 
IIIa below), adoption would not always have been appropriate. 
43. On partible inheritance as the general Greek pattern, cf. 
most recently Lane Fox (1985, 211ff.). 
44. MacDowell's claim (1986, 95) that ton chremat6n "probably 
refers to other forms of property" than land is extremely forced. 
Why should we think that Xenophon means to exclude the most 
important form of property, land? 
45. Cartledge (1981, 103 n.118); Lane Fox (1985, 223). Philo's 
evidence seems reliable since his accompanying statements that 
the Athenians permitted marriage between non-uterine 
half-siblings and the Egyptians full brother-sister marriage are 
both correct: cf. Harrison (1968-71, i. 22-3); Hopkins (1980, 
303ff.). 
46. I have adopted the interpretation of this passage by Lane 
Fox (1985, 222), who suggests that the clause aoc:).cpov~ ovra~ 
should be taken with all the preceding accusatives. On the 
relevance of polyandry to the concentration of property, Kunstler 
(1983, 475 & 593 n.990), who, along with Lane Fox (1985, 223), 
stresses that avoidance of division was as much a strategy of the 
rich as of the poor upon whom Aristotle concentrates . This is, 
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indeed, suggested in the context of wife-sharing by Xenophon's 
reference to the power (dynamis) of the kin. 
47. Asheri's additional references (1961, 66; 1963, 5) to 
privileges within the royal houses deriving from primogeniture 
(Hdt. 6.52; Paus. 1.1.4) are no support for a supposed system of 
indivisibility. Indeed, his general perspective (for which, cf. 
also 1966, 71 & 77), which involves the claim that primogeniture 
was the traditional practice of moderate constitutions, is 
fundamentally mistaken. Partible inheritance was the invariable 
practice throughout Greek antiquity; the unique regulations of 
Plato's Laws (740B-D, 923C-D) and the frequently misunderstood 
advice of Hesiod concerning the desired number of sons (Works and 
Days 376-80) offer no support to Asheri's view: cf. Lane Fox 
(1985, 211 & 216). 
48. Cf. also the criticism of Asheri's interpretation of this 
last passage by Cozzoli (1979, 7 n.2). 
49. David (1981, 102f.; 1982/83, 87) suggests that families used 
the new freedom of bequest to divide their estates among all 
their sons and that this became the common practice, with 
deleterious e1fects on the heirs, who each inherited too little 
land to remain citizens. This, however, involves the implausible 
view that families throughout Spartiate society voluntarily 
adopted this practice even when it was detrimental to their 
heirs. 
50 . For further arguments , Buckler (1977 , 258ff . ) . 
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51. The clearest case concerns the wording of the kings' 
prerogative to wage war (6.56), which was sufficiently imprecise 
to accommodate both their collegial right to declare war before 
506 and their subsequently reduced role whereby one of them 
merely conducted a war declared by the polis. 
52. MacDowell (1986, 96), indeed, follows some editors in 
emending Herodotus' text to read patr6ioukou. As he notes, the 
term the Spartiates themselves used is uncertain. 
53. Gortyn Code 7. 52ff.; 9. 8ff. ; text & English trans. in 
Willetts (1967). Cf. Cartledge (1981, 97f.), who notes that a 
case can be made for a parallelism of development between some 
aspects of the Spartan and Cretan social systems. My approach 
here, however, will be to use the evidence of the Gortyn Code, 
as also of the law of Athens, solely where it provides a useful 
analogy, not for alleged developmental inferences. On the 
Athenian epikleros, Harrison (1968-71, i. 132ff.); Schaps (1979, 
25ff.). The discussion of this issue by Karabelias (1982, 476) 
is vitiated by his view that a Spartiate held only a life tenure 
over an inalienable kleros until the time of Epitadeus (471 n.7). 
54. There is no evidence that Lysander had any sons. The 
episodes in which Dionysios of Syracuse twice offered him gifts 
for his daughters (Plut. Lys. 2.7-8; Mor. 141F, 190E, 229A) 
suggest that they were his only children. 
55. Karabelias (1982, 473 n.14 & 474f.); Grote (1854, ii. 558f. 
n.1); Roussel (1939, 122); cf. the usages of iKvtoµai recorded 
by Powell {1960, 171) . 
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56 . Ollier (1934, 23); Lacey (1968, 199 & 203), although I do 
not agree with his line of reasoning; Karabelias (1982, 479). 
The marriage of Leonidas and Gorgo may be a case in point , 
although it is not known whether it had been arranged by 
Kleomenes himself, or took place only after his death or during 
the possibly extended period of his flight from Sparta in winter 
491/0. On the problems surrounding the marriage, Harvey (1979, 
253ff.). MacDowell argues ( 1986, 97) that there were other 
criteria besides proximity of relationship. These criteria, 
however, such as the non-ownership of a lot of land, are his own 
inventions designed to make Herodotus' evidence fit that of 
Plutarch. This methodologically unsound procedure strains 
credibility. 
57. For a similar interpretation of the evidence of Herodotus 
to that given in the text, Karabelias (1982, 474). Note that the 
passage lends no weight to the interpretation of Lacey (1968, 
203) that marriage extinguished a girl's claim to her father's 
estate. It merely specifies which patrouchoi came within the 
kings' jurisdiction. 
58 . Harrison (1968-71, i. llf. & App. I); Schaps (1979, 28); 
Gortyn Code 8-.20ff. At Gortyn a childless heiress was allowed 
to avoid the obligation only if she ceded half the inheritance 
to the next of kin (7.52ff.). 
59. Cf. the usages cited in LSJ9 , s.v. 
60. Contra Schaps' idea (1979, 44) that the girl's relative was 
the true heir and that he simply gave her a dowry . I do not 
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imagine that any serious information about Spartan inheritance 
law underlies the remark of Plut. Mor. 775C, during his account 
of the love story of Damokri ta , that her exiled husband's 
property was confiscated so that his two daughters, his only 
children, might not be provided with dowries. The possible 
existence at Sparta of the kyrieia (the legal guardianship of a 
female by her male next-of-kin, on which see Cartledge 1981, 
99f., with refs. to earlier work) does not as such effect the 
question of female ownership of property; cf. Foxhall (1989). 
61. The date of the composition of the Lak. Pol. is uncertain. 
Higgins (1977, 65ff.), suggests the 350s and this is accepted by 
Cartledge (1979, 302). Other scholars have preferred earlier 
dates going back to the mid-390s; see, for example, the works 
cited by Tigerstedt (1965-78, i. 461 nn.526 & 530). In addition, 
it is difficult to relate Xenophon's evidence to a particular 
historical period because the ambiguous present tense used 
throughout the work may refer at different points to a past 
situation or to an ideal state of affairs as well as to the 
actual present: Momigliano (1936, 171). 
62. Karabelias (1982, 478); cf. the translations of this phrase 
by Newman (18-87-1902, ii. 329: "without having disposed of her 
hand by will") and by Asheri (1963, 19). 
63. see e.g. Asheri (1961, 62); (1963, 19); Jones (1967, 135); 
Lacey (1968, 204f.); Andrewes (1971, 125); Cozzoli (1979, 7); 
David ( 1982/83, 88f.); earlier ( 1984, 271); MacDowell ( 1986, 
107). 
I 
I 
II 
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64. Note that the adverb vuv used by Aristotle signifies not a 
contrast between present and past laws but the antithesis between 
the actual state of the law and that which Aristotle himself 
deemed more expedient: Grote (1854, ii. 554 note). 
65. Athens: Schaps (1979, 30 & 35); cf. the case of Andokides 
and Leagros, Andok. 1.117ff. Gortyn: Schaps (1979, 45); Gortyn 
Code 7.41ff. 
66 . There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this 
incident, which was contemporary with the period about which 
Plutarch was writing, in contrast to those sections of the lives 
of Agis and Kleomenes which refer back to earlier periods. This 
is not, however, a guarantee of the accuracy of the evidence 
about Agiatis' status. Like Aristotle, Plutarch mistakenly uses 
the Athenian term epikleros . On Eurydamidas, see Bradford ( 1977, 
s.v.), who notes that Pausanias may have given his name 
incorrectly; cf. also Marasco (1981, ii. 347f.). 
67. Even MacDowell (1986, 80), who is "inclined to believe that 
the blind-man's-buff device was used on some occasions", agrees 
that "it cannot have been the invariable method of making 
marriages; the passages from Herodotos show that many marriages , 
perhaps nearly all, were arranged individually". 
68. Again, even MacDowell ( 1986, 81f. ) , who accepts the evidence 
of Plut. Mor. 227F, concedes that, "although the law forbade a 
formal contract of marriage including an undertaking to give a 
dowry, in practice a father would often give a large gift to his 
daughter as soon as she was married" ( 82). 
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69. I say 'assumption' advisedly because the question of female 
rights to inherit in the presence of brothers is seldom even 
raised. The account of Michell (1964, 205ff.), for example, 
contains no discussion of female property rights at all. Most 
modern works assume without question that transfers at marriage 
were voluntary gifts, e.g. David (1981, 103); (1982/83, 89). 
70. 
€OT\ 0€ Kai ThlV yuvatKhlV OXEOOV r~~ ~aa~~ X@pa~ ThlV ~EVTE 
µephlv ra 660 (Pol. 1270a23-4). It is not clear whether axeoov 
should be translated here as "approximately" or ''nearly"; for 
general Aristotelian usage, Bonitz (1870, 739), which does not, 
however, refer to this passage. 
71. Lin Foxhall pers. comm.; such knowledge can often be 
remarkably detailed and accurate. 
72. Take, for example, the demographic calculations of Goody & 
Harrison (1973, 16ff.) = Goody (1976b, 133f.), which they deem 
to correspond most closely with the situation in pre-industrial 
societies. According to these calculations, in a 
self-reproducing 'natural fertility' population marked by high 
mortality, averaging six children ever born per family, and with 
only a one in three chance of a child surviving its father, 
roughly 41% of families would have both son(s) and daughter(s), 
21% son(s) only, 21% daughter(s) only and .17% no surviving heirs. 
The resulting proportion of land inherited by females would be 
38.91% [(41 x 1/3) + (21 x 1) + (17 x 1/4)]. (The figure used 
for calculating the proportion deriving from heirless families 
----------r ---:--------------
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is conservative, bearing in mind the prior claim to inherit of 
the brother(s) of an heirless person.) 
These calculations assume a sex ratio of 1:1. The exact 
proportion of land in female · possession will of course vary 
according to the precise percentage of households with, 
respectively, both surviving sons and daughters, surviving 
children of one sex only and no surviving children at all. But 
even quite significant changes in these percentages do not lead 
to deviations far from the figure of 40%. Take the extreme case 
of the calculations given by Goody and Harrison which postulate 
the greatest degree of continuity in family succession, those at 
the top right-hand corner of their Table, which assume a 
population marked by low mortality, averaging six children ever 
born per family, but with more than a two in three chance of a 
child surviving its father. According to these calculations, 
roughly 74% of families would have both son(s) and daughter(s), 
10% son(s) only, 10% daughter(s) only and 6% no heirs. The 
resulting proportion of land inherited by females would still be 
as high as 36.16% [(74 x 1/3) + (10 x 1) + (6 x 1/4)]. 
73. It might be objected that royal marriage customs may have 
been exceptional rather than representative of those of ordinary 
citizens, as was the case in some other societies, including 
ancient Persia and Egypt: Hopkins (1980, . 306f.). The Spartiate 
kings, however, were not monarchs distanced from their subjects 
like the kings of Persia, who referred to their subjects as 
'slaves' (e.g. Hdt. 7.39.1, 8.102.2, 3, 7.11.4) or those of 
Egypt, who received divine worship, but merely leading citizens. 
141 
74. Had she remarried and had children, they would have 
inherited. Had she remained childless, her property would then 
have been claimable by her father's kinsfolk. 
75. Her family may well have been of some substance. There is 
a possibility that her father, Diaktoridas, was the Olympic 
four-horse chariot victor of 456 (Moretti 1957, 53ff., no.278). 
In addition, Herodotus' gratuitous mention of Eurydame' s brother, 
Menios, perhaps suggests that he was a man of note. 
76. Xen. Ages. 9.6 & Plut. Ages. 20.1 describe her as the sister 
of Agesilaos, probably his natural sister and a daughter of 
Archidamos' second wife, Eupolia, rather than a daughter of 
Lampi to. For her chariot-race victories, perhaps in 396 and 392, 
Moretti, ibid. nos. 373 and 381. Xen. Ages. 9.6 is testimony to 
Kyniska's wealth. On the huge expenses of chariot-racing, see 
the collection of material in Davies (1971, xxv-xxvi n.7). Note 
also the costly dedications which Kyniska made to celebrate her 
victories (Pausanias 3.8.1-2, 15.1, 5.12.5, 6.1.6; IG V. 1.1564a; 
Palatine Anthology 13.16). 
77. Assuming that she was indeed married; the sources are silent 
on the point. Under the hypothesis of female rights of 
inheritance Kyniska will have been entitled to one-fifth of 
Archidamos' property, since the latter had another son, Agis II, 
and to no more than one-fifth of her mother's, since in addition 
to Agesilaos Eupolia had at least one other son, Teleutias, born 
of a second marriage (Xen. Hell. 4.4.19; Plut. Ages. 21.1). The 
fact that on Agis II's death, Agesilaos, as step-brother, 
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inherited all his property (Xen. Ages. 4.5; cf. Plut. Ages. 4.1), 
with Kyniska, as step-sister, apparently not sharing in the 
inheritance, is not incompatible with the hypothesis that 
daughters inherited in the presence of sons. In the Gortyn Code, 
for example, in the absence of sons or daughters, a man's or 
woman's property went first to any brothers, next to their 
children or grandchildren, and only in the absence of all these 
to any sisters or their descendants (5.9-22). 
78. Cf. the Gortyn Code ( 4. 23-31), according to which both 
mother and father could retain ownership of their property until 
death, with the exception that a son was entitled to receive his 
paternal inheritance prematurely in order to pay a fine. 
79. The actual figures were: Archidamia 72 units; Agesistrata 
54; Agesilaos 72; Agis 63. 
80. The amended calculations would read as follows: Archidamia 
56 or 33 units; Agesistrata 78 or 50; Agesilaos 100 or 66; Agis 
125 or 75. Two figures are given because McQueen's text 
(168ff.), as opposed to the family tree in his Appendix (181), 
suggestsalternative possibilities for the father of Agesistrata. 
Since the different nature of the calculations necessitates an 
alteration in the numerical base-line of property units, it is 
the relative landholdings rather than the actual figures which 
should be compared with those in the previous note. 
81. Besides the examples in the text, note also the late-third-
century marriage of Agis IV's brother, Archidamos V, to the 
daughter of his cousin Hippomedon (Plb. 4.35.13). 
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82. These different functions of dowry are clearly distinguished 
by Saller (1984, 195ff.), following the work of Goody (1973, 
17ff.). 
83. On the latter alternative, house and garden land in the five 
villages of Sparta would be an example of a category of land of 
the appropriate scale which might well have been regarded as a 
family's ancient portion I owe this suggestion to Bj0rn 
Qviller. Compare the idea of some Roman legal experts (Pliny, 
HN 19.50) that the heredium was the hortus, the kitchen-garden, 
as opposed to agricultural land. The heredium is a good example 
of a minute plot of ancestral land; at the size of two iugera, 
or slightly over half a hectare (Varro, De Re Rustica 1.10.2; 
Pliny, HN 18.7), it was clearly insufficient to keep a family. 
84. Refs. in Schaps (1979, 76f.); cf. Plato, Laws 774C & Foxhall 
( 1989), who stresses that the wife possessed the ultimate 
sanction of withdrawing herself and her dowry from the household. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SPARTIATES AND HELOTS: 
ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND LABOUR RELATIONS 
I. Defining the problem 
Although scholars have been considerably exercised by the 
political relationships between Spartiates and helots, especially 
the extent of the threat posed by the helots and the brutal 
Spartan response, and although they have focused attention upon 
the Spartiates' exploitation of the helots through the enforced 
system of economic support, there has been little investigation 
of the way in which the specific organization of the agricultural 
economy affected Spartiate-helot relationships at both an 
individual and community level. As a complement to my 
investigations into the nature of the Spartiates' tenure and 
inheritance of their landholdings and its implications for the 
longstanding stability and ultimate collapse of their social 
system (chs.2 & 4; originally Hodkinson 1986 & 1989), I here turn 
my attention to this question of the relationships between 
Spartiate landowners and their helot labour force. 
Fundamental to the existence and operation of Spartan 
society was the fact that tne Spartiate citizen elite lived as 
full-time hoplite warriors supported economically by produce 
delivered by the helots who cultivated their landholdings. 
Agricultural labour was the distinctive feature of helot 
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servitude. Although a significant minority of helot men and 
women were employed in other sectors such as service in Spartiate 
households and in the messes, the essential servile function of 
the vast majority of helots was to work their masters' lands. 
Upon this basic role of agricultural production the few chattel 
slaves who may have been present in Spartiate society did not 
impinge . 1 The helots were, consequently, the indispensable 
mainstay of Sparta's activity in the Eastern Mediterranean world 
for at least half a millennium from the early Archaic period on 
into the Hellenistic age, al though my concern here does not 
extend beyond the early/mid-fourth century with the liberation 
of the helots of Messenia in 370/69. 2 
The precise status of the helots has perplexed commentators 
since antiquity, owing largely to the mixture of communal and 
personal elements in their servitude. The most common modern 
approach has been to regard them as in a position of collective 
servitude to the Spartan polis. This approach has taken several 
forms from the 'collective slavery' of Lotze (1959), through 
Garlan's 'intercommunal servitude of tributary type' (1988 , 
93ff.) to the 'state serf' definition of Ste. Croix (1981, 149f.) 
and Cartledge ( 1988, 39). Recently, however, Ducat ( 1990, 
19ff.), following a line suggested by Cozzoli (1979, 158ff.) , has 
argued that, al though the helots were typically viewed as a 
collectivity, that does not necessarily mean that they were 
collective property. The Classical sources, he argues, view the 
relationship of individual helots to the particular Spartiates 
whose landholdings they worked as essentially one of private 
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ownership. Only with the attempt of the late-third-century 
reformist kings to impose a system of state-controlled equal 
kleroi did there emerge a parallel conception of the helots as 
a kind of public property such as is found in later writers such 
as Pausanias (3 . 20.6) and Strabo (8 . 5.4, except where he 
explicitly quotes Ephorus). 
Ducat's approach is a valuable corrective to the more 
communal definitions of helot status above; but it perhaps 
underemphasizes the conditional nature of all propertY, rights 
within the Greek polis. Moreover, it should not obscure the 
fact, which Ducat himself admits, that individual tenure of 
helots was qualified by a number of community regulations which 
meant in practice that Spartiate masters did not possess rights 
of mastery as full as owners of chattel slaves. The polis 
established the overall terms of social relations between 
citizens and helots, regarding the latter as enemies against whom 
they were waging a truceless fight, as is attested by the ephors' 
annual declaration of war against them (Plut. Lyk. 28.7 = Arist. 
fr.538 Rose). The harshest treatments were often applied, most 
notoriously arbitrary murder (Thuc. 1 . 128.1; 4.80.2-4; Plut. Lyk. 
28). These by definition ruptured a citizen 's private 
exploitation of his labour force. The polis also restrained the 
freedom of action of Spartiate masters in other, more mundane 
respects. For example, only the polis could manumit a helot 
( Ephorus, FGrH 70Fll 7, apud Strabo 8. 5 . 4; c f ·. Thuc. 4. 80. 3; 
5.34.1; Xen. Hell. 6.5.28), private sale was restricted (cf. 
Section II below) and for certain purposes a Spartiate had to let 
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other citizens make use of his helots (Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-4; 
Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7). Spartiate landowners were also 
personally responsible before the authorities for preventing the 
helots under their control from becoming sturdy (Myron of Priene, 
FGrH 106F2, apud Athen. 657D). The range and importance of these 
measures indicate that public control over the helots in the 
hands of individual citizens was exercised far more strongly and 
fundamentally than over their landholdings. 
It is the economic aspect of this combination of private 
possession of helots with lack of complete individual rights of 
mastery that I wish to explore in this chapter. As I shall 
argue, Spartiate masters were able to decide and vary the ways 
in which they utilized their labour force; but both Spartiates 
and helots had to conduct their relationships within a framework 
laid down by the polis which gave the helots some limited rights. 
The effect was to create a form of exploitative but nevertheless 
interdependent labour relations which, I believe, we can 
fruitfully study from the perspective of the richly documented 
and intensively studied systems of dependent labour systems found 
in many other societies. The benefits of the comparative study 
of different types of unfree or peasant labour systems have been 
advocated in recent years in the field of modern socio-economic 
history, especially in Kolchin's comparison (1987) of American 
slavery with Russian serfdom. The benefits are twofold, both 
methodological and empirical. Not only, as Kolchin stresses, 
does comparison enable one ''to weigh the impact of different 
variables and hence to distinguish the specific or incidental 
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from the general or inherent" (1987, ix); but also, as Hoch 
(1986, 1) has noted, despite the differences between the forms 
of exploitation of free peasants, serfs and slaves, "the key 
problem of establishing and maintaining authority determines much 
peasant behavior and accounts for the similarities of behaviour 
and attitude in many peasant societies". This is not to deny the 
primary phenomenon of helot servitude described above, but simply 
to recognize that complete analysis of the complex nature of the 
helots' position requires the application of a variety of 
approaches. No single model can claim a monopoly of insights or 
of truth. 
II. Helots, Spartiates and the land 
The exact relationship of the helots to the landholdings they 
worked is an important initial issue, since the degree of the 
farmers' security of cultivation rights is invariably a major 
determinant of landlord-peasant interaction. In the region of 
Tuscany in post-unification Italy, for example, tenants' rights 
were weak. The landlord's control over his tenants was ensured 
by terms of contract which specified that the labour capacity and 
subsistence needs of the tenant's family should match the labour 
requirements and size of the holding. To achieve this balance 
landlords were able to disperse members of their tenants' 
families elsewhere or order the adoption of living-in help, could 
give or withhold permission for marriage, could vet the 
appointment of new heads of households and could ensure that 
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tenant families never amassed sufficient saleable surplus to 
achieve independence (Gill 1983, 147). 
How secure was the position of the helots? A passage from 
Strabo (8.5.4) concerning the Lakedaimonians' treatment of the 
helots ("Karo1Kiai; nvai; auroii; a1roo€1~avr€i; Kai A€1Toupyiai; 
ioiai;") might be thought to provide a definitive answer to this 
question. MacDowell (1986, 24) translates the passage as 
follows: "fixing for them certain places of residence and 
particular duties", an arrangement which would appear to provide 
the helots with a security of continuity in cultivating 
particular plots not possessed by Tuscan tenants. There are, 
however, two difficulties here. The first is one of translation. 
Does KaTot Kt at; n vat; mean "certain places of residence" or, as 
Ducat (1990, 63) would have it, "des sortes d'habitations 
particulieres", i.e. specific kinds of dwellings? Secondly, this 
clause of Strabo's text is not part of his quotation from 
Ephorus, but his own addition. It is a subordinate clause 
following immediately upon his statement that the Lakedaimonians 
possessed the helots as "douloi in a way of the community". 
Hence, on Ducat's interpretation it would stand convicted of 
being late evidence, related to Hellenistic theories of state-
controlled equal kleroi, which has nothing to do with conditions 
in the Classical period. 
Earlier in the same passage Strabo reports Ephorus' 
statement ( FGrH 70Fll 7) that "it was not permitted for the 
( Spartiate] holder either to liberate them or to sell them 
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outside the boundaries". MacDowell ( 1986, 35) has suggested that 
the phrase "outside the boundaries" (tEw r&v bpwv) might be a 
reference not, as normally interpreted, to the borders of Lakonia 
and Messenia, but to the bounda'ries of a particular landholding, 
signifying that "the Spartiate could not sell a helot and thus 
remove him from his land". He thus extends the view of several 
scholars (e.g. Jeanmaire 1939, 478) who, although following the 
normal interpretation of the phrase, have argued that owing to 
its juxtaposition with the prohibition of private manumission the 
ban on sale should be viewed as applying inside as well as 
outside Spartan territory. Ducat (1990, 22 n.13) argues, 
however, that MacDowell's interpretation of the phrase seems 
unlikely, since in the comparable case of the Mariandynoi of 
Herakleia Pontika (whose status is frequently compared to that 
of the helots) the distinction made was precisely between sale 
inside and outside the territory. He claims (ibid., 21f.) that, 
as in the case of the Mariandynoi, helots could be sold within 
Spartan territory. Nevertheless, he envisages that such private 
sales took place when land under helot cultivation was 
transferred from one citizen to another. Consequently, even on 
Ducat's view it seems probable that a helot farmer ( and his 
family) was in practice attached to a given landholding where he 
would remain regardless of changes of Spartiate owner. 
such an arrangement would fit well with what little we know 
of the origin and general nature of helotage. The case of 
Messenia is the clearer. Before its conquest most Messenians 
will have been farming specific landholdings as 
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owner-cultivators, dependent peasants, landless labourers and so 
on. After its conquest they were presumably kept working roughly 
the same fields in a servile capacity. Concerning the origins 
of Lakonian helotage there is more dispute (cf. Ducat 1978, 5ff.; 
1990, 65ff.), but all theories accept that most of those thus 
enslaved were working farmers, who in their new state of 
servitude simply continued to farm for the Spartiates' benefit. 
The nature of the helots' position as a self-reproducing group 
with their own families (cf. Thuc. 1.103) and "in general, all 
the normal human institutions except their freedom" also suggests 
a population with a stable existence and subsistence derived from 
secure cultivation of particular landholdings rather than one 
subject to continual movements from estate to estate as the 
property holdings of their individual masters' lineages altered 
through the generations. 3 The latter arrangement would have 
produced an extraordinary level of disruption under a Spartiate 
inheritance system which operated on the basis of 'diverging 
devolution', a system of partible inheritance in which women were 
also landowners ( Arist. Pol. 1270a23-4). When not only men 
inherit land but women also, and those women receive at least a 
portion of their inheritance on marriage, land changes hands both 
down the generations and between the sexes at almost every adult 
death and at every marriage (Goody 1976a, 10). The ownership of 
specific holdings is drastically reorgani'zed every generation and 
continually reallocated from one patriline to another. 
Self-perpetuating helot families could hardly have maintained 
themselves over several centuries, let alone some accumulate 
wealth to the value of five minas (500 drachmas), as the 6,000 
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Lakonian helots who purchased their freedom in 223 had been able 
to do (Plut. Kleom. 23), had the location of the lands they 
cultivated been continually subject to such arbitrary alterations 
outside their control. 4 Helot families must, consequently, have 
normally remained attached to particular plots of land regardless 
of fragmentation and changes of Spartiate ownership. 
There remain, however, important consequences to consider 
concerning the impact of Spartiate inheritance practices and of 
demographic realities applying to both Spartiates and helots 
alike. The image, all too seductively conjured up by Plutarch 
(Lyk. 8.4; 24.2; Mor. 239D-E), of an enduring relationship 
between an unchanging group of helot farmers and a single 
Spartiate owner is deceptive. The reality is more likely to have 
been a complex web of relationships in which changing helot 
personnel owed their obligations to a number of different 
Spartiates. To appreciate this situation a brief discussion of 
the impact of inheritance customs and demographic factors is 
necessary. 
On the Spartiates' side, given the low probability of the 
owner having only a single male heir, 5 division of plots between 
a number of male and/or female heirs will have been a frequent 
possibility. This is a complex issue (Bentley 1987, esp. 35ff. 
& 40). In some societies, such as modern Greece, systems of 
partible inheritance have been responsible for the widespread 
fragmentation of individual fields, especially when strict equity 
between siblings or considerations of risk management, crop 
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scheduling or use of multiple ecozones have been overriding 
considerations (Herzfeld 1980, esp. 93 & 96f.). This is not, 
however, a uni versa! phenomenon. In other societies this outcome 
has been avoided, at least below a certain 'minimum threshold 
size', often because absolute sameness of inheritance and claims 
for tiny shares of small fields have not been insisted upon. 
This happens more frequently in areas of lesser environmental 
diversity and it is relevant that the Spartiates generally 
avoided landownership in the more mountainous regions. 
Some studies have suggested that overpopulation may be a 
more potent factor in leading to fragmentation than partible 
inheritance and a mathematical model has been employed to 
demonstrate that without population growth land becomes no more 
fragmented over time (Mccloskey 1975). This has obvious 
implications for Spartiate landownership patterns. There is some 
evidence to suggest that up until the later sixth century 
Spartiate citizen numbers were at least buoyant and possibly 
increasing, al though from the fifth century onwards they rapidly 
declined (Ch. 4 below & Hodkinson 1989, lOOff.). Even here, 
however, complications arise, since the model assumes that a 
family owns sufficient discrete fields to distribute without 
requiring internal fragmentation; when the number of fields is 
fewer, equitable division without splitting becomes more 
difficult. The decline in Spartiate citizen numbers was largely 
the result of the demotion of many persons to the status of 
'Inferior' owing to their impoverishment, a process in which the 
extent of real demographic decline is uncertain . There sti l l 
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existed many poor citizens and Inferiors whose number of discrete 
plots of land will probably have been limited. 
It is true, as Lane Fox (1985) has pointed out, that for 
families with little land, for whom division of the inheritance 
would have meant the splitting of individual fields, there 
existed various means of delaying or modifying its application. 
One of these was temporary or permanent fraternal cohabitation 
and there is evidence for the practice in Sparta of adelphic 
polyandry (Plb. 12.6b.8). This tactic itself, however, 
substituted a corporate for a single landlord and did not prevent 
some portion of the land going to any sisters. It was perhaps 
for this reason that close-kin marriage and the combination of 
wife-sharing with uterine half-sibling marriage were probably 
also practised in Classical Sparta (Cartledge 1981, esp 99 & 103; 
Lane Fox 1985, 222f.; Hodkinson 1986, 392f. & 400ff.; 1989, 90ff. 
= Chs. 2 & 4). In the latter arrangement two brothers could 
produce children by the same woman who could then intermarry to 
reunite their paternal grandparents' original properties. But 
even this manoeuvre, though it concentrated overall property 
holdings, did not eliminate boundary alterations and changes of 
ownership between the sexes even as regards the paternal 
grandparents' holdings, still less with the property belonging 
to the shared wife. 
In fact, in addition to the phenomenon of estate 
fragmentation, ownership of part of or all the estate will have 
changed between the sexes in the overwhelming majority of cases 
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each generation. 6 This too may have meant frequent changes in 
the nature of Spartiate-helot relations, owing to the probability 
that a female owner had to conduct transactions through the proxy 
of a male kyrios or guardian (Cartledge 1981, 109f.), frequently 
her husband, who would often be a non-kinsman. Often ownership 
will also have been transferred to another lineage, owing to the 
high proportion of families without surviving heirs as in most 
pre-industrial societies. 7 
In sum, helot farmers may have experienced considerable and 
continuous changes in the identity, and possibly number, of 
Spartiate masters or mistresses for whom they worked, even during 
the period of marked property concentration from the fifth 
century onwards. There is also likely to have been considerable 
variation in the ratio of Spartiate to helots on different 
landholdings. On larger holdings, particularly as property 
concentration advanced, there will have been several helot 
families. This is exemplified in Xenophon's account of the 
conspiracy of Kinadon in the early 390s when the latter pointed 
out to the informer that each master on the estates near to 
Sparta itself was outnumbered by his helots (Hell. 3.3.5). 8 On 
the other hand, the phenomenon of plot fragmentation and the 
increasing number of landowners who, as either poor Spartiates 
or Inferiors , 9 owned comparatively little land may have meant 
both that many helots were farming for more than one landlord and 
that some helots even cultivated more land than their masters 
owned. 10 
----- --------------- --~ 
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As this last remark suggests , the changes just discussed 
will not have been all on one side, for helot families will 
themselves have experienced widely differing demographic 
histories. The number of male cultivators on a given plot of 
land will have been constantly fluctuating. Furthermore, in each 
generation a large proportion of families (over 40%) will have 
produced no son to continue the cultivation. We have no evidence 
about such basic matters as who took over the cultivation of 
l{e ke,,_ J .,,r 
specific plots of land on the death ofJ a helot household, whether 
there were surviving children or not. There must, however, have 
been some arrangements for the devolution of non-landed property 
which helots are attested as owning (Hdt. 9.80; Thuc. 4.26; Plut. 
Kleom. 23). My inclination is to believe that a system akin to 
the practice of partible inheritance found throughout ancient 
Greece probably operated regarding the devolution of 'cultivation 
rights', with kinsmen having the normal residual claim in the 
case of sonless or heirless families. On this view differential 
reproduction and mortality will necessarily have led to the 
development of considerable inequalities among the helots in 
their access to land. On the other hand, assuming that helot 
women did not have 'rights of inheritance' comparable to those 
of their Spartiate mistresses ( as discussed in Ch. 2, Section 
III), transfers of possession will have taken place less 
frequently and division will have been less severe. 
Consequently, helot lineages will generally have had a more 
continuous association with the plots to which they were tied 
than will their masters. The dual relationship of the helots to 
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the land they cultivated and to the Spartiate(s) who owned it was 
clearly far from straightforward. 
III. Economic exploitation: fixed rent or sharecropping? 
I turn now to examine the nature of the economic support which 
the helots provided for the Spartiates. The ancient sources 
disagree about whether the Spartiates extracted a proportional 
or a fixed share of the crops. 
Plutarch refers to the extraction of a fixed share. 11 In 
his Moralia (239D-E) he states that, 
"the helots worked the land for them, paying over an amount of the proceeds (apophora) which was settled from the start. A curse was laid on anyone who charged more, in order that they might serve gladly because they were making a profit and [the Spartiates] themselves might not try to get more". 
The term apophora is often used of fixed sum payments. 12 
Plutarch repeats it twice in his life of Lykourgos: at 24.3, in 
a general reference to the helots' tribute, and at 8. 4, in 
connection - with the 70 and 12 medimnoi of barley and 
proportionate quantity of tree crops supposedly produced annually 
for a Spartiate and his wife, respectively, by each of the 9 , 000 
equal plots (kleroi) distributed by Lykourgos (and Polydoros). 
Plutarch clearly intended to identify these amounts of produce 
with the fixed rent in kind due from the helots to each Spartiate 
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family (Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 641 & n.4; Kiechle 1959, 61; 
Buckler 1977, 253; MacDowell 1986, 33). 
There is, however, reason to doubt the reliability of this 
evidence. The authenticity of the fixed rents in kind cannot be 
separated from that of the Lykourgan/Polydoran kleroi from which 
Plutarch says they were produced. But, as I have argued above 
(Ch. 2 = Hodkinson 1986, 382), these equal kleroi bear no 
relation to the reality of the Archaic or Classical periods, but 
are rather the product of later, probably third-century, 
invention. The same conclusion must necessarily follow for the 
amounts of fixed rent specified by Plutarch and almost certainly 
for the idea of a fixed rent itself. As Ducat (1990, 57-9) has 
noted, the notion of an apophora and that of helot agricultural 
labour are mutually contradictory. The "systeme reel de 
l 'apophora II operated in the sphere of craft activity in the 
context of more developed forms of chattel slavery in societies 
with a substantial degree of wage labour. The contrast with the 
underdeveloped agrarian economy within which helot labour 
operated cannot be overemphasized. At best such a rent was 
introduced only during the revolution of the late third century 
(cf. Lotze 1959, 29; Kessler 1910, 38ff., esp.40; Cartledge 1985, 
43). 
There is indeed an air of unreality both in Plutarch' s 
accounts and in most modern discussions which rely upon them. 
First, there is the naive assumption of the helots' willing 
service which presumes a profit with no hint of any danger of 
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crop failure, which, as we shall see below, was considerable. 
Ducat (1990, 57ff.) has plausibly identified this as an element 
of the Hellenistic notion of a 'contract of servitude' which 
sought to give Lykourgos' institution of helotage a favourable 
image. 
Secondly, even within their own terms of reference, namely 
the acceptance of a system of state-controlled equal kleroi, 
Lotze has rightly questioned whether every kleros could 
realistically have grown the same crops in the same proportions 
(Lotze 1959). Practical issues like this are left unaddressed. 
What rules, for example, governed the extraction of produce 
either from more privately-held non-kleric land (which, in most 
modern accounts, existed alongside the kleroi) or during the 
period from the fourth century onwards when, on Plutarch's view 
(Agis 5.2-3), the kleros system broke down? Most importantly, 
however, once one abandons the idea of state-controlled equal 
kleroi as the invention that it is, the problems with the notion 
of a universally fixed rent multiply. Fixed rents can operate 
within a system of private landholdings of variable size in which 
the rent due for each holding is individually fixed by the 
landlord ( and ·tenant) . But a system of variable private holdings 
in which the state imposes an overall limit for the amount of 
rent per family - the rent in kind is fixed per Spartiate man and 
wife in Plutarch's account (Ducat 1978, 41) - raises problematic 
questions. How was such an amount apportioned between different 
plots among a Spartiate's holdings? What rent was due when the 
landowner was not an adult male Spartiate with wife, but a woman 
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or a minor? 13 Could wealthier landowners receive no more from 
their larger estates than could ordinary citizens from theirs? 
And if so, how can one reconcile this with their known additional 
expenditure, such as their provision of the luxury of wheaten 
bread to their messes (Xen. Lak. Pol. 5.3) and their 
participation in the elite sport of chariot racing with its high 
levels of expendi ture?14 
What then of the evidence for a proportional (or 
sharecropping) quota? The earliest evidence is a fragment of 
Tyrtaios from the mid-seventh century (fr.4-5 Prato): 
"Like asses oppressed with heavy burdens; 
bringing to their masters (oEa"oauvotat) 
under grim compulsion, 
half ... of what the soil bears as fruit; (~µtau "6v0' 6aahlv Kap"6v &poupa ~!pEt )". 
This passage is quoted by the second-century A.D . travel writer 
Pausanias (4.14.4) in his account of the conditions the Spartans 
imposed upon the Messenians after their initial conquest in the 
later eighth century; scholars have generally accepted that this 
was indeed what Tyrtaios was ref erring to. 15 Pausanias and 
Aelian (VH 6 .1) interpreted Tyrtaios to be saying that the 
Messenians had to render half the produce to their Spartan 
masters; and this sense is also adopted by most historians. 16 
There is one difficulty with this , interpretation of the 
passage. Our manuscripts appear to be defective at the critical 
phrase ~µtau "6v0' 6aahlv and the word "6v0' has been judged 
ungrammatical (cf. MacDowell 1986, 33). Textual critics have 
suggested various emendations which preserve Pausanias' 
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interpretation of the passage's meaning such as ~µiau ~avro~ and, 
perhaps most frequently, ~µtau ~av, "an entire half" . 17 The 
emendation, however, which remains closest to the manuscript 
readings is ~µiau ~av 0', which .gives a slightly different sense, 
"half and all" or "half and the whole" (Allen 1936, 202; Rocha-
Pereira 1973, ad loc.). MacDowell (1986, 33), interpreting this 
to mean that "some helots handed over half and some the whole of 
their produce", suggests that it is poetic rhetoric which makes 
it "doubtful whether the passage can be used as evidence that a 
half was a legal figure". He argues that Tyrtaios is saying that 
a fixed rent in practice often amounted to a half. 
Although these arguments introduce an element of 
uncertainty, they are far from conclusive. First, Allen, who 
seems to have been the first to suggest this emendation, admitted 
that it was, to his knowledge, a singular usage. Secondly, the 
ancient interpretation given by Pausanias and Aelian ought to be 
given some weight. As Habicht (1985, esp. ch.6) has recently 
demonstrated, Pausanias was a most careful and sensible 
researcher whose accurate verbatim first-hand copying and 
reliable interpretation of hundreds of inscriptions, often 
written in old and unfamiliar alphabets and dialects, is 
abundantly substantiated. The fact that he felt sufficiently 
secure to offer an interpretation of the passage suggests that 
its sense was not ambiguous. Even if one prefers Allen's reading 
and MacDowell's translation, however, the passage is still 
capable of bearing an interpretation in favour of a proportional 
share. Sharecropping arrangements frequently contain different 
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provisions for different crops (e.g. Warriner 1962, 27; Reid 
1973, 118 & 128f.; Delano Smith 1979, 79; Valensi 1985, 109) and 
the passage could reflect a situation in which staple cereal 
crops were shared equally, but others went mainly or entirely to 
the Spartiate owner; or it could reflect flexibility in the 
exact proportion extracted by different landlords, an issue to 
which I shall return shortly. 
What relationship does this information concerning the terms 
of servitude imposed upon late-eighth-century Messenia bear to 
the situation in both Messenia and Lakonia throughout our period? 
There are two basic issues: first, whether within Messenia itself 
the initial terms of servitude were significantly altered in 
later centuries; secondly, whether the same terms of servitude 
applied in both regions. Kiechle (1959, 57ff.) has suggested 
that only after the major revolt known as the Second Messenian 
War sometime in the seventh century were the Messenians subjected 
as defeated rebels to full helotization and that a fixed levy was 
then imposed in place of the sharecropping arrangement mentioned 
by Tyrtaios (cf. Lotze 1959, 28f.; 1971, 72; Cartledge 1979, 
170). His view, however, depends upon Pausanias' portrayal of 
the Messenian ·position between the two Messenian wars as that of 
a vassal state which accepted an oath of loyalty to Sparta rather 
than a fully servile people (4.14.4). In this aspect - to be 
distinguished from his direct interpretation of the authentic 
lines of Tyrtaios - Pausanias' account is heaviiy influenced by 
the pseudo-historical Messenian tradition which developed after 
its liberation in 370/69. The idea that they remained 
163 
semi-independent after the original conquest is one means by 
which the Messenians created an 'early history' for themselves; 
as historical reality it is highly suspect (Oliva 1971, llOff.; 
Pearson 1962). 
Ducat (1990, 60f. & 14lff.) has recently, however, argued 
for an extended version of this idea, namely, that Tyrtaios' 
sharecropping arrangements tell us nothing about the form of 
Classical Sparta's economic exploitation of the helots because 
the Messenians were not helotized until after the war of the 
460s. He maintains, first of all, that the distortions evident 
in Pausanias' interpretation of the lines of Tyrtaios were not 
false to the latter's portrayal of the Messenians' position. In 
an argument whose course is not always clear, Ducat claims that 
both Pausanias and Tyrtaios have in their different ways added 
the colouring of a servile vocabulary (the noun desposynoi in the 
latter's case) to their account of the payment of agricultural 
tribute which (for an unexplained reason) "n'est pas un crit~re 
de servitude au sens propre" (ibid. 60f.). The status of the 
Messenians described by Tyrtaios is consequently not one of 
helotage, for the existence of which there is no contemporary 
proof; there· is accordingly no source which presents helotage 
in terms of a sharecropping arrangement. 
His second argument is that the evidence both of Herodotus 
(who, he claims, consistently treats the Messenians as an entity 
which he never confuses with the term 'helots') and of late-
sixth-/early-fifth-century Messenian dedications provide an image 
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of an ethnic group still at least partly free and fighting for 
its survival. Only after the defeats of the 460s did the 
Spartans apply a "solution veritablement definitive" to the 
Messenian problem, a "nouvelle · poli tique" by which they were 
dealt the same combination of repression and degradation as the 
helots of Lakonia to whom they now became more nearly 
assimilated. 
Ducat's theory, however, suffers from several flaws. The 
idea that Tyrtaios' use of the noun desposynoi is artificial 
servile colouring rather than an integral part of his account is 
both subjective and forced. The implication that the Archaic 
poet added extraneous elements to his account in a manner 
comparable to Pausanias, a distant observer encumbered by 
centuries of accumulated baggage of the 'mirage Messenien', is 
singularly implausible. As noted already, no reason is given why 
the sharecropping system which Tyrtaios describes should be 
dismissed as a criterion of servitude or of helotage. Indeed, 
Ducat's implied concept of what constitutes helotage remains not 
only undefined but also impervious to historical circumstance . 
His employment of the correct observation that the term 
'helot(s)' makes no appearance in Tyrtaios' work to suggest the 
non-existence of helotage implies a simplistic notion of the 
relationship between the emergence of an institution and of the 
concepts and terminology through which to express it. 
Ducat's vision of the exact position of "une ethnie encore 
au moins partiellement libre" ( 1990 , 143) before the 460s is also 
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vague. Does he mean that only the richest parts of Messenia had 
been properly subjugated, an idea with which he toys at one point 
(143 n.43)? In that case how was the status of the inhabitants 
of those regions different from that of the Lakonian helots? Or 
does he mean that all the Messenians were under Spartan control 
but "seulement partiellement hilotises" ( 144)? - a view in 
contradiction with his openness elsewhere (lOOf.) to the 
hypothesis "qui voit dans l'hilotisation des Messeniens ... le 
modele de celle des Laconiens". 
These uncertainties need not, however, trouble us overmuch, 
since Ducat's use of the evidence of Herodotus has been 
effectively criticized by Whitby (forthcoming), who points out, 
first, that there is no reason to suppose that all the 
historian's references to 'helots' denote only Lakonians and, 
secondly, that his use of the term 'Messenian(s)' is, with one 
mythical exception, confined to the context of military conflict 
with Sparta (Hdt. 3.47; 5.49; 9.35 & 64; exception: 6.52) . 18 
Herodotus used the specific term 'Messenian(s)' where it was 
appropriate, otherwise the generic term 'helot(s)'. He provides 
no grounds for a belief in Messenian independence. Nor is there 
any solid evidence for the supposed "nouvelle politique" after 
the 460s. None of the evidence for Spartiate (mal) practice 
towards the helots is sufficiently specific for it to be 
identified as part of a new policy applied to a freshly-
subjugated, later-fifth-century Messenian population. None of 
this is to deny that there were certain distinctive features of 
communal organization among the Messenian helots, as exemplified 
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by their capacity to revolt and their offerings at shrines;" 
but these are best explained, as in Section V below, in terms of 
the differential practical operation of common terms of servitude 
shared with the Lakonian helot~. 
In sum, there is no compelling reason to follow Ducat's 
professed agnosticism ("on ne sait rien sur les formes 
~conomiques de la d~pendance hilotique": p. 62) or to believe 
that the sharecropping arrangement attested by Tyrtaios was 
merely an ephemeral phase in the early history of Messenia. 
Moreover, as Cartledge (1979, 97) has noted, "there is nothing 
in the ancient literary sources to suggest that the status of the 
Lakonian helots differed from that of the Messenians". It is g 
priori likely that, whatever their diverse origins, the Spartan 
state would have spared no effort to assimilate the Lakonian and 
Messenian helots to a single set of conditions, in line with 
their "vision uni taire" which is evident above all in the 
officially-correct terminology of Thucydides (Ducat 1990, 13ff.). 
Sharecropping has been termed "probably the most widespread form 
of economic organization in the world" (Warriner 1962, 59). 
Def ini ti ve assertion is out of the question, but it seems 
warranted to adopt as a working hypothesis the proposition that 
the basic principle of the sharecropping arrangement mentioned 
by Tyrtaios applied in both Messenia and Lakonia during the 
Archaic and Classical periods. 20 
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IV. The practicalities and suitability of sharecropping 
In this section I shall examine some practical aspects of the 
application of a sharecropping · system for Sparta's exploitation 
of the helots and also the system's suitability for that purpose. 
Some scholars have thought a 50% quota too large to be a regular 
levy; but it is in fact common practice in many societies, as 
is suggested by the etymology of the standard French and Italian 
terms for sharecropping, metayage and mezzadria. 21 
Sharecropping quotas are attested historically as varying 
considerably, with landlords taking anything from about 10% to 
80% of the main crop (Delano Smith 1979, 79; Valensi 1985, 
107f.), depending on a variety of factors, such as density of 
population, alternative employment opportunities, quality of land 
and especially the relative proportions of the factors of 
production supplied by landlord and tenant. Several of the above 
conditions favouring higher quotas applied in Spartan-dominated 
Lakonia and Messenia. Even Figueira' s . recent conservative 
estimate (1984, 102ff.) of the number of helots assumes 
considerable pressure upon landed resources in the Classical 
period (though numbers were no doubt lower in earlier centuries) 
and they possessed no independent access to alternative 
employment. 22 The Spartiates also appropriated the best lands 
in the two regions, which have been noted for their fertility 
from antiquity to modern times (Plb. 5.19.7; [Plato], Alkibiades 
I 122D; Euripides, apud Strabo 8.5.6; Thiersch 1833, I 303f.) . 
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The one area of uncertainty concerns the relative production 
inputs of Spartiates and helots. The Spartiates provided the 
land and the helots the labour; but who supplied the seed, 
draught animals and equipment such as ploughs, pressing beds and 
milling installations? No direct evidence exists and it may be 
rash to expect a single answer, owing, first, to the considerable 
inequalities in access to landed resources among both the 
Spartiate and helot populations and, secondly, to the significant 
differences in distance for their Spartiate owners between plots 
close to Sparta and those in remoter parts of Lakonia and 
especially Messenia. The question is whether, given likely 
variations in landlord production inputs, we should envisage the 
development of some degree of flexibility in the extraction of 
an exact 50% or other proportional quota. The issue has 
important implications. To pose them in extreme terms, either 
the polis, in contrast to norms of landlord-cultivator practice 
which have operated frequently throughout history, imposed a 
rigid, artificial general quota for political reasons (in the 
interests of equality for those citizens less able to contribute 
production inputs and for the purpose of impersonalizing 
Spartiate-helot relationships); or it followed the same policy 
of non-interference as in the case of Spartiate land tenure, 
leaving individual citizens free to make their own arrangements 
but also more vulnerable to the consequences of personal failure. 
At first sight most of the sources appear to assume the 
existence of a standard norm imposed by the polis which 
determined the amount of extractable produce. Plutarch 
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explicitly asserts that there was a fixed maximum; Pausanias and 
Aelian write of the precise figure of a half. Myron of Priene 
too states that the Spartiates "fixed the portion (moira) which 
they [ the helots] should always render to them" ( FGrH 106F2, apud 
Athen. 657D). This seeming unanimity, however , is less 
impressive than it first appears. We have already seen that, if 
Plutarch's evidence has any historical authenticity, it belongs 
to the period of the late-third-century revolution, not earlier; 
Myron's evidence may also relate to the same period or even 
later. 23 Pausanias and Aelian are simply interpreting the 
evidence of Tyrtaios and it is uncertain whether the latter's 
words will bear the full weight of an argument in favour of a 
state-imposed standard norm. Not only is there the uncertainty 
already noted as to whether Tyrtaios is referring to an 
invariable half, but there is also room for doubt whether in his 
brief reference in verse composed for the purpose of exhorting 
his fellow citizens to battle one should expect to find a 
complete statement of the details of the Messenians' economic 
exploitation. 
Nevertheless, the central point of Tyrtaios' evidence cannot 
be ignored. He states plainly that the Messenian helots had to 
surrender half the crops and, if there is any variability about 
this proportion concealed within the ambiguity of the text, it 
tends in the direction of a greater Spartiate share. It appears 
that, however few production inputs Spartiates were able to 
contribute to their distant Messenian estates, they were 
guaranteed at least 50% of the produce . Variation above this 
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minimum, however, may have occurred; and, even if the 50% was 
supposedly a maximum, whether it was rigorously enforced is 
another matter. Spartiates who were able to provide more inputs 
or to exert sufficient pressure upon their helots may have been 
able to extract more of the produce. Tidy as it would be to 
believe that a neat 50/50 division of produce was the invariable 
practice, historical practice as opposed to theory is rarely neat 
and tidy. We should perhaps more realistically accept the 
possibility of variations, particularly concerning non-
subsistence items, and especially during the period of severe 
property concentration from the later fifth century onwards when, 
with the increased significance of wealth as a determinant of 
status (see Ch.4), both rich and poor citizens probably came 
under increased pressure to maximize the incomings from their 
estates. From this perspective it is still further evident that 
a sharecropping system was inherently more viable and realistic 
in allowing for such flexibility than the supposed fixed amount 
described by Plutarch. 24 
The suitability of sharecropping for Spartiate-helot 
economic relations can perhaps best be appreciated by comparing 
it schematically with alternative possible arrangements, 
utilizing an illustrative table from Scott's classic study of 
peasant rebellions and subsistence in southeast Asia. 25 
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Table 3.1. Distribution of Risk in Tenancy Systems 
Landlord assumes 
risk 
(A) 
e.g., Traditional 
(feudal) systems 
of tenure 
Cultivator's 
minimal return 
fixed & guaranteed 
Landowner assumes 
risk - and profit 
- of enterprise 
Risk shared 
(B) 
e.g., Equal shares 
sharecropping 
Cultivator's 
return a fixed 
proportion of the 
crop 
Landowner's return 
a fixed proportion 
of the crop 
Tenant assumes 
risk 
(C) 
e.g., Fixed rent 
tenancy 
Cultivator assumes 
risk - and profit 
- of enterprise 
Landowner's return 
fixed & guaranteed 
The above table indicates that the two key distinguishing 
factors concern which party, landlord or tenant, assumes (i) the 
risks of crop failure , and (ii) the potential profits of crop 
surpluses. Under a fixed rent (C in Scott's table) both are 
assumed by the tenant; under sharecropping (Bin the table) both 
are shared. Sharecropping was consequently the most secure 
arrangement in the Spartiate-helot relationship, which was 
characteri zed by a long-term mutual interdependence . Owing to 
the high degree of interannual variability of weather conditions , 
crop yields wi~l have fluctuated considerably from year to year; 
alternation between surplus and shortage will have been a basic 
fact o f life. 
The threat o f shortage i s oft e n f o rgotten by those who 
bel ieve tha t the Spartiat es extract ed a fi xed rental f r om t he 
helots. As was noted a bove, t his e r ror i s evident i n t he views 
of Plutarch, who, following the post-Classical tradition of 
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ameliorating the image of Lykourgos' measures, naively postulated 
helot contentment with their opportunity to profit from the 
surplus. Yet, as Scott (1976, passim, esp. 7 & 46ff.) amply 
demonstrates, modern peasants typically prefer to avoid fixed 
rents in favour of sharecropping contracts, even if the former 
are more profitable in most years, precisely in order to escape 
the risk that in bad years the fixed rent will leave them with 
little or nothing to live on. Recent studies have suggested that 
"the vast majority of communities of the [ancient] Mediterranean 
were endemically vulnerable to food crisis" (Garnsey 1988, with 
quotation on p.45; Gallant 1989 & 1991). Besides sharing the 
risk, sharecropping may also contribute to overall risk reduction 
by permitting a more flexible response than is possible under 
fixed rent to the emerging and variable conditions of each 
agricultural year. 26 
Of course, Scott's 'moral economy' approach does not in 
itself explain Sparta's employment of sharecropping for the 
exploitation of her helot populations. The preferences of helot 
cultivators would have been of little avail had sharecropping not 
also suited the 'political economy' of the Spartiates, to borrow 
the phrase adopted by Popkin (1979) in his argument against the 
peasant-centred approach of Scott. 27 As he notes, "exchanges, 
while... constrained by the subsistence needs of the weaker 
party, are based on the relative bargaining power of the parties" 
(1979, 27). We need not credit the Spartiates with any 
philanthropic concern for the helots' well-being; but the 
uninterrupted maintenance of helot farming and production was 
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crucial to their own position, both collectively and as 
individuals who to retain citizen rights had to produce fixed 
quantities of produce to the common messes. 28 
would have served this end better than fixed rent. 
Sharecropping 
At the same time sharecropping is not ineffective as a means 
of producing a surplus. The criticisms traditionally made by 
neoclassical economists, that it is inefficient and that a tenant 
who is paid only half the crop has a strong incentive to stint 
his efforts at a point when the marginal product of his labour 
and other inputs is still twice as high as tbe marginal costs, 
whereas the owner-cultivator will labour on until the costs are 
as high as the product, have been effectively undermined by 
recent studies within both the neoclassical and Chayanovian 
schools of thought. 29 First, marginal productivity under 
sharecropping can be as high as, if not higher than, under 
alternative regimes. Secondly, it is now widely regarded as a 
means of maximizing labour input, total land productivity and 
surplus, particularly when the holding worked by each tenant is 
relatively small. The 'whip of hunger' forces such sharecroppers 
to work as hard and as long as is necessary to ensure family 
survival. 30 The considerable difference in population between 
helots and Spartiates will have worked to the latter's advantage 
here. Quantitative analysis of the exact size of the helot 
population relative to the amount of available land is 
problematic; but, as was noted above, considerabie pressure upon 
landed resources seems assured at least from the Classical period 
onwards. In providing their own subsistence the numerically 
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superior helots will under an equal sharecropping system 
necessarily have produced an abundant surplus for their masters. 
Only the severely increasing disparity in land between rich and 
poor Spartiates from the late ·fifth century ruined this system 
by diverting too much of this surplus into too few hands. 
Sharecropping would accordingly have been a most effective 
means of maintaining the long-term economic relationship between 
Spartiates and helots. It was also most appropriate given the 
singular circumstances of the Spartan polis and its citizen body. 
For a start, in maximizing labour input it will have helped keep 
the helots occupied with farming at the expense of subversive 
activities. Furthermore, modern studies have emphasized that it 
is the location and extent of political power that usually 
determine whether landlords are able to extract a fixed rent from 
their tenants in bad years as well as good or must be content to 
share the deficits of poor harvests for the sake of their 
tenants' subsistence (e.g. Scott 1976, 65 & 175). Since the 
Spartan polis held ultimate control over both the lives of its 
citizens and the citizen body's overall relationship with the 
helots, it was able to limit the acquisitiveness of its citizens 
and to preserve helot subsistence. It is therefore readily 
intelligible that individual Spartiates had to accept a 
sharecropping arrangement. 
From a practical point of view too, sharecropping will also 
have tied in better with individual Spartiates' responsibility 
to keep their helots from becoming sturdy. Since they themselves 
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would gain at least part of the product from every plot of land, 
they could, by influencing choices about its use, control the 
foodstuffs available for helot consumption more effectively than 
if they had no rights beyond a limited rent. Finally, many 
Spartiates had the problem of extracting rent from distant parts 
of Lakonia and especially Messenia which were not easy of access. 
At times of crop failure tenants in other societies, when faced 
with rents which would take the bulk of the crop, have often 
simply appropriated whatever was needed for their subsistence 
(e.g. Scott 1976, 124, 126f., 139 & 146). As the younger Pliny 
complained of his own distant fixed-rent Italian tenants, "they 
even seize and consume the produce of the land in the belief that 
they will gain nothing themselves by conserving it" (Letters 
9.37). Sharecropping eased this problem because by leaving the 
helots with some crops it was more likely to avoid the growth of 
grievances induced in such circumstances by fixed rents and to 
increase the likelihood of helot compliance. The interests of 
the 'political economy' of the Spartiates and of the 'moral 
economy' of the helots coincided to make sharecropping the most 
practicable economic arrangement for their mutual interaction. 
V. Lakonians and Messenians: acquiescence and revolt 
These last remarks direct our attention to the overall nature of 
the landowner-cultivator relationship, in which the arrangements 
for crop-sharing were j ust one element . once again wide 
I 
I 
I 
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variations are attested at different times and places and even 
within particular societies. The landlord may intervene to a 
variable extent in the making of decisions about the practice of 
cultivation and stock rearing. He may accept a greater or lesser 
share of the production costs, in providing the instruments of 
cultivation, seed and other necessary equipment. He may also 
establish varying degrees of personalized links of paternalism 
or patronage with his tenants, potentially involving such things 
as subsistence help in times of crisis (e.g. gifts of food, 
remission of his share of the produce and long- or short-term 
loans), physical protection, legal and mediation services, 
subsidies to social or ritual events of farming communities and 
representation of their interests to higher authorities. Or he 
may maintain an impersonal relationship without obligation to his 
cultivators, but also without the prestige deriving from the 
performance of such obligations. 
This last point merits further discussion. Scott (1976, 
174ff.) has identified a spectrum of landlord-tenant 
relationships, ranging from those involving a considerable degree 
of landlord involvement and support and of reciprocity between 
landlord and -tenant to those in which the landlord provides 
nothing beyond the land at a high and invariable rent. The 
different consequences of these contrasting relationships are 
significant: 
"Towards the more reciprocal end of the spectrum, the 
status of the elite is more willingly granted and the 
attitude of subordinates more closely approaches 
genuine deference. Towards the less reciprocal end of 
the spectrum , by contrast, there is less patronage and 
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more force; status gives way to power and deference to 
submission." (Scott 1976, 176). 
A graphic illustration is provided in Johnson's study ( 1971) 
of plantation sharecroppers on the Fazenda Boa Ventura in 
northeastern Brazil. The tenants there expressed a 
near-unanimous preference for their previous landlord, the 
'General' , a stern, somewhat feared master, who intervened 
directly, often harshly, in his tenants' private lives but 
provided benefits and subsistence help in hard times, rather than 
the current landlord, who imposed milder conditions, disliked 
giving orders, refused to interfere in his tenants' lives and 
provided little subsistence help. The more exploitative and 
interventionist landlord was more popular and treated with more 
deference than his more lenient but disengaged successor. 
The above example illustrates the priority placed by 
peasants on obtaining the assurance of subsistence help at the 
expense of other considerations. As Gallant (1991, 168) has 
convincingly shown, despite the multiplicity of risk-buffering 
mechanisms available to peasant households, their utility is 
normally circumscribed by limited overall resources. Security 
has to be sought from members of the elite. To ensure a 
guarantee of subsistence help peasants have typically been 
willing to forge enduring bonds of dependence upon wealthier 
patrons. 31 These insights can shed light not only upon the 
nature of Spartiate-helot relations in general but also upon an 
important difference between the Lakonian and Messenian helots. 
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With whom could helots establish reliable ties of clientism 
which would ensure subsistence help? The fact that the polis 
imposed overall rules governing their relationships in itself 
limited the extent of personal reciprocity or patronage between 
Spartiates and helots, as did the prevailing Spartiate ethic of 
solidarity and exclusiveness. Instead, the polis maintained a 
state of war against the helots and enforced a systematic series 
of degradations aimed at sustaining an unbridgeable gulf between 
the two groups (Ducat 1974; 1990, 105ff.). One of the aims was 
surely to undercut the possibility of the creation of clientelae 
of helots which might have become a source of status distinctions 
and, worse still, a catalyst of private strife among the citizen 
body. The example of Menon of Pharsalos, who could mobilize a 
military force consisting of 200 or 300 of his private Penestai 
(Dern. 23.199; [Dern.] 13.23) , was one which Sparta had to avoid. 
By appropriating the exclusive right to manumit helots the polis 
also eliminated the possibility of patron-freedman ties which 
were so important elsewhere in the ancient world. Furthermore, 
as Scott's table on the distribution of risk indicates, the rules 
concerning sharing of the crops offered no absolute subsistence 
guarantee, no guaranteed minimal return, to the helots. A 
minimum of reciprocity and patronage and a preponderance of 
force, power and submission were the official prescriptions of 
the polis. 
The potential for the development of personal ties between 
Spartiates and helots may also have been hindered by the very 
structure of helot society. Historians have noted signs of a 
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helot elite in the fifth and fourth centuries (Ducat 1978, 36f.; 
1990, 159ff.). It may always have been there. It seems unlikely 
that during their helotization of Lakonia and Messenia the 
Spartiates took pains to remove existing inequalities among their 
subjects. More probably, they simply imposed their demands for 
rent on top of a pre-existing system of land exploitation already 
full of inequalities (which, even among the Messenians, were not 
necessarily entirely eliminated by their leaders' flight abroad: 
Paus. 4 . 14 . 1) . The different demographic histories of helot 
lineages will also have led to the continual development of 
differential access to land. The extent of such economic 
differentiation cannot be documented, but the possibility was 
suggested earlier that some helots may even have come to have 
cultivation rights to more land than was owned by some poorer 
Spartiates . Poorer helots are likely to have turned to such 
wealthier helots for assistance when the resources of kinsmen and 
friends were insufficient , just as modern south-east Asian 
peasants expected to receive help from richer village neighbours 
( Scott 1976 , 40ff.) . One should not even exclude the possibility 
that the richest helots , those with cultivation rights over more 
land than was manageable by their available family labour , will 
t h ems elves haVe bec ome quasi-landlords , u sing members of t he 
poorest families as labourers or tenants. Consequently, 
patronage and deference within the helot body may have been a 
p ot ent fact or . 
Despi te these obstacle s , t here probably remained some room 
for patronal relations between individual Spartiates and helots. 
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Precisely because the sharecropping arrangements did not offer 
the helots an absolute subsistence guarantee, there will have 
been more scope for individual Spartiates to intervene in times 
of hardship. The existence of patron-client ties among the 
helots need not have excluded similar relations between helots 
and Spartiates, since prudent helot farmers may have deemed it 
wise to cultivate both. Spartiates had the potential to be more 
effective suppliers of subsistence help than weal thy helots. 
When crop failure struck not just locally but across a region, 
thus limiting the capacity even of richer helot neighbours, many 
Spartiates could have drawn upon the resources of their lands in 
other parts of Lakonia or Messenia. Leading Spartiates could 
even have tapped external sources through their foreign ties of 
xenia. There were also several non-economic avenues for 
Spartiates to exercise patronage: for example through their 
selection of particular helots as household servants or army 
batmen and in the choice of helot women as sexual mates whose 
sons ( nothoi) would be integrated into central polis institutions 
such as the state upbringing and the army (cf. Xen. Hell. 5.3.9). 
Certain important limitations to such relations of patronage 
should, howeve·r, be borne in mind. Gallant has emphasized (1991, 
143ff., esp. 160f.) that even when patron-client ties do exist, 
one of their defining and limiting aspects is that they are in 
themselves merely particularistic and face-to-face. For 
clientism to operate as a reliable guarantee of subsistence help, 
the bond has to be added to and perpetuated in such a way as 
permanently to bridge the social gulf between patron and client. 
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This bridging was achievable for citizens in ancient Greek poleis 
owing to their common participation in a variety of 
'associations', such as demes, gene, phratries, orgeones and 
thiasoi, and through the prevailing ideology of social equality 
and reciprocity among citizens, regardless of economic 
differentiation. Between Spartiates and helots, however, there 
could be none of these things; and this state of 
'disassociation' will have been reinforced by the continual 
personnel changes of Spartiate landowners and helot farmers 
discussed in Section II. Any reciprocal relationships between 
Spartiates and helots will therefore necessarily have remained 
short-term and tenuous, dependent entirely upon ongoing face-to-
face contact. 
The fact that Spartiate-helot clientism was unable to 
transcend the character of a particularistic and face-to-face 
relationship meant that it could only be an effective, ongoing 
instrument when there was regular personal contact between the 
two parties. Hence the distance to his estates is likely to have 
exercised an important influence upon the extent of a Spartiate's 
paternalistic relations with his helots. In areas close to 
Sparta citizens will have been able to intervene more actively 
in the lives of their helots. In his account of the conspiracy 
of Kinadon in the early 390s, Xenophon (Hell. 3. 3. 5) depicts 
Kinadon as taking the informer from the agora into the streets 
of Sparta and then out to the Spartiates' estates where the 
individual citizen masters were to be found outnumbered by their 
helots whose work they will no doubt have been supervising. The 
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account suggests that these estates lay somewhere in Lakonia not 
too far from Sparta. 32 One doubts whether such active 
supervision would have been frequent further afield, especially 
in Messenia. This was owing not only to the factor of distance, 
including the time-consuming crossing or circumvention of the 
Taygetos range, but also to the probability that an individual 
Spartiate in Messenia would have been isolated and vulnerable 
away from the support (psychological as well as physical) of his 
fellow citizens in what was effectively a world of helots - even 
more isolated than Russian noble pomeshchiki evidently felt in 
the peasants' world of their provincial estates (Kolchin 1987, 
passim, esp. 51ff. & 98ff.). 
The problem of how absentee Spartiates effectively 
supervised their Messenian estates leads one to ask whether, like 
Russian pomeshchiki who employed stewards drawn from among the 
serfs themselves (Kolchin 1987, 62), they relied upon local helot 
agents. Several scholars (e.g. Cartledge 1987, 174; Talbert 
1989, · 30; and, with qualifications, Ducat 1990, 63) have recently 
argued that this was the case. The choice of crops, organization 
of labour, timing of sowings, management of animals and, above 
all, the collection and delivery of the harvest are just a few 
examples of important operations for which a Spartiate landlord, 
encumbered by citizen duties in Sparta or on campaign, may well 
have required an agent to ensure their satisfactory performance. 
There were admittedly other subordinate groups, such as Messenian 
perioikoi, who might in theory have been utilized for this 
purpose; but it is hard to see how even individual perioikoi, 
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whose communities were (to the best of our knowledge) located 
around the peripheries of, rather than intermingled with, 
Spartiate-owned territories could have occupied a niche 
sufficiently close to provide Sffective supervision. 
The Spartiates' selection of helot agents may well have been 
implicated in the existence of the helot elite referred to above, 
whether it was a question of promoting a new elite or (perhaps 
more frequently) of reinforcing existing social differentiation 
through the selection of helots already wealthy. A gloss of 
Hesychios, "µovoµoir~v Eilhlr~v &pxovrec" (µ 1626, ed. Latte, II, 
p.676), which has been plausibly emended to read "µv't)ov6µoi · r~v 
Ellhlr~v apxovrec", may be relevant here. Despite Wilamowitz's 
view (1924, 273), followed by Talbert (1989, 30 n.51), that this 
passage relates solely to Crete since the term mnoia is otherwise 
found only there, the mention of helots must indicate that the 
point of reference is Sparta, as both Gschnitzer (1964-76, II. 
81 & n.117) and Ducat (1990, 63) have pointed out. Who were 
these mnoionomoi , the "leaders of the helots"? Drawing upon the 
evidence of the poem of Hybrias ( apud Athenaios 695F-696A) , Ducat 
argues ( 1990, 63 & 74) that the mnoia was a group of slaves 
living and working on an estate; the mnoionomos was either their 
manager or customary chief, the kind of figure through whom a 
Spartiate owner would be likely to work. 33 Hesychios' gloss 
makes no distinction between Lakonian and Messenian helots and 
it may be that this social structure existed in both regions. 
On my argument above, however, the system will have had more 
significance in Messenia , where mnoionomoi will have had more 
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independence and the communal structures which they headed a more 
important role in organizing the everyday lives and guaranteeing 
the subsistence needs of their members. Indeed, in so far as 
Spartiates themselves attempted to provide crisis subsistence 
help for their helots in those regions which were too remote for 
them to be active direct patrons, they may have operated through, 
and thereby reinforced, such local structures. 
This suggestion of variations in degrees of supervision and 
personal interaction does tie in with observable differences 
between the relationships of Lakonian and Messenian helots to 
their Spartiate masters. It is important neither to exaggerate 
the extent of the Lakonian helots' acquiescence, nor to 
underestimate the Spartan authorities' capacity to enforce it by 
terror, nor yet to forget their skill in concealing sensitive 
information about events in both regions. 34 But, despite 
Talbert's claim to the contrary (1989, 31f. & 36f.), it is 
nevertheless clear that the helots of Messenia generally caused 
the Spartans far more trouble than did the Lakonians (Roobaert 
1977; Ducat 1978, 28ff.; 1990, 129ff.; Cartledge 1979, 40ff.). 35 
For example, although Lakonian helots close to Sparta may have 
initiated their own part of the revolt of the late 460s, it was 
the Messenian contribution which was the longer-lasting and more 
effective (cf. Thuc. 1.101.2; Diod. 11.63-4; Ducat 1990, 131ff. , 
who notes that the version in Plut. Kirnon 17, which gives the 
sole initiative to the Lakonian helots, is tainted with 
Hellenistic elements). Moreover, whenever we know the place of 
origin of those helots who, especially in the late fifth and 
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early fourth centuries, undertook military service for Sparta in 
return for their personal freedom, it is Lakonia not Messenia. 
In spite of Talbert's argument (1989, 31) that willingness to 
undertake such service was widespread, there is no firm evidence 
of Messenian involvement. 36 
These contrasting reactions came into sharpest relief when 
during the Theban invasion of 370/69 more than 6,000 Lakonian 
helots volunteered to defend Sparta, while the Messenians 
accepted the opportunity for their liberation (Xen. Hell. 
6.5.28-9; Diod. 15.66; Paus. 9.14.5). The extent to which some 
of the Lakonian helots had internalized Spartiate values was 
demonstrated when those captured by the Thebans declined to sing 
the poems of Terpander, Alkman and Spendon on the grounds that 
their masters had forbidden it ( Plut. Lyk. 28. 8-10) • This is not 
to suggest that the Messenian helots were daily on the brink of 
revolt. Talbert may be right to draw attention to the relative 
ignorance and limited horizons of most helots in a countryside 
closed off from the outside world. But this makes it all the 
more remarkable that when destabilizing situations arose the 
Messenians are sometimes known to have exploited those 
opportunities -with a degree of organization not evident among 
those Lakonians close to Sparta. 37 This phenomenon demands 
explanation. 
Cartledge ( 1985, 46) has recently identified the Messenians' 
"ethnic and political solidarity which provided ... [them] with 
the appropriate ideological inspiration and organizational 
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cohesion" as the key factors which distinguished them from the 
Lakonian helots, as well as from other servile groups in Greek 
antiquity who never appear to have revolted outright. His study, 
which examines helot revolts in the comparative context of slave 
revolts (or their absence) in the Americas and Classical Greece, 
draws in particular upon the work of Genovese (1979, llf.), who 
has suggested a list of eight factors conducive to revolts. Of 
these the most decisive factor, in Cartledge's judgment, is the 
development of the master-slave relationship "in the context of 
absenteeism and depersonalization as well as greater cultural 
estrangement" (1979, 39). Here Cartledge's conclusions 
concerning the master-slave aspects of Spartiate-helot relations 
converge with my examination of them as landowners and 
cultivators. The fact that the extent of absenteeism, 
depersonalization and cultural estrangement are precisely the 
variables which differentiated the relationships of Spartiate 
landowners with their Lakonian and Messenian cultivators enables 
us to augment Cartledge's explanation of the Messenians' capacity 
to revolt. 
If more direct and frequent Spartiate intervention in the 
productive process on their Lakonian estates was often 
accompanied by a more personalized , paternalistic relationship 
with the helot cultivators (even if by proxy of an adult 
Spartiate guardian in the case of female and child owners), then 
it is likely to have been a powerful agent in sustaining 
deference to the Spartiate elite. Moreover, some studies (e.g. 
Herring 1984, 136f. & 144) suggest that landlord provision of 
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critical production inputs, such as seed, may be decisive in 
increasing yields and thereby the cultivators' well-being. These 
factors would be especially strong if, as seems probable, the 
central Spartan plain was dominated by the ancestral estates of 
the wealthiest and most well-born Spartiates, those landlords 
best able to provide effective patronage and subsistence help. 
Paternalistic relationships involving Spartiate subsistence help 
would also reduce the significance of helot self-help and hinder 
the emergence of an autonomous leadership, another factor of 
importance in both slave and peasant revolts. Would-be leaders 
of Lakonian helot revolts came normally not from among the helots 
themselves but from the ranks of the master (or ex-master) class, 
from men such as the Regent Pausanias and the 'Inferior' Kinadon 
(Thuc. 1.132; Xen. Hell. 3.3.4-11). 38 
Conversely, in Messenia landlord absenteeism and indirect 
management will have constrained their capacity to provide 
production inputs, maintained the depersonalization of 
Spartiate-helot relationships and in tens if ied their cultural 
estrangement. If in times of subsistence crisis Messenian helots 
were thrown upon their own resources, and local self-help and 
intra-community patronage were their main source of 
protection, 39 local community organization is likely to have 
been highly developed. It is of course ' concerning this aspect 
of helot life that the ancient sources fail us most completely, 
so that it is difficult to construct a plausible image of the 
internal structures of Messenian society; but the evidence for 
the mnoionomoi suggests the existence of permanent associations 
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linking different social strata such as could not exist between 
helot and Spartiate. 
Another suggestive sphere is that of religion (Roebuck 1941, 
34ff.). 40 Despite their servitude, the Messenian helots seem to 
have maintained their sanctuaries, such as those of Zeus at 
Ithome, 4 1. the Andanian mysteries in the Stenyklaros plain, 42 
Apollo Korythos in the Akri tas peninsula43 - and possibly the 
river god Pamisos in the southern Messenian plain. 44 These 
were all major sanctuaries, and no doubt fuller information would 
provide evidence for numerous, more localized, shrines. Surface 
survey of the 'Five Rivers' area in the immediate environs of 
Nichoria has indeed yielded one probable and two possible 
examples of such small Archaic and Classical shrines. 45 The 
sanctuaries of Zeus at Ithome and Apollo Korythos, however, are 
particularly interesting cases in that the use of the former as 
the Messenians' place of refuge in the 460s revolt and of the 
latter as a location for the dedication commemorating their 
victory over the Athenians (Jeffery 1990, 206 no. 3; Bauslaugh 
1990), probably in the same revolt, marks them both out as places 
of pan-Messenian focus. 
It is relevant to consider also the evidence for tomb cult, 
"rituals aimed at linking contemporary society with the powerful 
beings perceived to be associated with ancient tombs" {Alcock 
1991, 448 n.3) beset though it is with difficulties of 
identification and dating resulting from the less than ideal 
quality of data from early investigations. 46 Although the most 
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striking example of tomb cult in eighth-century Messenia, that 
at Volimidia (Coulson 1988) seems not to have continued into the 
following century, other cases can - albeit sometimes tentatively 
- be identified in the early years of Spartan domination: through 
Proto-Corinthian pottery at Vasiliko at the Eastern end of the 
soulima valley near the N.W. corner of the Stenyklaros plain, the 
initial region of Spartan conquest; and through Corinthian 
pottery at Ano Kopanaki: Akourthi only about 12 km. W.N.W. up the 
valley (refs. in Coldstream 1976, 11 n. 26; Alcock 1991, nos. 30 
& 23) . 
Three other Archaic sites of tomb cult mooted in the modern 
literature all lie within about 5-8 km. of one another in inland 
West-Central Messenia: ( i) Papoulia, which "yielded black-glazed 
pottery, probably going back to the late seventh century" 
(Coldstream 1976, 10 n~24; Alcock 1991, no.28); (ii) Soulinari: 
Tourliditsa whose "offerings include wine amphorae from Archaic 
times onwards" (Coldstream, ibid.; Alcock 1991, no.5); (iii) 
Koukounara: Gouvalari 1 which, according to Coulson and Wilki~ 
"contained pottery from the 7th century B.C. onward, accompanied 
by animal sacrifices, particularly deer" (1983, 333; Alcock 1991, 
no.26). It should be noted, however, that recent reassessments 
of the Koukounara cult have suggested alternative explanations 
for some of the finds (Korres 1981/82, 381ff.; cf. Alcock 1991, 
465 with refs.). Morris (1988, 756 & 759, Table 1) classifies 
it as an eighth-century cult which soon died out. 
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The vagueness concerning terminal dates in the above 
information makes for considerable uncertainty about the extent 
of tomb cult in the Classical period of Spartan rule. Three out 
of five examples of Classical cult proposed by Coulson and Wilkie 
( 19 8 3 , 3 3 3 ) seem rather dubious: ( i ) the case of Koukounara 
discussed above; (ii) that of Voidokoilia/Boupras where there 
are no associated dateable finds (Coldstream 1976, 11); and 
(iii) that of Dafni where the finds appear to be late Classical 
(i.e. presumably post-370) in date (Alcock 1991, no.24, with 
refs.). 47 This leaves just two cases, both in the 'Five Rivers' 
area: the Vathirema chamber tomb (Lukermann & Moody 1978, 
Appendix, Feature 1; Alcock 1991, no. 6), which produced a 
sizeable group of black-glazed Classical pottery; and the tholos 
tomb at Nichoria whose cult usage is dated from the last quarter 
of the fifth century to the end of the first quarter of the 
fourth (Coulson & Wilkie 1983, 334ff.; Alcock 1991, no.3). 
Even on a maximal interpretation this evidence for tomb cult 
in the period of Spartan domination is dwarfed by the upsurge of 
the phenomenon in the post-liberation era (Alcock 1991). The 
evidence is, nevertheless, perhaps minimally sufficient to lend 
some credence- to Coulson and Wilkie's suggestion (1983, 333) that 
Messenian tomb cult served as "a way of perpetuating local 
traditions in the face of Spartan occupation". Their 
interpretation assumes, perhaps rather too easily, that the cults 
were indeed maintained by helots rather than by other social 
groups. It seems that the early cults in the Soulima valley 
should be explained differently (perhaps in terms of resistance 
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to Spartan expansion), since there is reason to doubt that its 
inhabitants were ever helotized (Ernst Meyer 1978, 192f.). The 
assumption of helot agency seems inherently more probable, 
however, in the other cases itemized above. In neither the West-
Central nor the 'Five Rivers' region is there any evidence of 
perioikic settlement. The spasmodic occurrence of the cult seems 
to rule out the hypothesis of activity by the Spartan state. 
Moreover, although the agency of individual Spartiate landowners 
cannot entirely be eliminated, the doubt whether Spartiate 
citizens would have so intimate an involvement in these distant 
areas, combined with the absence of attested tomb cult from any 
region of Archaic and Classical Lakonia, makes it more likely 
that we are dealing with another distinctive feature of the 
Messenian helot community. The change of regions from which the 
evidence comes in the different periods suggests precisely the 
kind of localized, fluctuating expression of identity which one 
might expect in their circumstances of subjugation. 
The Classical tomb cult at Nichoria , for which we possess 
by far the best documented evidence thanks to careful excavation 
and close study by the Minnesota expedition (Coulson & Wilkie 
1983, 332ff.), · contains some suggestive features. First, there 
are the intimations that the horizons of the cult participants 
or controllers were more than purely Messenian. Of the 23 
recorded items of fine ware (which forms some 52% of the total 
recorded assemblage) at least 13, or 56%, have been identified 
as either foreign imports or local imitations of foreign work, 
with especial links to Olympia and Attica. Secondly , finds of 
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pithoi and amphorae indicate the storage of surplus foodstuffs 
and liquids for use in the cult offerings. These features might 
be interpreted along a line of thought recently suggested by 
Morris (1988, 756ff. ), that while tomb cults cemented the 
community as a whole, they also proclaimed the superiority of 
leading families who traced their pedigrees back to the heroic 
age. In the Messenian case cults such as that at Nichoria are 
likely to have been administered by leading helots (such as the 
mnoionomoi), men with supra-local horizons and the capacity to 
extract the required surplus produce from their own or others' 
holdings. 
Cult organizations based on the sanctuaries of divinities 
or the tombs of 'ancestors' could, therefore, have provided an 
important vehicle for communal institutions and action. 
Moreover, Gallant ( 1991, 175ff.) has outlined the role that 
ancient Greek religious cults often played as food redistribution 
mechanisms, based either on the resources of the cult itself or 
on donations by weal thy individuals. To be effective in 
alleviating crises which affected all social strata in a 
particular locality such cults would need as wide a catchment as 
possible, as is suggested by the evidence for the sanctuaries of 
Zeus Ithomatas and Apollo Korythos and (in a different way) for 
the tomb cult at Nichoria. The factor of religious unity may 
help to explain the maintenance of Messenian solidarity over the 
three and a half centuries between its late-eighth-century 
conquest and its liberation in 370/69. 
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Scott has noted that such grass-roots initiatives may "form 
the potential nodes of class leadership and organization" (1976, 
207) and that in circumstances in which there is a general 
absence of landlord assistance "the collective legitimacy of 
landlords as a class may be called into question" (1976, 51). 
This point is reinforced by the case of the Russian serfs 
(Kolchin 1987) whose servitude shared many parallel points with 
that of the Messenian helots (in contrast with the position of 
slaves in the American South). Like the Messenians, Russian 
serfs were numerically preponderant, experienced only infrequent 
interference from their impersonal noble masters and had their 
own local autonomous culture. They also provided their own 
subsistence and played a considerable role in the administration 
of their own villages by means of peasant communes led by elected 
representatives. The commune' s scope included maintaining a 
reserve of money and grain to help the needy in times of crisis. 
It played a dual role as an instrument both of estate 
administration for the landlord and of defence and protection of 
peasant interests. In the latter capacity it often organized 
collective peaceful resistance to excessive noble demands, but 
also became the foundation for the highly-organized military 
operations of . the four 'Peasant Wars' of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Russian serfs, unlike American slaves, 
entertained continuing ideas of ultimate liberation and of their 
rightful place as free subjeGts of the Tsar. 
Russian serfs and American slaves may, as Kolchin (1987, 
237) stresses, represent two extremes of the spectrum of servile 
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communal behaviour; but the contrast between them highlights in 
essence many of the differences between Messenian and Lakonian 
helotage for which I have argued in this chapter. This suggests 
that, mutatis mutandis, compar~ble factors connected with the 
role of Messenian communal institutions may help to explain both 
their continued absence of acceptance of Spartiate rule and, when 
given the opportunity (as in 464 and, even more clearly, in 
370/69), their capacity to create and sustain a credible 
community organization and military resistance to Spartan 
offensives under their own autonomous leadership - with in 370/69 
the additional assistance of highly-motivated returning exiles, 
themselves in part the descendants of participants in the 460s 
revolt. It may be that when Spartan domination was secure richer 
Messenian helots were relatively content to lord it over their 
poorer fellows; but this is not inconsistent with their 
organization of mass liberation movements at certain times when 
opportunity knocked. 48 Landowner absenteeism, local self-help 
and intra-community patronage may thus have played their part in 
the undermining of Spartan domination and the origins of the 
Messenian polis in the early fourth century. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 3 
1. Arist. Pol. 127lb40-1272a2; Livy 34.27.9; Plut. Lyk. 24.3; 
Aelian, VH 13.19; Kahrstedt (1919, 288f.); Ducat (1978, 14f. & 
38f.; 1990, 53ff.); MacDowell (1986, 37ff.). On Busolt & 
Swoboda's interpretation (1926, 639) of [Plato], Alk. I 122D, 
they may have been more prominent in herding; but this 
interpretation is necessarily uncertain. 
2. Hence there is no need here to enter into the debate about 
the date and circumstances of the end of helotage, concerning 
which see most recently Ducat (1990, 193ff.). More pertinent is 
Ducat's argument (1990, 14lff.) that the Messenians were not 
helotized until after the revolt of the 460s, discussion of which 
I shall reserve until Section III below. For the purpose of this 
analysis of Spartiate exploitation of helots, I leave aside the 
controversial question whether helots may also have been in the 
possession of perioikoi. 
3. The quotation is from Finley (1985, 63). The fact that some 
helots were taken off the land from time to time, to serve in a 
Spartiate's household, for example, does not invalidate the 
general proposition in the text. 
4. Ducat (1990, 64) notes, however, tha~ the sum of five minas 
was a standard price paid for liberation in the third century. 
5. See Ch.4, Section I= Hodkinson (1989, 84) for one set of 
theoretical calculations of the comparative probabilities of the 
various combinations of heirs mentioned below in the text . They 
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derive from the work of demographers of pre-industrial societies 
and employ a common assumption of a stationary population in 
which any child born has a 0.5 chance of surviving beyond its 
parents' death. According to these calculations, the probability 
of only a single male heir is just under 12% compared with nearly 
70% for more than one child. Although these theoretical 
calculations are intended to indicate orders of magnitude only, 
these figures and those in the following notes are interestingly 
similar to real findings from some historical societies, e.g. 
Wrightson & Levine (1979, 96). 
6. On the calculations referred to in the previous note some 
transfer of land between the sexes will have occurred in almost 
90% of cases. 
7. Over 21% of families have no surviving heir according to the 
calculations above. 
8. On the implications of the Xenophon passage, Cartledge 
(1985, 43); and see Section V, below. 
9. There is no evidence that when Spartiates were degraded to 
Inferior status through (inter alia) failure to produce their 
mess contributions they ceased to own land. Given the nature of 
Spartiate land tenure, it is unlikely that the polis intervened 
to take away their remaining holdings. The fact that Inferiors 
continued to serve in the army and that one of them, Kinadon, was 
frequently employed in state service ( Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 7 & 9) 
implies that they retained their means of support, namely, 
landholdings worked as before by helots. It is a further 
I 
I 
I I 
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complication of ,Spartan-helot relations that the masters of an 
increasing number of helots in the late fifth and early fourth 
centuries will have been men who were no longer full citizens. 
10. Cf. the statement of Archemachos of Euboia (apud Athen. 
264B; fl. first half of the 3rd century B.C.?) that many Penestai 
were richer than their Thessalian masters. Although "many" is 
no doubt an exaggeration and the passage is distorted by an over-
favourable image of the institution (Ducat 1990, 70f.), the 
reality of the phenomenon should not be entirely dismissed. 
11. Greek texts and translations (which I have largely followed 
below) of the main sources . are conveniently presented by 
MacDowell (1986, 32f. ). 
12. E.g. Aeschines 1.97; Plut. Theseus 23.3. It was the regular 
word in Classical Athens for the payments which a slave working 
independently delivered to his master. 
13. Women owned approximately two-fifths of the territory, 
according to Aristotle ( Pol. 1270a23-4). Regarding minors , 
Osborne (1988, 309) estimates that in Classical Athens more than 
20%, and possibly closer to a third, of fathers died with sons 
under 18 or daughters only under 13. 
14. See Ch.4 below= Hodkinson (1989, 96~f.); on the expense of 
chariot racing, cf. the refs. collected by Davies (1971, xxv ff., 
esp. n. 7). Cozzoli ( 1979, 162f.) also notes some of the 
contradictions outlined in the text. 
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15. Exceptions are Chrimes (1949, 290f.), who argues that the 
"masters'' in the passage are the Messenian aristocracy, and Den 
Boer (1954, 73f.), who interprets it as a warning to the Spartans 
of their possible fate if defeated. These hypotheses have been 
convincingly criticized by several scholars: e.g. Diesner 
(1953/54, 220 n.7); Kiechle (1959, 13 & 62f.); Lotze, (1959, 33); 
Oliva (1971, 109); Figueira (1984, 104 n.54); Ducat (1990, 60). 
16. E.g. Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 641); Lotze (1959, 28); Jones 
(1967, 9); Figueira (1984, 103f.). 
17. Cf. the emendations listed by Prato (1968, 27). 
18. Ducat's picture of early-fifth-century Messenia is of "un 
peuple en guerre quasi permanente avec Sparte" (141). But this 
view is achieved only by separating the battles of the Isthmos 
and Stenyklaros from their most probable context within the 460s 
revolt and by over-reliance upon the reported argument of 
Aristagoras ( 5. 49, a piece of advocacy, not a dispassionate 
statement) that the Spartans should suspend their wars against 
the equally-matched Messenians in order to campaign against 
Persia. As Whitby notes, although the dramatic context is the 
year 499, the argument probably reflects the fighting of the 
460s; it does not provide evidence of continual conflict in the 
later sixth century. 
19. But note that Ducat's attempt to date Ageladas' statue of 
Zeus at Ithome to the late sixth century and to designate it as 
local work - in contrast to Pausanias' statement (4.33.2) that 
it was made for the Messenians at Naupaktos - on the grounds that 
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the sculptor must be the artist responsible for several victory 
monuments between 520 and 508, ignores the existence of another 
Ageladas active in the late fifth century (Schol. Aristophanes, 
Frogs 504; cf. Pliny, N.H. 34.49). 
20. One may not want to lay too much emphasis on the evidence 
of Myron of Priene (quoted in Section IV below), infected as it 
is by the notion of a contract of servitude - though not 
necessarily by the idea of a system of equal kleroi; but it is 
worth noting that his term moira is capable of interpretation as 
a proportional share of the crops. 
21. Powell (1988, 249) notes some scholars' doubts about the 50% 
quota. Societies in which it is common practice include 16th 
century Castile: Vassberg (1984, 212); 20th century Egypt and 
southern Iraq: Warriner (1962, 27 & 139); Japan: Dore (1959, 
42-3); late 19th century southern U. S . A.: Reid, (1973, 110 &: 
115ff.; early 19th century Greece: Thiersch (1833, I 303). Even 
fixed rentals often approximate a 50% share under the kinds of 
conditions which applied in Lakonia and Messenia in our period: 
cf. Clark (1968, 65f.). 
22 . Cartledge (1987 , 174) , noting a modern estimat e of 
170-200 , 000 helots, comments that "most helots could have been 
living at or near the margin of subsistence" . 
23. Although Myron is normally dated by reference to his f r. 6 
( apud Rutil ius Lupus , De Fig . 1.20 , who quotes him t o illustrate 
poi nts o f rhetoric ), in whic h he appear s to ment ion his 
f riendship with a certain Cremonides , probably the prominent 
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Athenian politician Chremonides ( florui t c. 270-240) , Pearson 
(1962, 411) notes that it does not necessarily follow that the 
two men were contemporaries, since the passage may be a purely 
academic oration or illustration in a rhetorical handbook. He 
could have lived at any time in the second century, since the 
only certain terminus ante quern appears to be the citation of a 
Myron in the Lindos temple chronicle of 99 B.C. (fr.4-5); even 
this depends upon the (plausible) assumption that this Myron is 
the same man. 
24. Another sphere in which we should expect a variety of 
indi victual arrangements is that of animal husbandry, the economic 
organization of which is unknown. It is likely that a helot 
herdsman might have been granted a proportion of the offspring 
and other products from a Spartiate's herd and that he might be 
able to build up a herd of his own which he could tend alongside 
his master's. But the extreme riskiness of pastoral enterprises 
compared with arable farming, as exemplified by the twin extreme, 
but ever-present, possibilities of rapid increase or sudden loss 
through disease, would surely have rendered impracticable the 
strict application of unvarying proportional shares. 
25. Scott (1976, 45). The table is reproduced by the kind 
permission of the copyright owners, Yale University Press. 
26. Reid ( 1975/76, 549ff.). Reid has questioned the superiority 
of sharecropping over pre-agreed rent as a means of risk sharing 
or dispersal; but his critique relates to situations in which 
percentage shares and levels of rent are mutually and 
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competitively determined by the ability of landlords and tenants 
to seek alternative labourers or masters or to opt for 
alternative contractual arrangements. Neither of these applied 
in Lakonia and Messenia. Cf. also Reid (1977, 403ff.). 
27. For a brief attempt to harmonize the two approaches, but 
with priority accorded to 'political economy', see Gallant (1991, 
7ff.) . 
28. Ducat (1990, 64) is mistaken therefore when, in reacting 
against Plutarch's overfavourable image, he asserts that the 
helots' rent was calculated to produce as much as possible to 
their Spartiate masters. His phraseology elsewhere, "de son 
travail l'hilote ne pouvait garder que ce qui etait necessaire 
a son double fonction de production et de reproduction" (181), 
although more practical in conception, shows no awareness of the 
fact that one such necessity would be the capacity to produce a 
sizeable surplus for storage against future crop failures. 
Gallant's recent compilation of the ancient Greek evidence 
concludes that peasants "aimed at having anywhere from 10 to 16 
months' worth of food in their storerooms" (1991, 97). 
29. Marshall (1890) defines the traditional neoclassical 
position. For the neoclassical revision, Cheung (1969); Reid 
(1973; 1975/76; 1977), with refs. to traditional views. For the 
Chayanovian interpretation, Herring (1984, 133ff.). 
30. Cf. Herring (1984) & several of the essays in Byres ed. 
(1973), esp. those by Byres, Bhaduri and Caballero. These 
effects counteract the standard Marshallian principle that 
·--
--
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sharecropping will be inefficient where there is 'practical 
fixity of tenure' (such as the helots possessed) because the 
landlord has no instrument for increasing the output of labour. 
It is in any case well attested that long leases are a source of 
increased productivity because they encourage improvements by 
tenants: cf. Parker (1955, 158); Herring (1983, ch.9). Note that 
in my discussion productivity is used as a measure of efficiency 
because, although the latter should technically and properly be 
defined by relating returns to 
literature, which dominates 
costs, 
modern 
in land reform policy 
economic debate of 
sharecropping, inefficiency usually means low returns per unit 
of land, i.e. yields (Herring 1984, 145 n.1). 
31. Note, for example, the attempt of the Russian serfs of 
Riazan to establish a bond with Prince Leonid Mikhailovich 
Golitsyn in order to obtain an amelioration of their harsh 
conditions: "we consider you forever as our father"; and 
contrast the instrumental nature of his response: "How am I a 
father to you?... I am just your pomeshchik, I have legal 
authority over you" (quoted in Kolchin 1987, 307). 
32. Xen. Hell. 3.3.5. The wording connotes physical movement 
into the countryside rather than just cogitation and can 
therefore be used as direct evidence for the situation on 
Spartiate estates. This is shown by the use of the aorist 
optative mood in the phrase "Kal oaoi &~ !v roic x~pioic 
~1rap11a1wv ruxoiEv ovrEc" ("as many as happened to be [i.e. 
actually at that time] on the estates of the Spartiates"). The 
optative mood is used because the clause is governed by E~~ in 
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the previous sentence, in which Kinadon was pointing out specific 
individuals in the streets of Sparta. I am grateful to Paul 
Cartledge and Robin Osborne for helpful discussion of this 
passage. 
33. For the form of the terminology, compare the paidonomos 
(Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.2) who had charge of Spartan youths in the 
agoge. 
34. These caveats are stressed by Cartledge (1979, 177) & Powell 
(1988, 218 & 250). 
35. One illuminating exception may be the helots who revolted 
and fled from Malea to Koryphasion (Pylos) during the Dekeleian 
war (Xen. Hell. 1.2.18). The Malea peninsula is another area 
distant from Sparta. Were these helots located in the modern 
plain of Molaoi, which is second only to the Eurotas valley in 
terms of size and which lacks any identified perioikic site east 
of Goulas (anc. Kyparissia?) at the plain's western extremity? 
One should note, however , that a more natural interpretation of 
Xenophon's text (Kiechle 1959, 108 n.3; Ducat 1990, 137) would 
put the helots' movements from Koryphasion to Malea. 
36 . For example, the helots who served with Brasidas from 424 
and the neodamodeis with whom they were stationed on their return 
in 421 must both have been from Lakonia , since they were 
stationed in the extremely sensitive territory of Lepreon not too 
far from the northern borders of Messenia (Thuc. 5.34). This 
would have been an extremely improbable place to have located 
1
/ I 
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ex-helots of Messenian origin whose neighbours and kinsfolk would 
have been in servitude not far away. 
37. In general Talbert's argument stressing helot acquiescence 
in Spartan rule suffers from a failure to appreciate the 
distortions of perspective produced by the chronic lack of 
evidence. Despite his citation of Kolchin's comparative work 
(1989, 32 nn.57 & 61), he fails to appreciate the latter's 
essential point ( 1987, 244f. & 255ff.) that servile revolts 
(which tend to occur only at times of severe crisis) are less 
satisfactory indicators of bondsmen's mentality than flight and 
small-scale confrontations, which are many times more frequent. 
Because details of this level of activity are only rarely 
mentioned in the ancient narrative sources Talbert's argument 
that Spartiate-helot tension was limited is the weakest of 
arguments ex silentio. On the distortions evident in generic 
ancient statements about helot tension, see Ducat (1990, 145ff.). 
For further criticism of Talbert's argument, Cartledge (1991). 
38. Many scholars (e.g., recently, Welwei 1974, 122; Ducat 1990, 
129ff.) reject the authenticity of Pausanias' plan to give helots 
the citizenship as the fabrication of his enemies; if so, it 
remains indicative of the Spartiates' view of what was possible . 
3 9. Such a tendency may have been expcerbated by a higher 
proportion of arable holdings belonging to ordinary Spartiates , 
estates originally allocated in the late eighth century to all 
those who participated in the original conquest and/or in the 
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seventh century to bring poorer citizens up to the level required 
for the exercise of their civic duties. 
40. A general problem underlying the following discussion is the 
question of determining whether any given cult site lay within 
territory inhabited by helots or by perioikoi - always assuming, 
as most scholars have done, that helot and perioikic areas of 
residence were largely separate. My discussion here must 
necessarily be summary; but cf. Ernst Meyer (1978, 253ff.) for 
an almost identical set of conclusions. The sole contemporary 
evidence concerning boundaries comes from a comment of Euripides 
(apud Strabo 8.5.6; 366B) that the border between Lakonike and 
Messenia was formed by the River Pamisos. Since there is reason 
to believe that Classical writers reserved the term 'Messenians' 
for the helot population (Niese 1891, 18f.; cf. Ernst Meyer 1978, 
253), this comment appears to set an eastern boundary to helot 
territory. 
There seems little doubt that the stenyklaros (or upper 
Messenian) plain formed the heart of helot arable cultivation. 
In view of Euripides' evidence above it seems, contrary to the 
judgement of some scholars (e.g. Toynbee 1972, 190) , that the 
Western part ~f the lower plain, known as Makaria, was also helot 
territory. Furthermore, it seems likely (especially given the 
emphasis of [Plato], Alk. I 122D upon . the Spartiates' use of 
Messenia for large-scale pasturage) that the huge region between 
the eastern plains and the west coast, south of the Soulima 
valley, was in Spartiate rather than perioikic hands - although 
there may have been significant variations in the density of the 
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helot population (cf. Thuc. 4.3 on the neighbourhood of Pyles; 
Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 639). The status of the Akritas peninsula 
is less certain. Some scholars (e.g. Niese 1891, 19; Busolt & 
Swoboda 1926, 639), relying in part upon Euripides' 
characterization (ibid.) of Messenia as being "far from the 
navigators", have taken the view that the entire southern coast 
of Messenia was perioikic territory. Euripides' remark, however, 
which is an accurate comment upon the bulk of inland Messenia, 
need not mean that no portion of helot territory was coastal. 
We should note Thucydides' reference (4.26) to the helots who 
owned their own boats; his statement that they put to sea from 
various parts of the Peloponnese suggests that these helots were 
not exclusively Lakonian. The sole attested pre-370 perioikic 
settlements in the Akritas peninsula are Methane and Asine (mod. 
Korone) at its extreme S.W. and S . E. points. I would therefore 
view most of the peninsula as a helot-settled area, especially 
in view of the Messenians' use (discussed below) of the sanctuary 
of Apollo Korythos which lay only a kilometre or so from the east 
coast and less than 10 km. north of Asine. 
41. Roebuck (1941, 34); Cartledge (1979, 193). Cartledge 
wonders whether a helot could have afforded the bronze figurine 
of Hermes dedicated there c.525 (Lamb 1926, 138 no.9). In view 
of probable helot economic differentiatipn this may not be such 
a problematic issue; but in any case the dedication could have 
been communal. 
42. Valmin (1930, 92ff.); Roebuck (1941, 35f. ); McDonald & Rapp 
(1972, 316f. no. 607); Jeffery (1990, 206 nos. 6 & 9). 
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43. Versakes (1916); Jeffery (1990, 206 nos. 3, 7, 10 & 11); 
Bauslaugh (1990). Cartledge (1979, 193) suggests that the 
sanctuary may have pertained to a perioikic predecessor of the 
town of Kolonides founded nearby in the 360s; but there is no 
evidence for such a predecessor, nor is there for any predecessor 
of late-Classical Korone, further north along the coast 
(MacDonald & Rapp 1972, 312f., no. 502). 
44. Valmin (1938, esp. 424f.); MacDonald & Rapp (1972, 314f., 
no. 530); Jeffery (1990, 206 no. 1). Located hard against the 
eastern bank of the river, the sanctuary lay just outside 
Messenia, and hence probably within the territory of one of the 
perioikic towns located along the Western foot of Mt. Taygetos. 
45. Coulson & Wilkie (1983, 332 & 337). Probable Archaic 
example: on the hill of Panayitsa near Neromilo; possible 
Classical examples: at Nichoria itself and at Ayios Nikolaos near 
Karpofora. 
46. · Alcock (1991, 450) whose catalogue numbers I shall use to 
identify the cults cited below and whose flexible approach I 
prefer to the over-rigid and dismissive approach of Korres 
(1981/82). I have been unable to gain access to the work of C.M. 
Antonaccio, 'The archaeology of early Greek "hero cult"' (Diss. 
Princeton 1987), referred to by Alcock, stnce the author has now 
withdrawn it from general use. 
47. I have also omitted the cult at Peristeria where the "later 
offerings" mentioned by Coldstream ( 1976, 11) are "now dated 
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primarily to the fourth and third centuries B.C. 11 (Alcock 1991, 
no.4, with refs.). 
48. Talbert (1989, 39) rightly notes the initial weakness of the 
new polis of Messene in the years immediately after 369. Since 
the vast majority of Messenians were new to the role of citizen, 
this is hardly surprising and does not imply any supposed 
previous loyalty to Spartan rule. On the contrary, their 
enthusiasm for their new status is suggested by their prompt 
participation in their allies' campaign outside Messenia in 368 
(Xen. Hell. 7.1.28-32). 
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CHAPTER 4 
INHERITANCE, MARRIAGE AND DEMOGRAPHY 
The internal reasons for Sparta's crisis and decline in the early 
fourth century have long been the subject of debate. Already in 
antiquity widely differing opinions were expressed by 
contemporaries such as Xenophon, Isokrates and Aristotle, as well 
as by later writers like Polybius and Plutarch. Modern 
scholarship has been equally divided, and the controversy has 
continued unabated in recent years with the divergent 
interpretations of David (1981), Cawkwell (1983), Figueira 
(1986), Cartledge (1987) and Hamilton (1991). 1 The fact that 
the Spartan polis appears, in the face of various tensions which 
I analysed in Chapter 1, to have maintained an underlying 
viability for over a . couple of centuries from perhaps the 
mid-seventh century onwards and then to have undergone a more 
rapid period of transformation and crisis in the later fifth and 
early fourth centuries must form the essential backcloth for the 
interpretation of any particular aspect of the social system. 
The subjects of this chapter inheritance, marriage and 
demography are closely linked with the question of the 
viability of Spartan society in ways which I shall hope to 
demonstrate. 
In most societies whose economies are dependent primarily 
upon sedentary agriculture the distribution of land and the rules 
governing its tenure and inheritance exercise a fundamental 
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influence upon the nature of the social system, and there is 
every indication that the same was true of classical Sparta. It 
is abundantly clear from evidence in Herodotus (6.61.3; 7.134.2), 
Thucydides (1.6.4), Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 5.3; 6.4; Hell. 
6. 4 .10-11) and Aristotle (Pol. 1270al8) that throughout the 
classical period there were marked inequalities in Spartiate 
ownership of land (cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 137f.). These passages, 
among other evidence, include specific references to activities 
which required larger than average estates. One example is the 
maintenance of horses for chariot racing ( Ste. Croix 197 2, 
Appendix XXVII) and the cavalry. Another is the provision by the 
rich to the common messes of extra donations of bread made from 
wheat, a higher status and less reliable additional cereal crop 
compared with the barley which all citizens grew to provide the 
alphita (barley meal) for their compulsory mess contributions. 2 
Beyond this point, of course, we move into highly 
controversial areas concerning the nature of land tenure and 
inheritance discussed in Chapter 2. I argued there that the 
character of Spartiate land tenure was essentially one of 
indefinite individual possession and that, unless a landowner 
exercised his · (or her) rights of gift or bequest, the estate 
would be divided among his surviving children (or their heirs). 
The issue of female inheritance was seen to be less certain; but 
I argued that daughters probably shared in the inheritance even 
in the presence of sons (at a rate of half a sonis portion), not 
just in their absence. ( I shall henceforth refer to these 
alternative systems as 'universal female inheritance' and 
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'residual female inheritance', respectively.) The Spartiates 
consequently operated a thoroughgoing version of 'diverging 
devolution', according to which the property of both father and 
mother passed into the hands of 6hildren of both sexes. 
I. The cohesive influence of universal female inheritance 
Before turning to the implications of these practices of land 
tenure and inheritance, it is relevant to comment briefly upon 
the genesis of the overall system of landownership of which they 
were a part. It seems likely that this system in its 
fundamentals went back to the seventh century when so many 
aspects of Spartan society seem to have been reshaped as part of 
the compromise between different interests which was involved in 
the creation of a united body of citizen homoioi (Equals, Peers 
or Similars). In the sphere of landholding this compromise must 
have involved bringing the property of poorer citizens up to a 
basic minimum level at which they could have been expected to 
provide their compulsory mess contributions (failure to provide 
which meant loss of citizenship) and feed their families. This 
basic minimum may have been set quite high; but, apart from this, 
the compromise involved the retention of existing inequalities. 
The practices of indefinite indi victual tenure and partible 
inheritance I would also view as a matter of the retention of 
previous usages comparable ( though of course not necessarily 
identical) to those evident elsewhere both in the early Archaic 
period (e . g . Hesiod , Works and Days 37-9 , 341, 379-80; cf. 
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Odyssey 14 .199ff.) and throughout Greek antiquity (Lane Fox 1985, 
2llff. & 216; Van Bremen 1983, 231). These practices were now 
applied, I suggest, to newly-distributed holdings as well as to 
pre-existing estates. A compromise of this sort is a much more 
plausible product of the crises of the seventh century than the 
unrealistic schemes in Plutarch; and it was made more acceptable 
for ordinary homoioi by the practice of institutionalized sharing 
(Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-5; Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7), by the 
distributive mechanisms which operated within the common messes 
(see Ch.l, Section IIbt by the restrictions upon ostentatious 
expenditure by the rich (for example at funerals: MacDowell 1986, 
120ff.) and by the uniform clothing, equipment and, to a large 
extent, lifestyle shared by all citizens (Thuc. 1.6; Cartledge 
1977, esp. 13, 15 & 27; David 1989). 
The achievement of a workable compromise in this crucial 
field must have been important psychologically in sustaining the 
unity of the homoioi; but what about its long-term practical 
effects? Here I want to examine in some detail the implications 
of the inheritance system, focusing in particular upon the 
effects of the system of universal female inheritance, in order 
to suggest some ways in which it may have contributed both to 
Spartan society's long-term stability and to its ultimate 
decline. I shall in the remainder of this section and in Section 
II, respectively, stress two related but conflicting 
implications . 
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The first implication is that a system of universal female 
inheritance tends in itself to produce less inequality among both 
individuals and families than a system of residual female 
inheritance only. Or, to express it more preciselY.i the 
inequalities generated by the former system are more graded and 
less sharp. The reason is that when all daughters as well as 
sons inherit at least some land, it is divided more evenly among 
more persons ; and when those daughters marry, the combined 
husband-wife landholdings show less marked inequalities from one 
family to the next. 
The correctness of these observations can be tested by a 
computer simulation designed to make a systematic comparison of 
the theoretical implications of these two inheritance systems: 
residual female inheritance and universal female inheritance in 
which a daughter's portion is half that of a son. A few 
introductory words concerning the purpose of simulations are 
perhaps necessary. "Computer simulation is easy to 
misunderstand, for it is easy to jump to the false conclusion 
that an experiment must propose to recreate some particular 
historical reality inside a computer, rather than to recreate and 
test the ideas that scholars have" (Wachter, Hammel & Laslett 
eds. 1978, xix). The simulation is designed to evaluate my 
hypothesis about the inherent implications of the different 
systems of inheritance, not to construct a hypothetical Spartan 
reality . It also employs several simplifying assrimptions, since, 
as J.E. Smith (1987, 250) has noted, "experience with scientific 
models in general, and computer simulation models in particular, 
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has shown that attempts to produce more and more realistic 
results usually lead to unwieldy models which contain many ad hoe 
assumptions and which are impossible to verify and replicate". 
The algorithm (that is, the set of procedural statements 
specifying the operations to be performed by the computer) behind 
the simulation postulates a model population of 10,000 married 
couples in which each couple owns one unit of land in what I 
shall call Generation One. 3 It also employs a Family 
Composition Distribution model (see Table 4.1) which specifies 
the numbers of surviving sons and daughters produced by each of 
the 10, OOO couples) . This model was calculated by means of 
binomial expansion on the simplifying assumptions of a stationary 
population with an equal sex ratio in which the replacement of 
all members of one generation by the next takes place 
simultaneously and in which each child born has a 0.5 chance of 
surviving beyond the deaths of its parents. 4 
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TABLE 4 . 1 Family Composition Distribution 
I II III IV V 
Combinations of Number of Numbers of 
Sons Daughters families Sons Daughters 
0 0 2126 0 0 
1 0 1191 1191 0 
0 1 1191 0 1191 
1 1 1028 1028 1028 
2 1 578 1156 578 
1 2 578 578 1156 
2 0 514 1028 0 
0 2 514 0 1028 
2 2 366 732 732 
3 1 244 732 244 
1 3 244 244 732 
3 0 193 579 0 
0 3 193 0 579 
3 2 165 495 330 
2 3 165 330 495 
4 1 112 448 112 
1 4 112 112 448 
4 0 82 328 0 
0 4 82 0 328 
4 2 78 312 156 
2 4 78 156 312 
3 3 76 228 228 
4 3 37 148 111 
3 4 37 111 148 
4 4 16 64 64 
10000 10000 10000 
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On the basis of the Family Composition Distribution each 
family's single unit of land is first divided among their 
surviving children according to the different rules of the two 
inheritance systems. Secondly, land belonging to families with 
no surviving children is reallocated to some of the other 
families on a 'selective proportional basis'. (There are 2,126 
units of such land to be distributed among 7,874 families with 
surviving children; consequently, 27% [2126/7874 = 0.27] of 
these families each receive one extra unit. So, for example, of 
the 16 families with 4 sons and 4 daughters, four families will 
receive an extra unit of land in addition to their original 
holding [16 x 0.27 = 4.32].) This additional land is then 
divided among the children of these families in the same way as 
the families' original landholdings. The indi victual men and 
women who form Generation Two of the model population are now 
grouped (separately) into different male and female 'landholding 
sets', each set comprising those holding identical amounts of 
land. 
The following operation pairs off these men and women to 
form Generation Two families. (The assumption is made that all 
individuals will marry, but only once.) This pairing is also 
performed on a selective proportional . basis, such that an 
identical proportion of women from any given landholding set is 
partnered with the members of any given landholding set of men, 
and vice versa. (To examine the inherent logic of the 
inheritance systems it is of course necessary to avoid 
introducing such ' real life' factors as the tendency towards 
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marriages between persons of similar wealth.) It is then 
possible to calculate the combined landholdings of each new 
Generation Two family and to group these families into 
landholding sets. The cycle now recommences with the application 
of the Family Composition Distribution model, again on a 
selective proportional basis, to each of these family landholding 
sets, in order to produce the indi victual men and women of 
Generation Three whose personal landholdings are then calculated 
and ranked in landholding sets as before. 
The routines described above have been applied across a 
number of generations as far as Generation Thirteen. The results 
are demonstrated in the graphs below. (Their scope is restricted 
for the sake of clarity to holdings up to two units in size; 
this restriction omits only the very richest members of the 
population.) Figure 4.1 indicates the outcome of land 
distribution among families at the stage of Generation Thirteen. 
It shows for the two inheritance systems the number of families 
(on the horizontal axis) who possess holdings egual to or less 
than the numbers of units of land on the vertical axis. Under 
both systems the majority of families own holdings smaller (many 
much smallerr than their ancestors' original one unit of land . 
The higher starting-point and the flatter graph of universal 
female inheritance, however, indicate a less unequal distribution 
of land than the sharply-rising one of residual inheritance only. 
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This picture is reinforced by Figure 4.2 which shows that 
among the male population ( considered on its own) universal 
female inheritance produces not only less relative inequality, 
but also fewer very poor men in absolute terms. This latter 
result is at first sight unexpected, since males own considerably 
less land under universal female inheritance {57.6% of the total 
as against 74.9%). The key to the paradox seems to be that, 
among the poorer sections of the population, men generally gain 
more land through inheritance from their mothers (most of whom 
would own no property under residual female inheritance) than 
they lose by sharing the parental holdings with their sisters. 
Although a simulation is a fiction, "like a good fictional 
story .•. it does claim to be understandable in terms of the real 
world and to be useful in shedding light on the operation of that 
world" (J.E. Smith 1987, 250). The results of the simulation 
lend support to the idea that the existence of universal female 
inheritance rights was a force for stability. In comparison with 
other possible inheritance systems it helped to reduce the 
diminution of the landholdings of poor families, and thereby the 
number of Spartan citizens, and also to restrict the rate of 
development of an excessively large wealth gap with all its 
implications for social disunity. If, moreover, one were to take 
account of one variable expressly excluded from the model, the 
fact that in real life there is normally at least some tendency 
towards marriages between partners of comparable wealth, this 
conclusion would be reinforced. When daughters inherit only in 
the absence of sons, only a minority of women receive any land 
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and these would tend to be acquired as wives by men of greate~ 
wealth; poorer men would normally have to take brides from among-
the large majority of landless women. But when all daughter~ 
inherit something, even the poorest men gain some addition or 
land with their wives. The implications of these model 
inheritance systems are, therefore, not mere theory, but woulq 
apply with even greater force in real life. Acceptance of the 
hypothesis of female inheritance in the presence of sons would, 
consequently, help to explain the longevity of the Sparta11 
socio-economic system, how and why it achieved two centuries 0:t:' 
so of comparative stability before property concentration and the 
decline in citizen numbers became serious problems in the late:t:' 
fifth century. 
The 
II. The problems of diverging devolution and 
Spartiate marriage practices 
other, contrasting implication of universal female 
inheritance, however, is that, although it tended to lessen 
long-term inequalities in landownership, it did so at the cost 
of considerable continuous short-term instability. As already 
noted in Chapter 3, when not only men inherit land, but women 
also, and those women receive at least a portion of thei:t:-
inheritance on marriage, land changes hands both down the 
generations and between the sexes atievery adult death and at 
every marriage (Goody 1976a , 10). The ownership of specific 
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and these would tend to be acquired as wives by men of greater 
wealth; poorer men would normally have to take brides from among 
the large majority of landless women. But when all daughters 
inherit something, even the poorest men gain some addition of 
land with their wives. The implications of these model 
inheritance systems are, therefore, not mere theory, but would 
apply with even greater force in real life. Acceptance of the 
hypothesis of female inheritance in the presence of sons would, 
consequently, help to explain the longevity of the Spartan 
socio-economic system, how and why it achieved two centuries or 
so of comparative stability before property concentration and the 
decline in citizen numbers became serious problems in the later 
fifth century. 
II. The problems of diverging devolution and 
Spartiate marriage practices 
The other, contrasting implication of universal female 
inheritance, however, is that, although it tended to lessen 
long-term inequalities in landownership, it did so at the cost 
of considerable continuous short-term instability. As already 
noted in Chapter 3, when not only men inherit land, but women 
also, and those women receive at least a portion of their 
inheritance on marriage, land changes hands both down the 
generations and between the sexes att every adult death and at 
every marriage (Goody 1976a , 10) . The ownership of specific 
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holdings is drastically reorganized every generation and may be 
continually reallocated from one lineage to another because 
daughters are constantly inheriting land from both father and 
mother and ultimately bequeathing it to children whose father may 
be from an entirely different lineage . In addition, the parental 
landholdings are subject to far greater division when daughters 
inherit in the presence of sons, a division which varies 
considerably in its effects from family to family, according to 
not only the total number of children but also the ratio of sons 
to daughters. For example, the grandchildren of couples with 
only sons stand to gain increased inheritances as those sons 
marry propertied wives without losing any of the parental 
property to sisters; whereas families with more daughters than 
sons give away more land with those daughters than is brought in 
by the wives of their sons. 
These phenomena of continual movement of land, its constant 
reallocation among different lineages, multiple division of the 
inheritance and extreme short-term variability in property 
levels, all of which arose directly from Sparta's particular 
system of diverging devolution, must have been important 
preoccupations for Spartiate families concerned for the 
well-being of their descendants. There was, moreover, a lack of 
direct mechanisms for remedying their most serious effects. In 
some societies the landhol4ings of families without children 
would lapse out of cultivation and become available for 
exploitation by families with too many children; but in Sparta 
the helots maintained the cultivation for whomsoever inherited 
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on grounds of kinship, not of need. There is no evidence that 
the kings, in their role of adjudication between claimants to the 
hand of unbetrothed heiresses, provided any help by allocating 
such women to sons from larger families (Ch.2, Section IIIa, 
above) . Nor is there evidence for a reservoir of public land for 
such sons to exploit, such as existed in Ptolemaic and Roman 
Egypt which practised an even more extreme form of universal 
female inheritance. 5 Furthermore, whereas the Egyptians 
utilized purchase and sale of land as a means of adjusting 
property holdings affected by partible inheritance (Rowlandson 
1981, 377; 1983, 176ff.), these activities were in Sparta 
restricted by a combination of legal prohibition and social 
disapproval. Only through adoption (Hdt. 6.57.5) could some 
evening-out of property be achieved, though probably largely 
within kin groups rather than between them. Consequently, it was 
in the sphere of marriage that Spartiates had to seek solutions 
to their problems. 
The anthropologist, Jack Goody (1976b, ch.2, esp. 13ff.), 
in a statistical analysis of several hundred societies, has noted 
a high degree of association between inheritance systems of 
diverging devolution and specific kinds of marriage practices 
which seem designed, from the viewpoint of indi victual households, 
to minimize the various difficulties de'scribed above. In many 
respects marriage customs at Sparta accord well with the general 
pattern pointed out by Goody. He notes, for instance, the 
frequent coexistence of diverging devolution with the practices 
of monogamy and polyandry, as opposed to polygyny, 6 and this is 
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precisely what we find in Sparta. Herodotus (5.39-40) indicates 
that when King Anaxandridas II in the mid-sixth century took a 
second wife in addition to his first one, who was thought barren 
but whom he was unwilling to divorce, it was a very un-Spartan 
practice which he performed only on the express orders of the 
ephors and gerontes, who themselves adopted this counsel only as 
a measure of last resort for fear that the Agiad line would die 
out. When Anaxandridas' fellow king, Ariston, voluntarily took 
a third wife, he adopted the more usual practice of divorcing his 
second spouse (Hdt. 6.63.1). Polyandry is attested by Polybius 
(12.6b.8), who says that it was a longstanding custom and quite 
usual for three, four or even more brothers to have one wife. 7 
Both monogamy and polyandry can be interpreted as practices 
designed to limit the number of legitimate children that a man 
sired and hence the di vision of the inheritance. Other Spartiate 
customs tended in the same direction. It seems that a woman 
typically married at a later age than in most Greek states, 
perhaps between ages 18 and 20, thus reducing her years of 
potential fertility. 8 The practice of wife-borrowing (Xen. Lak. 
Pol. 1.8-9; Plb. 12.6b.8; Plut. Lyk. 15.7; Comp. Lyk.-Numa 3.3; 
Moralia 242B)' also enabled one woman's fertility to be divided 
between two men; Polybius specifically remarks that it was when 
a man had begotten sufficient children by his wife that he would 
give her to a friend. 
Goody also notes a significant correlation between the 
existence of diverging devolution and a high degree of control 
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over female marriage aimed at ensuring that one's womenfolk marry 
persons of similar status (the practice of homogamy). When women 
are owners of property it is indeed important for the families 
on both sides of the marriage that their son or daughter does not 
marry someone of markedly inferior wealth. Once again we see 
control over female marriage and a strong tendency towards 
homogamy in Sparta. A woman's marriage was decided by her male 
kyrios, or legal guardian. 9 Herodotus (6.57.4) implies that it 
was a father who normally betrothed his heiress; and Aristotle 
(Pol. 1270a26-9) states that, if the father did not do so, that 
right fell to the kleronomos, in my view, her male next of kin. 
Although matrimonial rites may have included a symbolic marriage 
by capture (Plut. Lyk. 15.3-5), which was on one infamous 
occasion exploited by King Damaratos, who carried off the woman 
betrothed to Leotychidas ( Hdt. 6. 65) , it seems that it was 
Leotychidas' method of acquiring a wife which was the orthodox 
one and that normally marriages were preceded by a betrothal 
approved by the bride's parents or next of kin (Cartledge 1981, 
99f.; MacDowell 1986, 77ff.). 
The tendency towards homogamy can be seen through a variety 
of evidence. - One illustration is the episode (Plut. Lys. 30.6; 
Mor. 230A; Aelian, VH 6.4; 10.5) in which Lysander's daughters 
were deserted by their suitors when the poverty of their 
inheritance became known. Such a marriage would have meant a 
drop in status and wealth for the suitors and for their potential 
children, despite the fact that the girl's father had been one 
of the most prestigious and influential men in Sparta . Homogamy 
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can also be seen in the practice of wife-sharing. Xenophon's 
remarks about the kind of wife a man would request to borrow 
imply that she would be of similar status. Furthermore, Philo 
( On Special Laws 3. 4. 2 2) informs u·s that the Spartiates permitted 
marriage between uterine half-siblings (homometrioi, children of 
the same mother but of different fathers) . This would have 
allowed the woman's sons and daughters by her different partners 
to be exchanged in marriage. The whole complex is clearly one 
of homogamy, with the added bonus of concentrating the parents' 
properties for the benefit of their grandchildren. 
Another form of homogamy was the practice of marriage 
between close kin. Several examples are attested within the 
royal houses: the marriages of Anaxandridas II to his sister's 
daughter (Hdt. 5.39), of Kleomenes I's daughter, Gorgo, to her 
step-uncle Leonidas (Hdt. 7.205.1) and of Archidamos II to his 
aunt Lampito (Hdt. 6.71). Close-kin marriage had the advantage 
that not only did it ensure that the amount of property brought 
by the bride was consonant with the status and wealth of the 
groom and his parents, but it also retained the property of a 
kinswoman within the kin. Close-kin marriage was especially 
important to the royal houses which were the richest and most 
prestigious lineages in Sparta. It was often their best option 
to avoid marriages below their station and 'the dispersal of their 
property and therefore their power. 
Often of course close-kin marriage was not possible. In 
those circumstances the royal houses typically contracted 
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marriages with spouses from leading non-royal families who were 
nearest to being their social and economic equals. When King 
Ariston in the mid-sixth century wanted to replace his wife, he 
selected a woman from a prosperous family who was the spouse of 
his closest friend (Hdt. 6.61-2). Similarly, the future king 
Agesilaos II, although at the time without a definite prospect 
of succeeding to the throne, was married to Kleora, daughter of 
Aristomenidas (PB 134), a leading Spartiate with connections in 
Boiotia (Paus. 3.9.3). 
Such matches were of course attractive propositions for the 
leading families concerned. The mid-sixth-century episode 
mentioned above in which King Anaxandridas II was compelled to 
take an additional wife provides the most vivid illustration of 
the passion with which such alliances with the royal houses were 
sought and jealously guarded by the girl's kin. Anaxandridas' 
first wife was his own niece (his sister's daughter); but his 
second wife came from a different lineage, being the daughter of 
Pr inetadas and granddaughter of a certain Demarmenos. The second 
wife produced a male child; but then the first wife straightaway 
became pregnant, whereupon the kinsfolk of the second wife 
expressed with such vigour their suspicions concerning her 
fortuitous conception of a prospective rival for the throne after 
several years of barrenness that the ephors were obliged to 
attend the birth to guarantee that the pregnancy was genuine and 
a false baby was not smuggled in. The value this same kin group 
put upon achieving distinguished marriages for their womenfolk 
is further indicated by the fact that another granddaughter of 
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Demarrnenos, Perkalos, daughter of Chilon, was betrothed to 
Leotychidas, the leading member of the junior branch of the 
Eurypontid royal house (Hdt. 6.65). Perkalos was indeed such an 
attractive match that, as we have seen, Leotychidas' senior 
kinsman, King Damaratos, stepped in and seized her for himself 
before the marriage was consummated. Here we see a leading 
Spartiate lineage attempting to further the status of its 
descendants by marrying two of its womenfolk into the two royal 
houses, and two royal males keen to establish a liaison with such 
a prominent family, which was perhaps related to the famous ephor 
Chilon. 10 
III. Problems of interpretation 
At this point we must confront the problem of the limitations of 
our evidence. Some of the marriage practices considered above, 
such as homogamy and close-kin marriage, are attested through 
episodes dating as early as the mid-sixth century. Others, 
however, such as wife-sharing and polyandry, become apparent only 
in sources writing in the fourth century or later. It is 
important to consider whether the whole range of marriage 
practices should be viewed as longst'anding concomi tants of 
inheritance by di verging devolution or whether some came into 
prominence rather later than others. For example, Sallares has 
claimed that wife-sharing probably developed from much earlier 
Dark Age practice whereby unmarried members of an age class had 
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sexual access to the wives of members already married (1991, 
169ff.; cf. Baxter & Almagor 1978, 18). Even if this is so, 
questions remain: when did such a development take place? and 
how and why did it become both a matter of private agreement to 
be negotiated between two individuals and a general practice, no 
longer tied to a particular phase in the development of an age 
class? An important aspect of course is not just the date at 
which a specific practice began, but how common it was at 
specific stages of its history. Did Xenophon, for example, 
highlight wife-sharing for its symbolic significance out of all 
proportion to its frequency? Or was its frequency in the early 
fourth century the reason why he drew attention to it? (Note his 
claim that Lykourgos "permitted many such arrangements".) And 
if so, for how long had it been frequent? Unfortunately, the 
sheer paucity of prosopographical information concerning 
Spartiate marriages imposes severe limits upon our capacity to 
answer such questions from the evidence of the sources alone. 
Similarly, although we see the royal houses practising close-kin 
marriage as far back as the mid-sixth century, lack of evidence 
prevents us from knowing whether it was already then a widespread 
practice or whether the royal houses with more property at stake 
were exceptional in this regard. 
These questions are important because of the tendency of 
these marriage practices to counteract the inheritance system's 
moderating influence upon the development of inequality. If 
implemented by a significant number of individual households, the 
impact upon the delicate balance between levels of population and 
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of landownership was potentially disastrous. Here we begin to 
touch upon the subject of Spartiate demography because limitation 
of family size, marriage of like to like and concentration of 
property are all factors which have justifiably been invoked by 
historians as both symptoms and causes of the citizen manpower 
shortage (oliganthr6pia) which destroyed Sparta, according to the 
famous account of Aristotle (Pol. 1270a33-4). The decline in 
Spartiate numbers was closely connected with the increasing 
poverty of many ordinary citizens and with their potential and 
actual inability to provide the monthly mess contributions 
necessary for the maintenance of their citizen status. The issue 
of the precise timing and rate of decline has been the subject 
of considerable disagreement among historians, linked as it is 
with problematic calculations of the size of the citizen body at 
certain dates based upon extrapolations from the size of 
Lakedaimonian armies. The debate over whether we should double 
Thucydides' figures for the forces at Mantineia in 418, for 
example, has long been notorious. 11 Critical scrutiny of army 
figures is clearly necessary; but, equally clearly, that alone 
is not going to resolve the continuing controversies, and I would 
suggest that consideration of .the wider issues of inheritance and 
marriage patterns may open up a helpful perspective upon the 
subject. 
Constraints of space prevent full exposition here of the 
variety of opinions concerning the development of Spartiate 
oliganthr6pia. Most interpretations, however, fall within a few 
broad categories. There is the 'gradualist' approach which views 
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the decline in citizen numbers as a long-term process extending 
over more than a century at least, with an ever firmer tightening 
of the screw as the inherent deficiencies of the system of land 
tenure and inheritance, exploited by the acquisitiveness of 
leading citizens, reduced more and more Spartiates to a level of 
poverty at which they failed either to maintain their mess 
contributions or to reproduce themselves through attempting to 
limit the number of their heirs. Within this approach there is 
disagreement between those (e.g. Cartledge 1979, ch.14; 1987, 
esp. 168) who view this process as accelerating under the impact 
of the Peloponnesian war and its aftermath and those (e.g. 
Cawkwell 1983, 385ff.; Flower 1991, 88f.) who argue that the rate 
of decline was steady throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. 
In contrast to the gradualist position stand interpretations 
which view the decline as taking place more dramatically, the key 
event being for many scholars (e.g. Toynbee 1969, Ch.4; Lane Fox 
1985, 220ff.; Figueira 1986, 177ff.) the earthquake of c. 465 in 
which losses are judged to have been sufficiently large to have 
caused a sudden permanent drop in Spartiate numbers. Other 
historians (e.g. Bommelaer 1981, 231; David 1981, 5ff.) would lay 
greater emphasis upon the acquisition of empire in 404 which is 
said to have led to the passing of the supposed law of Epitadeus 
which, it is claimed, wrecked Sparta's inheritance system; there 
are even those who implausibly ascribe all Sparta's problems to 
this putative law. 
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IV. The significance of wealth as a determinant of status 
As presented so far, my analysis of the implications of the 
system of inheritance could in principle be adduced to support 
any of these broad approaches. The moderating effect of the 
inheritance system might seem to support the gradualist position 
whereby inequalities increased slowly from the seventh century 
onwards until they began to have a serious impact in the fifth 
century. On the other hand, several of the marriage customs 
aimed at limiting family size and achieving the concentration of 
family property could be viewed as later developments stimulated 
by the consequences of the earthquake and/or the acquisition of 
empire. 
This brings us back to the problem already mentioned, that 
a direct answer to questions concerning the age and frequency of 
these marriage customs is not possible from the evidence of the 
sources alone. We can, however, make some progress by 
considering the conditions under which these marriage practices 
would be most likely to flourish. Here Goody's work is once more 
illuminating because it suggests that it is the degree of social 
stratif icaticin based upon ineguali ties in property ownership 
which is the key underlying factor (1976b, chs.1-4; cf. Morris 
1986 , 112). In societies heavily influenced by such economic 
stratification families are typically very concerned about the 
level of wealth of potential spouses for their children, since 
that will affect the status of the family and its descendants. 
One could further hypothesize that this in turn might lead to the 
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practice of family limitation. This perspective is helpful, 
first, because it suggests that at least some of the marriage 
practices in question should be viewed not as indissolubly-linked 
concomitants of inheritance by diverging devolution, but rather 
as customs whose frequency, and even existence, might be altered 
by the socio-economic context; secondly, because the degree of 
stratification based upon unequal ownership of wealth is a factor 
about which it is possible to make some assessment, however 
imperfect. 
In Chapter 1 I attempted to assess the relative importance 
of a variety of factors in the determination of a man's status. 
It seems clear that some lineages had long been more important 
than others and that differential ownership of land was a major 
factor in their importance. This was certainly the case in the 
early seventh century (Arist. Pol. 1306b36-1307a2, referring to 
a non-surviving part of Tyrtaios, fr.1 Prato) and it seems to 
have remained true even after the seventh-century reforms, to 
judge by the comments of Alkaios (fr. z 37, Lobel/Page), 
"For so they say Aristodamos once spoke in Sparta no 
foolish saying: 'Money maketh man; no poor man can be 
noble or held in honour'"· 
The Spartiates' self-imposed restrictions upon involvement in 
other economic activities ensured that land was the only form of 
property through which substantial wealth could be accumulated. 
Landed wealth must also have enabled leading Spartiates to 
sustain the guest-friendships with leading men from other states 
which are attested throughout the classical period (refs. in Ch.l 
n. 6). Land-rich Spartiates could gain status through patronizing 
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their messmates with extra donations of produce from their 
estates ( Xen. Lak. Pol. 5. 3) or by lending their horses and 
hunting dogs for the use of poorer men ( Xen. Lak. Pol. 6. 3; 
Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7). 
As Goody (1976b, 13) has noted, however, "criteria of 
ranking are rarely single-stranded", and this was especially true 
in Sparta where the significance of differential landownership 
was restrained within certain limits by the new social order of 
citizen homoioi which emerged out of the compromises of the 
seventh century. This social order entailed a common life cycle 
within which there was a large degree of uniformity in lifestyle 
for all citizens (with the exception of the kings and their 
immediate heirs) supported by an ideology which stressed the 
priority of collective interests over private ones. Within this 
system status was acquired partly through seniority, partly 
through the display of civic virtue through conformity to 
specified types of action and standards of behaviour required in 
different situations, ranging from absolute obedience to vigorous 
competition with one's peers. 
For much of the late Archaic and Classical periods the 
competing claims of uniformity, seniority and merit are likely 
to have been significant countervailing ' influences against the 
monopoly of high status by the rich. The role of differential 
landownership as a source of status distinctions does seem, 
however, to have developed considerably from the mid-fifth 
century onwards. This is suggested, above all , by the evidence 
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that the overwhelming majority of Spartiate victories in the 
four-horse chariot race at Olympia fell in the period from c. 450 
onwards: 10 out of 15 victories won by 8 out of Sparta's 11 
victors ( see Table 4. 2) . This is a phenomenon to which one 
should give full weight because not only was chariot racing, with 
its high costs of breeding and maintaining horses, a most 
expensive sporting activity within the capacity of only the 
wealthiest of men (Davies 1971, xxv ff ., esp. n.7), but the 
Olympic four-horse chariot race was the most important equestrian 
event at the most significant Panhellenic gathering. Expenditure 
and success on this scale carried with them an unmistakable claim 
to social and political influence, using large-scale property as 
a power base, as Davies (1981, 98ff.) has demonstrated with 
reference to Athens. 
TABLE 4.2 
Spartiate victories in the Olympic four-horse chariot race12 
Date Name Moretti no. 
548 Euagoras 110 
544 Euagoras 113 
540 Euagoras 117 
504 Damaratos 157 
484 Polypeithes 195 
448 Arkesilaos 305 
444 Arkesilaos 311 
440 Polykles 315 
432 Lykinosn 324 
428 Anaxandros 327 
424 Leon 332 
420 Lichas 339 
396 Kyniska 373 
392 Kyniska 381 
388 Xenarches14 386 
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The pattern of Spartiate victories outlined above is worth 
elaborating in a little detail. The main expansion of interest 
in regular Panhellenic chariot-racing competitions on the part 
of the elite of the Greek poleis seems to have taken place in the 
first third of the sixth century (Davies 1981, 103f.). Between 
this time and the second Persian invasion of 480-79 three 
Spartiate Olympic victors are known, a record second to that of 
Athens ( four victors). From this period there is also the 
evidence of a Panathenaic amphora dated c.525-500 and dedicated 
in the temple of Athena Chalkioikos on the Spartan akropolis, a 
prize for a four-horse chariot victory in the Athenian games. 15 
After the Persian wars, according to Pausanias ( 6 .1. 7) , the 
Lakedaimonians became the most ambitious (philotimotata) of all 
the Greeks in the breeding of horses, an interest perhaps 
stimulated by the distribution of captured Persian horses among 
the army after the battle of Plataia (Hdt. 9.81). But there is 
no record of any definite Spartiate Olympic victories until 448 
when Arkesilaos' first victory initiated the unparalleled string 
of seven victories out of eight Olympiads, achieved by no fewer 
than six different Spartiates, which Moretti places between 448 
and 420. After 420 the Spartiates were banned from competing 
until they disciplined Elis at the end of the Peloponnesian war 
(Xen. Hell. 3.2.21-31). But then further victories followed in 
the first third of the fourth century, not only those listed in 
Table 4.2, but also one by Eurybiades in the four-horse chariot 
race for foals in 384 and by Euryleonis, a Spartiate woman, in 
the two-horse chariot race of 368 (Moretti nos. 396 & 418). 
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On its own this evidence suggests that participation in 
competitive horse breeding for chariot racing became more 
widespread and enthusiastic among leading citizens from the 
mid-fifth century. How reliably can the evidence for Olympic 
victories be used as an indicator of more general trends? It is 
true that some of the details of Moretti's catalogue are 
uncertain and that Olympic victors probably represent only a 
small subset of a larger field of competitors in both Panhellenic 
and purely local festivals. There can be little doubt, however, 
concerning Moretti' s overall schema which places the bulk of 
Spartiate victories after 450; and it is hard to believe that the 
their sudden virtual monopoly of victories in this period does 
not reflect some significant deep-rooted development. 
Further evidence of such a development comes from the 
uniquely rich testimony of the dedication to Athena set up by 
Damonon which records 47 four-horse chariot-race and 21 
horse-race victories won by himself and his son at nine different 
local festivals in Lakonia and Messenia over a period of at least 
twelve years. 16 The dedication has normally been dated to the 
440s or 430s (cf. Jeffery 1961, 196f. & 201 no. 52); but more 
recently a date in the early fourth century was suggested by the 
late Miss Jeffery (1981; 1988; 1991, 448) on the grounds of the 
style of its relief as well as of the letter forms. One aspect 
of the uniqueness of the Damonon inscription deserves emphasis. 
Although Jeffery (1990, 196) claims that it is "the crowning 
example" of a type of local Lakonian inscription of which there 
are many incomplete examples from the mid-sixth century onwards, 
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it should be noted that none of the victory lists or dedications 
in her catalogue (1990, 198ff. & 446ff.) definitely relates to 
chariot racing. A number concern athletic events, and of a 
further eleven whose event is unknown (nos. 30, 41-48, 50 & 51b) 
only four certainly come from Sparta itself. Evidence for 
Spartiate forerunners of Damonon in the period before 450 is at 
present lacking. 
If the lower dating is correct, Damonon's activities may fit 
into the context of the criticisms which King Agesilaos II made 
against those who bred horses for chariot racing ( Xen. Ages. 
9.6), arguing that such studs were a mark only of wealth not of 
manly virtue ( andragathia) . Agesilaos' criticism is a clear 
indication that in the early fourth century many leading 
Spartiates were exploiting their wealth in this way to enhance 
their status. Damonon himself boasts no fewer than three times 
that his victories were won with fillies bred from his own mares 
and his own stallion (lines 15-17, 20-3 & 27-9). His 
self-advertisement was , however , only a particularly blunt 
version of a practice already developed by Sparta's Olympic 
four-horse chariot race victors . The victory dedications of ten 
o f these eleven per s ons are known to us ; a nd again a c hange is 
evident in the period after 450. It was then that Spartiate 
dedic a tion s at Olympia c ommenced the custom of including a statue 
representing t he v i ctor in place of the previous practice of 
dedic a t i ng onl y a mode l o f the chariot . 17 The c ulmination o f 
this i ncreased emphasis upon the personal prestige of the owner 
came with the dedications of Kyniska . These dedications included 
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model bronze horses in the pronaos of the temple of Zeus at 
Olympia and a statue group outside (consisting of chariot and 
team, driver and Kyniska herself) with an inscription acclaiming 
the first female Olympic triumph (Paus. 5.12.5; 6.1.6; IG V 
1.1564a; Greek Anthology 13 .16). A fragment of a small inscribed 
Doric capital and abacus (IG V 1.235) found at the Menelaion 
which bears her name and once supported a votive offering, 
probably dedicated (according to a plausible restoration of the 
inscription) to Helen (Woodward 1908/09, 86f.; Levi 1979, II 28 
n.45), seems to be another of Kyniska's victory offerings. That 
she was posthumously honoured in Sparta with a hero shrine (Paus. 
3.15.1) demonstrates the prestige that chariot-race victories 
could bring. 
Kyniska's involvement in this self-glorification was doubly 
ironic: first, because her brother Agesilaos had supposedly urged 
her to emulate Spartiate male chariot owners precisely in order 
to discredit the sport; secondly, because he also scorned the 
making of personal statues as being appropriate to wealth rather 
than virtue (Xen. Ages. 11.7; Plut. Ages. 2.2). Behind 
Agesilaos' criticism of chariot-horse breeding and personal 
statues there clearly lurked a fear that his rivals might 
outstrip him in prestige. To this threat he himself responded 
not by spurning horse breeding but by rearing many horses for the 
army (Xen. Ages. 9.6). He thus took advantage of another avenue 
for gaining status by horse breeding which had opened up in 424 
when Sparta began to use a cavalry of its own for the first time 
(Thuc. 4.55). By the early fourth century the cavalry, some 600 
---
----· 
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strong, was a regular part of the army and the horses were 
. provided by the very rich (Xen. Hell. 6.4.11). 
In view of this evidence for the late-fifth-century 
development of competitive breeding of horses, whether for 
chariot racing or the cavalry, it comes as no surprise that 
almost 9% of adult Spartiates known to us by name in the period 
432-362 have names incorporating the words hippos (horse) or 
polos (foal), compared with less than 3% in the preceding period 
from c.600 to 433; 18 or that horses were one of the main topics 
of conversation between Kings Agesilaos and Agesipolis II (Xen. 
Hell. 5.3.20); or that the early-fourth-century (Platonic) 
dialogue Alkibiades I, after highlighting the size of Spartiate 
estates, should single out their horses for special mention among 
all the other livestock grazing in Messenia ( l22D). Equally 
noteworthy is Isokrates' critic ism ( 6. 55) that citizens were 
still devoting their resources to "feeding teams of ravenous 
horses", even when Sparta was in dire straits after the loss of 
Messenia in 370/69. Attitudes and behaviour in late-fifth- and 
early-fourth-century Sparta are a perfect exemplification of 
Aristotle's generalization (Pol. 1289b33-5) that among wealthy 
Greeks the nufuber of horses a man kept was a determinant of 
social differentiation. 
In sum, the evidence for the increased concentration upon 
horse breeding as a source of prestige suggests that, although 
disparities in wealth had long been one important factor among 
several determinants of social differentiation, their 
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significance had increased considerably by the mid-fifth century 
and continued to develop thereafter. This picture of Sparta's 
development reminds one of the transition from the timocratic 
state to the oligarchic state · described in Plato's Republic 
(547A-555B). Although an artificial construct, Plato's 'ideal 
type' of the timocratic state is c l earl y influenced by the Sparta 
of real life (cf. esp. 547B-D). It is essentially a compromise 
between virtue and wealth which changes towards oligarchy as new 
ways of expenditure are invented, and wealth and wealthy men 
become esteemed more highly than virtue and men of merit. 
Eventually status becomes equated with the possession of wealth. 
Plato's model of the changes occurring within his ideal 
timocratic state, based upon his perception of contemporary 
political realities, provides a valuable corroboration of the 
developments suggested above. 
V. Spartiate population trends: causes and effects 
We are now in a position in the following two sections to 
investigate two related hypotheses which are suggested by the 
evidence just considered. The first hypothesis, already 
suggested by some earlier scholars (e.g. Burckhardt 1898-1902, 
IV. 102; Busolt & Swoboda 1920-6, II. 602) is that the upsurge 
of ambition in horse breeding was connected · with the twin 
processes of decline in citizen numbers and concentration of 
property. If our picture of the increasing i mportance o f 
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economic stratification from the mid-fifth century onwards is 
correct, there should be some evidence of parallel developments 
in these spheres. The second hypothesis, which will be treated 
mainly in Section VI, concerns the significance of Spartiate 
marriage practices. Given the high degree of association which 
Goody has detected between economic stratification and several 
of the marriage practices discussed earlier, it is plausible to 
suggest that they increased in frequency as the fifth century 
progressed. 
These hypotheses fit in well with certain trends observable 
in Sparta's demographic history. As Figueira (1986, 178) has 
pointed out, Spartiate population trends up to the Persian wars 
appear to have been rather different from those evident from the 
later fifth century onwards when the citizen body was declining 
in numbers. Herodotus (1 . 66) connects the Spartans' aggression 
against Tegea in the early sixth century with their strength in 
numbers. The purpose of their campaign was to divide Tegean 
territory among themselves with the natives as helots. They may 
have put this into effect in the Thyreatis after winning it from 
Argos in c.545. In the 'Battle of the Champions', which was part 
of this successful campaign, the Spartiates were prepared to face 
the loss of 300 warriors in a fight to the death against an equal 
number of Argives (Hdt. 1.82). C.520 Dorieus, disgruntled that 
the kingship had been given to his half-brother Kleomenes I, was 
permitted to take a body of Spartiates with him on his colonial 
expedition (Hdt. 5.42) . This evidence for the period up to c. 
520 suggests a need for additional land , which may be an 
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indication that impoverishment of poorer families was perceived 
as at least a potential danger; but otherwise there is no hint 
that citizen numbers were anything but buoyant. 
Rec~ntly, Sallares (1991, 213f.; cf. 170f.) has criticized 
the idea that Archaic Sparta had a populous and stable social and 
demographic system, partly in line with his general thesis that 
human population dynamics are inherently unstable, partly on the 
grounds that Sparta's age class system had the effect of 
restricting population growth throughout her history. It is a 
particular weakness of Sallares' argument that he fails to 
consider the literary evidence outlined above, and his general 
arguments can also be combatted. 'Populous' and 'stable' are not 
the same. His argument about population instability is 
indisputable, but does not rule out a Spartan population increase 
in the Archaic period. Nor do the regulatory effects of the 
age class system. Sallares himself (150f.) notes that Sparta's 
marriage pattern ( late marriage for males, early marriage -
relatively - for females) lay at only an intermediate level of 
demographic restriction, being less restrictive than those of 
early modern England and France which themselves attained an 
average completed family size as high as 8.42 children for women 
who married at age 20. As Sallares emphasizes both throughout 
his book (esp. Part II, ch.2) and specifically with reference to 
Sparta (170f.), it was the combination of a regulatory marriage 
pattern with limitations of resources (in Sparta'i case owing to 
excessive property concentration) which led to population 
decline, not the former alone. In the lengthy period before 
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property concentration started to have a serious impact upon poor 
Spartiates (cf. Section I above) there was potential for 
moderately steady demographic growth . 
At the time of the second Persian invasion the homoioi were 
said to number as many as 8,000 (Hdt. 7.234) and in 480 the 
Spartiates despatched 300 men to Thermopylai, men whom Leonidas 
was ultimately willing to sacrifice in battle. The selection of 
only men with sons suggests some concern to preserve lineages 
from extinction; but whether this betokens a concern about 
declining citizen numbers is unclear. By the later fifth and 
early fourth centuries, however, the trends evident in the sixth 
century had clearly been reversed. In 425 when considerably 
fewer than 300 citizens were trapped on Sphakteria and about 120 
of them subsequently captured, the Spartans were demoralized and 
went to great lengths to ensure their survival and return (Thuc. 
4.14-41, 108, 117; 5.15). The figures for Lakedaimonian armies, 
however precisely one interprets them, and (pace Lazenby 1985; 
cf. aodkinson 1986b) the incorporation of perioikoi into formerly 
exclusively Spartiate regiments show that citizen numbers were 
in decline. Aristotle, viewing the whole process with the 
benefit of hindsight, attests the phenomenon of widespread 
impoverishment and loss of citizen status (Pol . 1270a15-b6; 
1271a26-37). 
This outline of Sparta's demographic trends appears to 
indicate that both gradual and dramatic change were involved. 
The implications of the sixth-century population buoyancy are 
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well summarized by Wrigley's observation (1978, 149) that at 
normal pre-industrial mortality levels there must always be a 
substantial number of large families if demographic decline is 
to be avoided. The evidence that for a considerable period, up 
to at least the late sixth century, this did not lead to such 
significant poverty as to cause a widespread loss of status and 
decline in citizen numbers is compatible with the argument in 
Section I that under a system of universal female inheritance 
landed inequalities would develop at a comparatively more 
moderate rate with a lesser degree of impoverishment of the poor. 
But even under this system, as inequalities gradually deepened, 
the requirement of compulsory mess contributions made it 
unavoidable that in the long run Spartiate numbers would either 
decline through family limitation or shrink through economic 
disqualification. By the later fifth century one or (more 
probably) both of these processes were fully under way. 
The concentration of property suggested by the upsurge in 
competitive horse breeding developed, therefore, as part of a 
gradual long-term process. We should not, however, ignore the 
question whether short-term contingent events may have 
dramatically exacerbated the impact of long-term demographic 
trends. 19 The quarter century from the second Persian invasion 
to the battle of Tanagra in 458 ( or 457) was an extremely 
difficult period militarily during which Spartiate manpower is 
bound to have suffered. After the loss of almost 300 men at 
Thermopylai, 91 Spartiates were killed the following year at 
Plataia (Hdt. 9.70) . At some time during the 470s and 460s , in 
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addition to a campaign in Thessaly (Hdt. 6.72), the Spartans had 
to meet two serious challenges in the battles of Tegea and 
Dipaieis (Hdt. 9.35). 
against great odds 
At the latter battle they had to fight 
in a single line, according to the 
exaggerated account of Isokrates (6.99) - against almost all the 
Arkadians; although victorious, they may have suffered 
significant losses. Then in the helot and Messenian revolt of 
the 460s at least one contingent of 300 men was wiped out and 
there was a major battle at 'the Isthmos' or Ithome (Hdt. 9.35, 
64). Finally, there were great losses at the battle of Tanagra 
in which 1,500 Lakedaimonian troops were involved (Thuc. 
1.107-8) . 
In addition, there was the great earthquake that struck 
Sparta c.465 which several scholars have seen as a turning-point 
in Spartan demographic history, although most recent accounts 
have been inclined to minimize its importance (e.g. Ste. Croix 
1972, 331f.; Cartledge 1979, 307ff.; Cozzoli 1979, 59ff.). Of 
the main sources, Thucydides (1.128.1; 3.54.5; cf. also 1.101.2; 
2.27.2; 4.56.2) suggests that the earthquake had a major impact, 
but is restrained concerning details. Diodorus ( 11. 63; 15. 66. 4), 
probably folrowing Ephorus, claims that more than 20,000 
Lakedaimonians perished, including most of the male citizens, 
many of them through the collapse of their homes during the 
course of a prolonged series of shocks. Plutarch (Kirnon 16.4-5) 
states that only five houses remained undemolished and he 
narrates a suspiciously dramatic story in which the neaniskoi 
fortuitously escaped the deaths suffered by the epheboi through 
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dashing out in pursuit of a hare just before the collapse of the 
stoa inside which they had been exercising. 
In my original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1989, 
103ff.) I attempted, following the example of Toynbee (1969, 
346ff.) and Figueira (1986, 177ff. & 18lff.), to model 
statistically the possible impact of deaths in the earthquake and 
in the following helot revolt upon subsequent Spartiate 
demographic trends. Assuming, in particular, the elimination of 
the 18-19 year old epheboi and heavy casualties among women, 
girls and boys under age seven trapped in their homes while their 
menfolk were outdoors, I concluded that the J,,.,.u.pl--,.:s"'- of fecundable 
marriages would have been such as to cause future fertility 
levels to be appreciably lower than mortality levels, thus fixing 
a considerably lower ceiling for Spartiate numbers. 
I am now, however, considerably less sanguine concerning the 
feasibility and fruitfulness of that exercise, partly on 
empirical, partly on theoretical grounds. My empirical doubts 
concern not so much the extent of destruction and loss of life 
caused by the earthquake as the difficulty of knowing - or even 
guessing - whi'ch sections of the population were most affected. 
Although Diodorus' figure of 20,000 deaths seems an exaggeratedly 
round number, Thucydides as noted above indicates the 
magnitude of the event and Plutarch 's precise statement about the 
number of surviving houses suggests access to a carefully-
informed Hellenistic source ( Ducat 1984, 78f.). Plutarch' s story 
of the fortunate escape of the neaniskoi and deaths of the 
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epheboi, however, is in a different category. As Ducat has 
pointed out, its ethical paradox (the saving of the undisciplined 
neaniskoi, who acted contrary to Spartiate standards) and the 
implausible presence of a Hellenistic-style gymnasium building 
in fifth-century Sparta, plus the use of non-Classical terms for 
the age classes, all point to subsequent invention. Al though the 
collective tomb named Seismatias mentioned by Plutarch presumably 
did exist, that it contained an entire age class of epheboi, as 
he claimed, is open to doubt. (I was in error in stating (1989, 
103) that Plutarch himself saw the tomb; the text does not 
authorize such a conclusion.) No less problematic than the 
elimination of the 18-19 year olds are the supposed heavier than 
average casualties among females and young boys, which are not 
mentioned in any ancient evidence and are a product of modern 
guesswork. Plutarch makes no mention at all of persons being 
trapped in their homes. Diodorus, who does, fails to specify 
precisely whom and writes in general only of the large number of 
deaths among adult males. If there is any truth in his picture 
of a series of separate shocks, several might have taken place 
at night when adults of both sexes would have been at home. Our 
ignorance of the precise categories of persons most affected 
means, conse·quently, that previous attempts at model 
calculations, including my own, are built upon sand. 20 
Theoretically , too, there are problems in utilizing presumed 
earthquake deaths to deduce the parameters for subsequent 
Spartiate demographic trends. This is not just because of the 
difficulty of choosing an appropriate model life table and the 
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fact, recently stressed by Sallares (1991, 415f.), that model 
life tables are static constructs which can be used to make only 
linear predictions, whereas the dynamics of human populations are 
inherently non-linear. Even more fundamentally, as he has also 
pointed out (e.g. 114f.), the determining factor in human 
population dynamics is not levels of mortality but rates of 
fertility, and these latter may change rapidly in response to 
altered conditions; hence the correct observation that 
"populations recover quickly from such natural disasters unless 
there are inherent factors independently causing decline'' (Ste. 
Croix 1972, 332; cf. Le Bras 1969, with a more nuanced approach 
to the question of perturbations in a population's age 
structure). This means that to argue that the deaths caused 
during the earthquake and subsequent helot revolt had a lasting 
impact upon Spartiate population levels, one must identify ways 
in which those mortalities could have hindered the acceleration 
of fertility and birth rates which one might expect after these 
disasters. In his examination of the Athenian epidemic of 430-27 
Sallares ( 1991 , 258ff.) was able to establish a link with 
fertility rates, owing to the known effects of smallpox in 
causing high rates of spontaneous abortions, miscarriages and 
damage to male reproductive organs. In spite of these effects, 
Athenian population levels relatively soon recovered, although 
with some short-term distortions of age structure (Thuc. 6.26.2, 
qualified by Sallares ibid . . 259f.). Sparta's earthquake and 
battle casualties will have had no such direct impact upon 
fertility rates - at most a marginal impact through trauma 
·---
---
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effects upon pregnant women and a certain reduction in frequency 
of coitus owing to increased campaigning! 
If one is to discover a longlasting impact of the increased 
mortalities of the 460s, it must be sought in its effects on the 
distribution of property. Thucydides (2.53) states that during 
the Athenian epidemic, 
"Seeing how quick and abrupt were the changes of 
fortune which came to the rich who suddenly died and 
to those who had previously had nothing but now 
inherited their wealth, people now began openly to 
venture upon acts of self-indulgence which before then 
they used to keep dark". 
In his concern to delineate the moral decline caused by the 
epidemic Thucydides concentrates upon public perceptions, which, 
as usual, focused upon the exceptional rather than the ordinary 
event. But the passage draws attention to the effect that 
increased and unexpected mortality has in accelerating the normal 
ongoing process of property devolution and in doing so abruptly 
and prematurely, often before property owners have had chance to 
found families or make planned arrangements for its disposition . 
So too in the late 460s many Spartiates will have inherited 
additional land which would not otherwise have come their way. 
For example, many will have gained larger inheritances, either 
immediately or later, through, for example, the sudden death of 
siblings, nephews or nieces who would have been entitled to a 
share in the parental property or of parents who would otherwise 
have produced more children. The essential points for our 
purpose are threefold. First, the gradual development of 
inequalities discussed in Section I will have been powerfully 
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accelerated by the premature replacement in many cases of one 
generation (and sometimes more) of landowners. Secondly, 
although citizens of all levels of wealth will have benefited 
from such random mortality, the overall result will have been 
increased economic differentiation. Richer persons with deceased 
relatives will have gained considerably more property in 
comparison not only with those whose relatives survived but also 
with beneficiaries from poorer backgrounds, simply because their 
deceased relatives will themselves generally have had a greater 
actual or potential inheritance. No doubt there were some 
exceptionally fortunate poor men who inherited great wealth, as 
in Athens; but in general the greater cohesion of the wealthy 
elite in Sparta's more exclusively land-based economy is likely 
to have reduced the frequency of this phenomenon. Thirdly, there 
will have been an increased number of wealthy heiresses. This 
is likely to have stimulated both a higher level of movement of 
wealth between different lineages (to the advantage, doubtless, 
of the rich) and a greater than normal competition for securing 
economic advantageous marriages. These factors would tie in with 
the evidence for the increased importance of wealth as a 
determinant of status in the following decades. It is in this 
economic context that the casualties of the 460s may have had an 
impact upon future levels of fertility, a suggestion which will 
be explored further in the following section. 
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VI. Changing marriage patterns: causes and effects 
It was the increasing concentration of property resulting from 
the combined impact of the above long- and short-term factors 
which, I suggest, enabled and stimulated leading Spartiates to 
develop their passion for horse breeding; and their very success 
and the status it brought probably exercised reciprocal effects 
by promoting an increased acquisitiveness at the expense of 
poorer citizens. It is in this context that I would posit the 
increasing significance of the marriage practices discussed 
earlier (homogamy, close-kin marriage, wife-borrowing, uterine 
half-sibling marriage and polyandry) which served to retain land 
within the kin group and to limit the number of heirs. These 
were all means by which wealthy families could seek to ensure 
that the property of their descendants was maintained in a 
society in which their status increasingly depended upon it. 
These methods could also help poor families to avoid slipping 
still further into impoverishment in an age in which marriage 
above one's station is likely to have been harder than ever to 
achieve. 
Other factors may also have contributed to these 
developments. In some societies increased levels of in-marriage 
or systematic exchange of siblings between families have been 
known to occur as a response to a perceived need for solidarity 
in situations of 'environmental stress' (Rosenfeld 1976, 126; 
Okely 1983, esp. l 75ff.). The crises of the 4 70s-450s were 
indeed serious - loss of leadership over the eastern Greeks, 
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serious disaffection from her Peloponnesian allies (Andrewes 
1952), an internal threat to her way of life from the regent 
Pausanias (or at least one advertised as such by the Spartan 
authorities), the major helot revolt whose deep-rooted effect on 
Spartiate mentality is emphasized by Thucydides ( 5 .14. 3), a 
dangerous war with newly-democratic and imperialist Athens and 
the disfavour of the god Poseidon manifested in the shattering 
earthquake. These combined stresses may have developed a general 
sense of insecurity in a universally hostile environment and a 
psychological need to 'marry-in'. Moreover, close-kin marriage 
could in part have resulted from attempts to restore the size of 
the holdings of one's descendants at a time of economic crisis, 
as in areas of early modern Cumbria (M.T. Smith & Challands, 
unpub.). The long helot revolt of the late 460s may have caused 
difficulties for many citizens in getting sufficient produce from 
their estates, especially among poorer Spartiates a greater 
proportion of whose estates may been in Messenia, making 
close-kin marriages appear a prudent means of guarding against 
future crises by ensuring that existing holdings remained within 
the kin group and did not have to contribute to the upkeep of 
spouses (and their children) drawn from outside the kin. 
This variety of potential influences suggests that there 
were strong reasons in mid-fifth-century Sparta for the growth 
of marriage customs aimed at concentrating property and limiting 
the number of heirs. These may also have been supplemented by 
more direct efforts at family limitation within marriage, 
although the evidence is not clear on this subject. Sallares 
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(1991, 129ff.) has argued that the populations of Archaic and 
Classical Greece were 'natural fertility populations' which did 
not in aggregate practice family limitation. The evidence is, 
however, either too generic or too specific to Attica to exclude 
exceptions among particular Greek populations at particular 
times. Some of the main motives for high fert~lity which he 
mentions - the need for more large families who could work for 
their parents' subsistence in old age and provide additional 
family labour and income - did not apply among citizens who lived 
off helot labour. The situation in late-fifth- and early-fourth-
century Sparta appears more similar to the general conditions of 
Hellenistic Greece which Sallares (1991, lOlf.; 158ff.) argues 
were responsible for the emergence of widespread voluntary family 
limitation - namely, shortage of land for poorer citizens and 
among richer families a desire to save wealth for lifetime 
consumption and to prevent estate subdivision (cf. Plb. 36.17.7). 
The incentives for Spartiates to bear additional sons (Arist. 
Pol. 1270a39-b6) may also suggest perception on the part of the 
authorities of a tendency to limit family sizes. There is also 
the possibility that among some families struggling on the 
borderline of citizen status the need to give priority to 
maintaining the mess contributions led to a decline in 
nutritional provision for female and younger members of the 
household which may have affected rates of fertility and child 
mortality. 
When added to the long-term effects of the inheritance 
system and the dramatic short-term increase in mortality of the 
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460s, all these developments are likely to have made a major 
contribution to Sparta's demographic problems. At this point my 
analysis differs from that of Figueira (1986, 177 & 180f.), who 
suggests that Spartiate numbers may have resumed a slow increase 
after the earthquake until the disaster at Pylos in 425. He 
doubts whether a fall in the birth rate could account for the 
extent of Sparta's citizen decline. 21 I would argue, however, 
that it is within the context of the combination of factors 
discussed above that the growth of marriage practices which 
concentrated property and limited the number of heirs became of 
critical importance in helping to bring about a decline in 
Spartiate numbers which cannot all be dated after the start of 
the Peloponnesian war. Wrigley (1978, 149) has pointed out that 
at normal rates of mortality in pre-industrial communities, a 
society 
"would run into great difficulties if any significant 
proportion of the population was so moved by concern 
for solving its immediate problems of heirship that it 
kept family sizes down to a level that appeared 
rational in the local context of the immediate nuclear 
family". 
Among the Spartiates, a closed elite with virtually no 
recruitment from outside and an economic qualification for 
continued memb~rship, the difficulties created by the combination 
of factors referred to above must have been considerably more 
serious than even those posited by Wrigl~y. 
In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1989, 
107ff.) I suggested, basing my arguments on modern genetic 
theory, that the above difficulties might have been compounded 
by higher child mortality and ( I might have added) reduced 
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fertility deriving from the deleterious effects of increased 
levels of inbreeding known as 'genetic load' (loss of fitness in 
terms of disease and survival). As I stressed, such genetic 
effects do not in themselves lead to population decline and, if 
population size is increasing, the long-term effect of increased 
mortality among the offspring of consanguineous marriages may be 
beneficial because recessive mutations will thereby tend to be 
selectively eliminated. Nevertheless, I suggested that within 
a population like that of Classical Sparta which was already in 
decline the genetic and demographic effects of higher levels of 
inbreeding could only have proved harmful. 
Although not impossible, this analysis requires 
modification, since the situation is more complex than originally 
stated. First of all, as Khoury et al. indicate (1987, 252), 
"the concept of genetic load has been controversial in the 
literature ... [and] this concept does not provide a clear picture 
of the importance of inbreeding as a determinant of mortality in 
human populations". Secondly, even assuming that the theory of 
the genetic ill-effects caused by inbreeding is basically 
correct, studies of the demographic impact of inbred marriages 
have led to divergent results (Khlat 1988, with refs.). Some 
report a significant reduction in fertility compared with non-
consanguineous marriages; but others show elevated levels of 
fertility, and yet others no significant pattern. Elevation of 
fertility with inbreeding has, it is true, often been interpreted 
either as a reproductive compensation mechanism, a response to 
higher child mortality, or as attributable to reduced 
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maternal/fetal incompatibility as a result of accrued genetic 
homogeneity; but even these explanations have not always been 
found to apply. 
Similarly, al though some studies have indicated higher 
mortality among the offspring of consanguineous couples, others 
have reported no difference at all. Population genetics theory 
in fact predicts that progressive elimination of deleterious 
genes - and consequently a diminished impact of inbreeding - will 
occur not just in circumstances of population increase but 
generally under conditions of prolonged high levels of inbreeding 
(Coralli-Sforza & Bodmer 1971, 34lff.). It is also the case that 
many of the earlier studies (including some on which my original 
discussion in part relied) produced results which are now thought 
to have been considerably exaggerated owing to the inadequacy of 
their control groups, somewhat arbitrary modelling and failure 
to apply appropriate statistical techniques ( Bi ttles & Makov 
1988, 164). Finally, the fact that recent studies (e.g. Khoury 
et al. 1987, 259 & 261; Khlat 1988, 188) stress the variable 
effects of inbreeding on different populations according to 
varying genetic constitutions or environmental conditions 
indicates, as Sallares (1991, 235) has commented, that one cannot 
securely extrapolate from the theoretical possibility of 
deleterious genetic effects to their actuality in the specific 
case of Classical Sparta. As a recent general survey has 
concluded , "with the exception of incest and families known to 
carry deleterious recessive mutants, the risks to the offspring 
I I 
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of inbred unions generally are within 
acceptability" (Bittles & Makov 1988, 164). 
the limits of 
Despite these reservations on the genetic issue, my analysis 
has uncovered a significant combination of other reasons why the 
apparently buoyant population trends of the sixth century were 
dramatically reversed from the fifth century onwards. From this 
perspective it becomes possible to comprehend the astonishing 
rate of decline in Spartiate numbers from 8,000 in 480 to a 
maximum of 1,500 in 371. 
VII. The failure of Sparta's leaders 
It is possible not only that Sparta's leaders were aware of the 
problem of the declining number of citizens, but also that they 
tried to counteract it by stimulating the birthrate in a variety 
of ways. First, the institutional controls upon the timing of 
male marriage seem to have been altered. In the fourth century 
Spartan males normally married in their twenties; but until age 
30 they were severely restricted in performing the normal roles 
of a husband. They could not reside with their wives, meetings 
were limited and furtive, and they were prohibited from entering 
the market to obtain their family's household necessities (Xen. 
Lak. Pol. 1.5; Plut. Lyk. 15.4; 25.1). These restrictions were, 
I suggest, developments from an earlier period when men were not 
permitted to marry until age 30 when they finally left the agoge 
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and became fully adult (cf. Sallares 1991, 176). At some point 
in Sparta's history, however, the male age of marriage was 
lowered; and in addition an upper age limit (perhaps 30) before 
which a man had to get married was imposed (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.6; 
Plut. Lys. 30.4; Moralia 228A; Pollux 3.48; 8.40; cf. MacDowell 
1986, 73ff.). Compulsory marriage (or, perhaps more accurately, 
compulsory procreation) was now enforced by elaborate sanctions 
against offenders (Xen. Lak. Pol. 9.5; Klearchos, fr.73 Wehrli; 
Plut. Lyk . 15.1-2; Moralia 227E-F; cf. Cartledge 1979, 310). 
Secondly, incentives were introduced to encourage greater 
numbers of sons. Fathers of three sons were given exemption from 
military service and fathers of four exemption from all public 
duties (Arist. Pol. 1270a39-b6). In addition, older men with 
younger wives were permitted, and probably encouraged, to bring 
in younger men for the purpose of procreation. (Xen. Lak. Pol. 
1.8; Plut. Lyk. 15.7). Even the practice of wife-borrowing may 
have been officially encouraged as a device to ensure that when 
a couple had decided to have no more children the woman's 
remaining fertile years should not be wasted. 
Of course, we do not know the date(s) at which these various 
changes were introduced. Daube (1977), followed by Cartledge 
(1979, 309f.) , suggested the period around 500 as the time when 
Sparta took legal steps to stimulate the procreation of embryonic 
warriors. This view has been criticized by MacDo~ell (1986, 76); 
but his argument that the sources almost invariably attribute the 
above measures to Lykourgos is a very weak reason for ascribing 
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them to a much earlier date. His discussion provides no 
historical context for their existence. Sallares' argument 
(1991, 171) for an early date for their introduction manages to 
avoid this weakness. He argues that a stigma on bachelorhood may 
arise within an age class system when most members of a class 
have married and pressure grows upon bachelors to rectify their 
anomalous position. On this view such a stigma could have 
existed in early Sparta without reference to any manpower 
shortage. There is an important difference, however, between 
this type of pressure, however strong, and the state-imposed 
penalties attested in the Classical period; it is the 
introduction of the latter which we need to explain. 
The dating of Daube and Cartledge certainly provides a 
plausible context. It was in the late sixth century that Sparta 
several times had to recognize the limitations of her capacity 
to campaign abroad (Hdt. 3.148; 5.49; 6.84; cf. also 6.108; Thuc. 
3.68). I myself, however, would prefer the hypothesis that most 
of the changes itemized above were introduced during the mid- or 
late fifth century following the troubles of the 460s. I would 
place them alongside other reforms of this period which were 
intended to combat the growing threat of declining citizen 
numbers such as the brigading of perioikoi within the Spartiate 
ranks and the creation of the new military force of the 
neodamodeis (freed helots). 
The problem was that these changes attacked only the 
symptoms of the malaise and ultimately failed. The incentives 
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for fathers of several sons were, as Aristotle (Pol. 1270b4-6) 
pointed out, positively harmful, since they led to still greater 
di vision of holdings and consequent impoverishment. The practice 
of wife-borrowing could, as we have seen, be turned into an 
instrument of family limitation and property concentration. Even 
the sanctions against failure to marry could be ignored by a 
leading citizen like Derkylidas (PB 228) without his forfeiting 
his prestigious overseas commands (Plut. Lyk. 15.2). 
The one cardinal aspect of Sparta's decline which requires 
explanation is the failure of Sparta's leaders from the mid-fifth 
century onwards to tackle not just the symptoms but the roots of 
the malaise - namely, the economic difficulties facing poorer 
families. The problem required radical solutions such as a 
redistribution of land or a restructuring of the economic basis 
of the common messes and the link between mess membership and 
citizenship. Such solutions were never embraced and Sparta's 
leaders chose, whether consciously or not, to take instead the 
soft options which led to the destruction of her hegemony. 
This striking failure is of course partly explicable by the 
developments already discussed (particularly the concentration 
of landed property and its increased importance as a determinant 
of social status, with the associated patterns of attitudes and 
behaviour to which these gave rise), all of which gave rich, 
leading Spartiates a vested interest in maintaining the status 
quo. Their importance was still further increased by the impact 
of the Peloponnesian war and the resulting Spartan empire, 
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especially from c.412 when harmostships and other foreign posts 
became available in significant numbers for the first time. The 
process by which competition for these attractive positions is 
likely to have strengthened still further the influence of 
status-defining wealth and the pressures towards its 
concentration will be examined in detail in Chapter 5. 
Quite apart from these developments, however, there are two 
further factors, closely connected with the themes of inheritance 
and marriage, which merit consideration in explaining the failure 
of leading citizens to tackle the roots of Sparta's problems. 
The first is the influence of women which has been the subject 
of increasing debate in recent years with different scholars 
adopting minimalist (Cartledge 1981) or maximalist (Kunstler 
1983; 1986; Bradford 1986) interpretations of the independent 
role of women within Spartan society. The Spartan polis was of 
course a male club which excluded women from most of its public 
institutions. Their primary role was, as Plato ( Laws 805E) 
observed, to be active in running the home and managing the 
household. Plato was referring to married women, whose personal 
influence within the household may often have been significant 
owing to their husbands' frequent absence performing their many 
compulsory and time-consuming public duties, such as residence 
in the barracks until age 30, daily commitments in the gymnasium 
and common messes and periodic absence on campaign. 
This influence will have been augmented considerably by 
female ownership of a not insignificant proportion of the 
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property belonging to the household. The woman's position was 
further enhanced by several of the marriage practices considered 
above, especially those whose significance increased during the 
fifth century. Her comparatively late age of marriage combined 
with the lowering of the male age at marriage made her less 
unequal in terms of seniority to her husband. Furthermore, not 
only was she secure from the possibility of the importation of 
additional wives owing to the practice of male monogamy, but 
there were circumstances in which she could legitimately take on 
additional partners. When describing the custom of 
wife-borrowing, the first motive which Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 1.9) 
stresses is that "the women want to take charge of two 
households". Similarly, polyandry should be seen as a practice 
by which the status of the woman was underlined, not undermined. 
The background to polyandrous marriages must usually have been 
that the woman was wealthier than any of her male partners and 
that the sons of the marriage were dependent upon the inheritance 
of her property for the maintenance of their status. The 
development of these marriage practices in the fifth century, 
therefore, probably meant an increase in the influence of rich 
married women. 22 Studies of Classical Athens where women were 
less advantaged than in Sparta have noted several examples of 
female initiative and influence in the affairs of their 
households (Schaps 1979, 76f.; Gould 1980, 49f.; Foxhall 1989). 
One would expect such initiatives in Sparta to be both more 
frequent and more effective. Redfield ( 1977 /78) has indeed 
pointed to the reputation of the women as fierce enforcers of 
their menfolk's observance of the Spartiate code . The rationale 
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for this was that the public performance of its male members 
influenced the prestige of the household, and thereby the status 
of its womenfolk, not least because it affected the capacity of 
the household to contract advantageous marriages for its 
daughters. 
Traditionally, therefore, there was an identity of purpose 
between the polis and the female-influenced household which 
reinforced official codes of conduct. During the later fifth 
century, however, this identity of purpose between women and the 
polis may have been seriously weakened by the increasing 
importance of wealth rather than adherence to the Spartiate code 
as a determinant of status. This happened precisely at the time 
when the influence of women was increasing. The two developments 
were in fact closely linked, since it was greater economic 
differentiation which led to the changes in marriage practices 
which increased female influence; and for the benefit of their 
children women (or at least wealthy ones) probably supported 
these new practices which themselves fuelled the growth of 
economic differentiation. Aristotle was obviously aware of this 
link when he pointed to the connection between female influence 
and the esteem given to wealth (Pol. 1269b23-4). Wealthy women 
now had both the motive for promoting the interests of their own 
households to the detriment of poorer families and also more 
authority to make their wishes effective through their influence 
upon the behaviour of their husbands. This is precisely what 
Aristotle complained about in his rhetorical question: "in the 
time of their empire many things were controlled by the women; 
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and indeed what difference does it make whether the women rule 
or the rulers are ruled by women?" ( Pol. 1269b31-4). In the long 
run it was the wealthy female descendants of these women who were 
among the chief beneficiaries oi the breakdown of the Spartiate 
code which followed the decline of Sparta's hegemony. This is 
vividly illustrated in the description of life in mid-third 
century Sparta in Plutarch's biography of King Agis IV (4; 6.4; 
7.3-5), in which we see them holding great wealth and wielding 
considerable informal public influence in obstructing Agis' 
proposed redistribution of land which would have robbed them of 
their status and power. In explanations of Sparta's failure to 
make fundamental reforms in the late fifth and early fourth 
centuries the role of weal thy women should similarly not be 
overlooked. 
Secondly, I would draw attention to the direct social 
implications of the new marriage patterns themselves, and in 
particular the emphasis upon homogamy and the exchange of sons 
and daughters in the context of wife-sharing and uterine 
half-sibling marriage. Here we can contrast the situation in 
modern Greece, as analysed by Ernestine Friedl (1962, 64f.). As 
in ancient Sparta, children of both sexes inherit from both 
father and mother, and daughters typically receive their portion 
at marriage. But the rules of the Greek Orthodox church and the 
Civil Code of the Greek state prohibit exchange marriages; and 
this prohibition nprevents the transfer of property at marriage 
from resulting in either a series of equal exchanges between two 
sets of kin groups or in regular pattern of circulation through 
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several generations among particular sets of such groups". In 
Sparta, which lacked such restrictions, I suspect that the 
opposite may have occurred, with huge landholdings circulating 
among networks of wealthy families who became closely associated 
through exchange marriages. In this way, I suggest, an elite was 
maintained and the social hierarchy hardened. 
The net effect, I submit, was the formation of separate 
interest groups within Spartiate society. This is our final clue 
to the failure of Sparta's leaders to remedy the economic 
problems facing poorer families. The social distance between 
rich and poor, firmly entrenched by the patterns of marriage 
which arose out of the need to cope with inheritance by diverging 
devolution, particularly in the changed conditions from the 
mid-fifth century onwards, sowed the seeds for the development 
of two poleis, a polis of the rich and a polis of the poor, as 
Plato (Republic 551D) expressed it in his account of the 
degeneration of the timocratic state into oligarchy a 
description influenced, as we saw earlier, by his perception of 
contemporary Sparta. As in Plato's theoretical state, so also 
in Classical Sparta, the first polis had no interest in 
alleviating the distress of the second. As with the influence 
of women, we can see these two poleis clearly differentiated in 
the mid-third century, when of the 700 remaining Spartiates there 
were only a hundred with large estates (Plut. Agis 5.4, following 
the interpretation of this passage by Fuks 1962) who throughout 
Agis' brief reign were implacably opposed to the reforms desired 
by the other 600 poorer citizens. 
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For these reasons, therefore, leading Spartiates ignored the 
economic problems of poorer citizens, and the unity and identity 
of purpose among the homoioi created by the seventh-century 
compromise over landownership finally broke down. The rich 
became richer, while poorer families lost their citizen status 
and Spartiate numbers continued their rapid decline. After her 
defeat at Leuktra Sparta had insufficient manpower to prevent the 
Thebans from liberating Messenia or to regain it afterwards. 
From being the leading power in sixth-century Greece, a position 
created and sustained by her large population among whom land was 
shared with a modicum of fairness such that each family possessed 
at least an adequate sufficiency, Sparta dropped in the fourth 
century to the level of a second-rate polis with a minute citizen 
body rent by socio-economic divisions. In this transition from 
hegemon to local wrangler we have seen that the roles of the 
inheritance system and of changing marriage patterns were 
critically important. In these ways the subjects of inheritance, 
marriage and demography can be seen to shed light upon both the 
reasons for Sparta's long-term success and the problem of her 
ultimate decline . 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4 
1. Cartledge (1987, ch.21) provides a convenient analytical 
summary of the most important ancient and modern interpretations 
of the Spartan crisis. 
2. Barley is a more reliable crop than wheat, and was 
consequently the staple cereal for much of Greek antiquity, 
because it can tolerate a greater degree of drought. The 
critical minimum amount of precipitation during the growing 
season (roughly October - May) is around 200mm for barley, 300mm 
for wheat: Halstead (1984, Section 2.8). 
3. This initial equal distribution of land is of course an 
entirely fictional construct whose sole purpose is to depict in 
sharper relief the different degrees of inequality generated by 
the two inheritance systems. The figure of 10,000 couples is 
simply a convenient round number of the approximate order of 
magnitude for the size of the Spartiate citizen body at its 
apogee, being the factor of 10 closest to the figure of 8,000 
homoioi put by Herodotus (7.234) into the mouth of King Damaratos 
in 480. It does not imply belief in the veracity of the figure 
of 10,000 Spartiates which some fourth-century writers mentioned 
with reference to former times (Arist. Pol. 1270a36-7). 
4. The distribution used in this study derives from the work 
of Professor E.A. Wrigley and Dr. R.M. Smith, who have produced 
a number of distribution tables employing varying assumptions 
regarding fertility and mortality rates and rising, stationary 
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and declining populations: cf. Wrigley (1978, 135ff., Tables 
3.1-3.3); smith ed. (1984, 44ff., Tables 1.2-1.7). Table 4.1 
represents my own extrapolation from these published tables, 
which I have extended to cover combinations of surviving 
daughters as well as sons. This extrapolation has been 
cross-checked against similar, unpublished calculations made by 
Dr. Smith, then subjected to minor adjustments to render the 
population stationary. 
5. Rowlandson (1983, chs.2-3, esp. 155), where she notes that 
the Egyptians' reputation for casualness about their numbers of 
offspring may stem from the availability of public land. 
Contrast the incentives Sparta had to offer to fathers of several 
sons (Arist. Pol. 1270b3-4). The comparative lack of public land 
in Sparta is evident from Aristotle's contrast (Pol. 1272al3-21) 
between the Spartan and Cretan methods of supporting the public 
messes. 
6. On th~ association of polyandry with "systems in which women 
as well as men are the bearers of property-rights'', Leach (1955, 
185). 
7. As I have pointed out (Hodkinson 1987, 232), MacDowell 
(1986, 86) confuses Polybius' attestation of polyandry with the 
practice of wife-sharing which he mentions immediately 
afterwards. MacDowell is consequently wrong to state that 
Polybius' evidence should be rejected. 
8. Xen . Lak . Pol. 1.6; Plut. Lyk. 15.4; Cartledge (1981, 94f.); 
MacDowell (1986 , 72f .). Note , however , t hat a delay i n marriage 
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can sometimes have beneficial effects on fertility, since "women 
who marry young ..• will be particularly at risk because of the 
strains already made on their resources during puberty": Higgins 
(1985, 115). 
9. On the kyrieia at Sparta, Cartledge (1981, 99f.), with refs. 
to earlier studies. 
10. Of course every typical pattern has its exceptions, and one 
such seems to have been the second marriage of Eupolia (PB 312), 
daughter of Melesippidas, to an otherwise unknown Theodoros. In 
view of the fact that Eupolia's first marriage had been to King 
Archidamos II (Plut. Ages. 1.1) and that her new kinsfolk were 
poor (Xen. Ages. 4.5; Plut. Ages. 4.1), it seems likely that 
Eupolia remarried down the economic scale - although probably 
still within the social elite, since the name of the son of the 
marriage, Teleutias, suggests a link with the family of the well-
born commander Pedaritos (PB 599; for further discussion, see 
Ch.1, Section II (d)). What is of interest, however, in this 
case is the fact that King Agesilaos II, her son from her first 
marriage, was concerned to redress this economic imbalance by 
giving these kin a generous gift of property. (There is no 
evidence for the assumption of Hamilton (1991, 13) that Eupolia 
herself was from a poor background; Xenophon states that it was 
her kinsmen who were poor.) 
11. The account which brings out most 
complexities involved in this controversy 
clearly 
is the 
the many 
judicious 
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discussion of Andrewes (in Gomme et al. 1945-81, IV. lllff.), who 
ultimately reaches his own conclusion only "with misgiving". 
12. This table is based upon the catalogue of Olympic victors 
in Moretti (1957 & 1970); cf. Honle (1972, ch.5, esp. 129f.). 
I have omitted the victory of Diaktoridas in 456 (Moretti no. 
278). Moretti suggests that he may have been Spartiate owing to 
the identity of his name with that of the father of King 
Leotychidas' second wife. His state of origin, however, is not 
known and the name is also found in Thessaly and elsewhere. 
13. There is some doubt about the date of Lykinos' victory, 
since Pausanias (5.8.10) states that he won the chariot race for 
full-grown horses only after one of his animals had been 
disqualified from entering the race for teams of foals. This 
race was not introduced until 384. Since most scholars, however, 
have disputed the authenticity of this story and decided in 
favour of a fifth-century date for Lykinos' victory, I have 
adhered to this dating. For the arguments, Frazer (1898, I. 588; 
IV. 4); Hyde (1921, 24 & 259f.) . 
14. I have retained Moretti's original (1957) dating for 
Xenarches' victory, even though he subsequently ( 1970) 
acknowledged the doubts concerning this dating raised by Honle 
in her dissertation of 1968 (1972, 154 n~3). Honle argued that 
an earlier date would better suit the context of Pausanias' 
reference to Xenarches and that, since Pausanias does not state 
which equestrian event he won, it could have been one of the 
other contests of 428, such as the horse race whose victor is 
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given as unknown in Moretti's catalogue. It is more likely, 
however, that Xenarches achieved his success in the four-horse 
chariot race than in any other event because his name stands at 
the head of a list of known chaiiot-race victors. 
15. Beazley {1956, 369: 'Leagros group' no. 112). Cf. also the 
dedication of Alkibiadas at Delphi, possibly for a chariot-race 
victory, discussed in Ch.1 n.6. 
16. IG V 1. 213; I know of no published translation of this 
important inscription. I have calculated the minimum period of 
twelve years by adding the eight victories at the festivals of 
Poseidon at Thouria and of Ariontia mentioned in lines 18-19 & 
24-5 to the four different ephoral years specified in lines 66, 
73-4, 81 & 90. 
17. Compare the chariot dedications of Euagoras and Polypeithes 
(Paus. 6.10.8; 16.6) with the statue dedications of Anaxandros 
and Polykles (6.1.7), Xenarches, Lykinos, Arkesilaos and Lichas 
(6.2.1-3); Leon (Polemon Periegetes, apud scholion on Euripides, 
Hippolytos 231 = Muller, FHG iii. 122; Eustathius, Comm. on Iliad 
2.852). 
18. 25 examples out of c.285 names of Spartiates datable with 
reasonable certainty in the period 432-362; three out of 110 in 
the period c. 600-433. statistics from Poralla & Bradford 
(1985). 
19. Such a combination of "raisons accidentales" and "raisons 
permanentes" has been suggested by Andreades (1931) . 
I 
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20. Contrast the precise age- and sex-specific mortality rates 
derived from research into the epidemiology of smallpox which 
Sallares (1992, 258ff.) was able to use to deduce the likely 
demographic impact of the Athenian epidemic of 430-27. 
21. One reason for Figueira's view is the importance he attaches 
to a putative change in the inheritance system in the late fifth 
century. According to him (184ff. & 193ff.), the supposedly 
traditional life tenancy of a kleros was abandoned in favour of 
partible inheritance and rights of alienation over one's land. 
For the spurious historicity of life tenancy, however, and the 
existence of rights of individual inheritance and of alienation 
throughout the classical period, cf. Ch.2 above. 
22. The position of married women should be contrasted with that 
of unmarried girls whose marriages may have been subjected to 
increasing control in the same period as the trends towards 
homogamous and close-kin marriages developed. This contrast is 
a common phenomenon in societies with female property ownership; 
as Goody (1976b, 21) notes, "where they are more propertied they 
are initially less free as far as marital arrangements go, though 
the unions into which they enter are more likely to be monogamous 
(or even poly~ndrous)" . 
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CHAPTER 5 
WARFARE, WEALTH AND THE CRISIS OF SPARTIATE SOCIETY 
The outbreak of war with Athens in 431 marked for Sparta the 
beginning of an extended period of warfare outside her 
traditional sphere of influence within the Peloponnese which 
lasted, with only temporary interruptions, for a period of 60 
years. This prolonged external engagement was a new factor in 
Spartan history. Her earlier campaigns outside the Peloponnese 
had been spasmodic and brief; but in this period Spartiate 
officers ( a term I shall henceforth use to embrace men with 
various kinds of military responsibilities outside the regular 
citizen army under the command of a king) were involved in 
continual military activity abroad. In the central years of the 
period (412-386) Sparta created an unprecedented foreign empire. 
The effects of this prolonged foreign engagement are worthy of 
investigation, especially because the end of the period witnessed 
her rapid decline to the status of a second-rate power. 
The particular concern . of this chapter is with the impact 
of war and empire upon the Spartiate citizen body whose social 
system had by the end of the 370s reached a dual state of crisis. 
Not only had the number of citizens become so few that they were 
unable to prevent the "single blow" as Aristotle put it 
(Politics l270a33) - of defeat at Leuktra from leading on to more 
permanent catastrophes; but also at the very height of enemy 
invasion, when Sparta itself was under attack, some of those 
-. ___..... 
- - ---?.:a--
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citizens were secretly plotting revolution (Plutarch, Agesilaos 
32.6; David 1980). For a citizen body which had long maintained 
a remarkable and genuine political cohesion, this latter crisis 
was a real setback which limited Sparta's ability to defend her 
core territory. These twin crises of Spartiate society lay at 
the heart of her international decline; how much did they owe 
to the impact of prolonged foreign warfare and empire? 
I. The limits of modern discussion 
Surprisingly, there has been no sustained discussion of this 
question in most specialist books on Sparta. The most informed 
comment is to be found in the works of Moses Finley (1986) and 
Paul Cartledge (1987). It is worth quoting the relevant parts 
of Finley's seminal article (1986, 168 & 177), 
"Presumably a sufficient equilibrium could be 
maintained despite the pressures so long as the 
Spartans remained safely cocooned within their own 
world. But not when they were drawn abroad"; 
and again, 
"Sparta's tragedy thereafter stemmed from a familiar 
cause: she did not live in a vacuum .... Sparta was 
drawn into extensive military activity, genuinely 
military. That entailed... unprecedented 
opportunities for ambitious individuals, extensive 
travel abroad and a breach in the traditional 
xenophobia, the impossibility ot' holding the line 
against the seductions of wealth. The system could 
not and did not long survive. And so the final 
paradox is that her greatest military success 
destroyed the model military state". 
Two typically trenchant Finleyesque passages which, however, beg 
some important questions: first , in the picture of a society 
275 
which, despite its tensions, remained in balance until its 
transformation proceeded only through the intervention of 
external factors; secondly, in the failure to indicate the 
precise linkage between foreign involvement and social collapse, 
the exact constituents of which are left unspecified. 
Whilst endorsing Finley's "final paradox", Cartledge takes 
the argument a stage further. He surveys (1987, 34ff.) several 
areas of change associated with war and empire which, he 
suggests, precipitated the Spartan crisis: manpower shortage and 
changes in army-organization, changes in strategy and tactics, 
finance, individual Spartiates' involvement abroad and increased 
domestic conflicts. Locating these changes within the broader 
context of the problems of shortage of citizens (oliganthr6pia) 
and of increasing concentration of property which, he argues, 
were the underlying components of Sparta's crisis, he contends 
( p . 16 8 ) that , 
"the Athenian War registered a watershed. By bringing 
significant numbers of elite Spartans into sustained 
and intimate contact with hitherto unimagined amounts 
of coined silver and gold, this war accelerated and 
gave a new twist to a process that had been underway 
since at least the mid-fifth century". 
This account has the merit that it connects the impact of the war 
with longer-term internal developments, , but the precise causal 
links between access to coinage and the concentration of property 
still remain unclear. 
One reason for the elusive quality of even the best modern 
accounts is the lack of explicit statement of the precise 
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internal crisis. Cartledge has constituents of Sparta's 
correctly identified the twin developments of property 
oliganthropia as the central long-term concentration 
phenomena. 
developments? 
and 
What processes, however, lay behind these 
Following the discussion in Chapter 4 at least 
four factors can be identified. 
First, there was a slow but steady trend towards inequality 
of landownership among citizens embedded in the combination of 
differential reproduction with a system of partible inheritance 
among both sons and daughters. By means of computer simulation 
it has been possible to demonstrate how this intrinsic trend was 
produced regardless of conscious human intention. 
Secondly, inequalities were increased by the actions of 
richer Spartiates. As early as the mid-sixth century wealthy 
families can be observed conserving and extending their property 
through advantageous marriage practices; and Aristotle's 
comments (Politics l307a35-7) on the notables' grasping at wealth 
hint also at the pressurized acquisition of property. 
Thirdly~ Sparta's leaders failed to counteract these 
dangerous property and population trends. The symptoms of 
manpower shortage were tackled, for example, through efforts to 
stimulate the birth rate and by drafting non-Spartiates into the 
armed forces; but the roots of the malaise - the economic 
difficulties of poorer citizens - were left untouched. 
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Finally, underlying these developments was a fundamental 
breakdown in the solidarity of the citizen body, especially in 
the longstanding compact between rich and poor upon which 
Sparta's successful social system had been based. 
The first factor, which operated in a manner independent of 
external events, must obviously be set apart. Although it had 
severe effects in Sparta in the context of a closed citizen body 
with a concealed property qualification, these effects might have 
been counteracted but for the operation of the other three 
factors - in other words, had there been less individual property 
accumulation, more strong-minded action by Sparta's leaders and 
greater solidarity between rich and poor. It is upon these three 
factors that we must concentrate. 
What role then did foreign warfare and empire play in these 
developments? The following discussion will be divided into four 
main parts. In Section II I shall look at the answer to my 
question given by some of the ancient sources. Section III will 
examine the methods and personnel through which Sparta organized 
and conducted her foreign campaigns. In Section IV I shall 
consider thelr socio-political impact and the implications for 
the concentration of property. Finally, Section V will compare 
Sparta's experience of warfare and empire with that of the Roman 
Republic as a control for . assessing its significance in the 
development of the Spartiate crisis. 
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II. The influx of wealth 
Several ancient writers claim that the Spartan social order was 
ruined by the influx of forei~n wealth, especially the gold and 
silver coinage sent home by Lysander after the defeat of the 
Athenian empire in 404 (refs. in David 1979/80, 38 n.24). The 
clearest statement is in Plutarch's Life of Lysander (17.1-4) 
which, drawing upon Ephorus and Theopompos , reports the debate 
concerning how to deal with this wealth. According to his 
account, there was considerable opposition to allowing the 
coinage into Sparta. It was finally agreed, however, to permit 
its introduction for public use but not for individual 
possession. Plutarch criticizes this compromise on the ground 
that its consequence was to stimulate private greed.i 
Plutarch's account implies that the acceptance of foreign 
coinage for public use was something new, a point he states 
directly in another passage (Lyk. 30.1): "during the reign of 
Agis coined money first came into Sparta through the agency of 
Lysander". This seems to have been the view of at least one of 
his sources, Ephorus, as reflected in the comments of Diodorus 
(7.12.8), 
"as they little by little began to relax each one of 
their institutions and to tu~n to luxury and 
indifference and as they grew so corrupted as to use 
coined money, they lost their leadership". 
Ephorus' view, however, can hardly be correct (Cawkwell 1983, 
396; Cartledge 1987, 88). Although it did not mint coinage of 
its own, the polis will long previously have needed foreign 
coinage , for instance , for the use of its ambassadors and f or 
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hiring mercenaries - whose employment goes back at least to 424 
( Thuc. 4. 55) . 
A strong case can indeed be made that until 404 individual 
possession of gold and silver had also been permitted (Michell 
1964, 298ff.; MacDowell 1986, 119; Noethlichs 1987). The 
probable or actual use of currency appears in a variety of 
contexts in Spartiate life. The mess contributions included the 
sum of 10 or so Aeginetan obols (Dikaiarchos, apud Athen. 141C). 
Thucydides (5.34) indicates that the right to buy and sell was 
one of the privileges of citizenship, although these activities 
need not strictly necessitate coinage. Cases involving contracts 
were among those judged by the ephors (Arist. Pol. 1275b9-10; cf. 
Plut. Mor. 221B). Dioskorides (s.v. skytale, Muller, FHG ii. 
19 3) attests the practice of lending between citizens. Herodotus 
(6.56) refers to private citizens' owing debts to the king or to 
the state - debts which were remitted on a new king's accession. 
Money fines were levied after legal convictions (e.g. Ephorus 
FGrH 70Fl93; Thuc. 5 . 63 - not actually implemented). 
Noethlichs, whose study itemizes the considerable number of 
alleged cases of bribery by or of Spartan citizens before 404, 
emphasizes the important point (1987, 165 & 170) that, despite 
their unprovability, no contemporary source expresses any doubts 
that such bribery could plausibly have taken place. Sparta was 
not seen as any different in this regard from other Greek states. 
Gylippos' theft of part of the coinage sent home by Lysander 
(Plut. Lyk. 16) - the act which prompted the decision of 404 -
--" 
-----
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suggests that possession and use of coinage per se was a normal 
part of Spartiate life; otherwise why did he bother to steal it? 
(It was the manner of his acquiring it which forced him into 
exile.) On this view the innovation introduced in 404 was that 
it was now banned for the first time because of fears about the 
sheer quantity of wealth being brought into Sparta -in total 
1,500-2,000 talents plus a sizeable quantity of non-coined 
moveable wealth, according to the estimate of David (1979, 
38ff.). 
So the compromise of 404 may well have marked a tightening-
up of previous practice or, if not, was simply a reaffirmation 
of existing law. 2 Either of these interpretations undercuts the 
claim of ancient writers that it was the new acceptance of 
foreign wealth which undermined the Spartiate social order. 
Plutarch's evidence shows that the application of this 
explanation to Spartan history originated with Ephorus and 
Theopompos, both of whom were writers known for their moralizing 
interpretations of historical events. As Flower ( 1991, 93f.) has 
recently pointed out, the use of moralizing explanations of 
luxury and idleness to account for military defeat had long been 
a commonplace in Greek thought; the application of such an 
explanation to the history of Sparta has no independent 
historical value. Plato, moreover, provides a corrective to 
Plutarch's moralizing about the corrupting effects of public use 
of coinage because in his Laws ( 742A) he recommends for his 
Cretan state the same compromise as Sparta applied in 404. 3 
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Extending his criticism of moralizing explanations of the 
impact of foreign wealth, Flower (1991, 89ff.) also denies the 
very existence of the phenomenon of foreign wealth finding its 
way in any quantity into the possession of individual citizens 
in Sparta itself. He plausibly reinterprets Xenophon's famous 
statement (Lak. Pol. 14.3: "I know that previously the 
Lakedaimonians were afraid to appear to have gold, but now there 
are those who pride themselves in possessing it") as a reference 
only to the behaviour of commanders abroad. He brings it into 
relation with Theopompos' allegation (FGrH 115F237) that 
Archidamos III went abroad in order to live luxuriously and (more 
dubiously) with Poseidonios' claim (FGrH 87F48c) that Spartiates 
deposited their gold and silver in Arkadia. 
It should be noted, however, that, even assuming Flower's 
interpretation of Xenophon's statement to be correct, the 
latter's restriction of his criticism to Spartiate vices abroad 
may not be free of distortion. By so restricting his criticism, 
Xenophon would have avoided any hint of criticism of his patron 
Agesilaos, whose personal probity when abroad he stresses in his 
other works (e.g. Hell. 4.2.3; Ages. 1.36; 4.6; 5.4-5), but whose 
deployment of wealth at home was well known (Xen. Ages. 4; 11.8; 
Cartledge 1987, 132ff.). Moreover, one should not place as much 
weight as Flower does upon Xenophon's statement earlier in the 
Lak. Pol. (7.6) which implies the effectiveness of the ephors' 
searches for gold and silver, since the chapter in which it 
occurs is a most transparently ingenuous assertion of the 
unimportance of wealth in Spartiate life. Indeed, if private use 
I' 
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of coinage had been permissible in Sparta before 404, it would 
be surprising if age-old habits of possession could have been 
effectively and speedily eradicated, especially when Spartiate 
commanders abroad now had greater opportunities for self-
enrichment. One extremely suggestive episode is Agesilaos' 
manipulation of booty during his Asian campaign to make profits 
for his friends (Xen. Agesilaos I. 17-19); unfortunately, 
Xenophon does not specify whether those friends were solely Asian 
Greeks or included his 30 Spartiate companions. 
Whether or not one accepts Flower's denial of the private 
acquisition of foreign wealth, in one sense does not matter too 
much for the purposes of this discussion. Even if one believes 
that foreign wealth found its way into private hands, one could 
still accept Flower's doubts that (at least of itself) it 
abruptly widened the gap between rich and poor citizens or caused 
a dramatic alteration in Spartiate lifestyles, since it is clear 
that private greed for wealth was nothing new. As noted above, 
the alleged susceptibility of leading Spartiates to bribery had 
long been notorious. Noethlichs has catalogued no fewer than 11 
instances recorded in the sources concerning the period before 
431 (1987, 136ff.: nos. 9-19). In his Republic (548A-B) Plato 
treats the avid private possession of gold and silver as an 
essential characteristic of his Spartan-based timarchic state. 4 
The same picture appears in the possibly pseudo-Platonic 
dialogue, Alkibiades I (122E-123A), in which Sokrates comments 
that there was more gold and silver privately held in Sparta than 
in the rest of Greece since it had been passing in to them over 
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many generations. Gylippos' theft of coinage and Thorax's 
suicidal act (Plut. Lyk. 19 . 4) in bringing money home so soon 
after the introduction of the death penalty for private 
possession are surely to be eiplained in terms of the advantage 
they thought they could gain by making use of it. 
The above evidence implies that mobile wealth was already 
important as a determinant of status and influence. That the 
significance of wealth generally had already developed markedly 
against other criteria of ranking during the course of the fifth 
century is of course a proposition I have already argued in 
Chapter 4 (= Hodkinson 1989, 95ff.). Even if it is true that 
individual Spartiates were able to acquire greatly increased 
amounts of foreign wealth for use at home , we should view the 
impact as exacerbating current trends rather than as initiating 
something new. To uncover its real role in the Spartan crisis 
we would still need to explore the socio-political context in 
which the acquisition of imperial wealth was important for 
leading citizens and to examine the impact of foreign warfare and 
empire upon that scenario. In order to do both these things we 
need first to investigate the nature of Spartiate involvement in 
f oreign mi l ita ry activity. 
III . The organization of military campaigns 
I n t h is section I shall exami ne t he or gan ization and personne l 
through which Sparta conducted her foreign campaigning. Let me 
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first briefly outline the main known facts ( cf. Parke 1930; 
Bockisch 1965; Sealey 1970). During the central years of empire 
(412-386) Sparta fought her overseas wars by means of a dual 
system of forces, the beginnings of which can be seen during the 
Archidamian war in the 420s. The first element was the 
Peloponnesian fleet under the admiral (nauarchos) and his staff 
of supporting officers, often with subordinate commanders in 
charge of subsidiary naval contingents in regions distant from 
the main force. The second element was a variable number of 
harmosts (harmostai), who operated usually on land, but sometimes 
with a few ships and whose sphere of action might vary from the 
territory of a single Greek polis to an 'area command' over a 
large region . In addition individual Spartiates were sometimes 
sent out, with or without supporting forces, to bring aid to 
independent allied communities. The essential point is that this 
command system allowed Sparta to conduct simultaneous campaigns 
in different regions whilst committing abroad only a small 
minority of Spartiates almost all of whom acted as commanders. 
The vast majority of citizens were retained at home to ensure 
security against the subject helot population. The rowers in 
Lakonian ships within the fleet were either helots or mercenaries 
( Xen. Hell. -7 .1.12; Myron, FGrH l06Fl) and the harmosts' land 
forces contained varying combinations of freed helots 
(neodam6deis), allies and mercenaries (e.g. Thuc. 8.5.l; Xen. 
Hell. 3.1.4-6, 4.2, 15). After the end of overseas campaigning 
in 386 harmosts continued in use on a reduced scale for mainland 
campaigns outside the Peloponnese, although during the 370s they 
were largely restricted to out-of-season garrison duties. Later 
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in the same decade their forces were replaced by regiments of the 
Lakedaimonian army led by the polemarchs. 
Scholars have often pointed to the obvious contrast between 
the position of the Spartiate citizen at home living under the 
austere and strictly regimented, state-controlled system and the 
same Spartiate as an independent officer abroad separated from 
the 'Big Brother' of the home authorities. But to evaluate the 
significance of this contrast we need to ask some specific 
questions, such as: how many men were involved? for how long 
were they typically abroad? of what social status were Spartiate 
commanders? how were they chosen? how much contact was there 
with, and how much supervision by other commanders and the home 
authorities? how much scope was there for the exercise of 
personal ambition? 
(a) The number of Spartiate officers abroad 
There is no easy answer to the question how many Spartiates were 
employed abroad. One can set a baseline through the number of 
officers known by name, as represented in Table 1. (For the full 
lists of names and discussion of the criteria used in compiling 
the statistics, see below, Appendix 1 & Note to Appendices 1 & 
2. ) 
420s 
24 
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TABLE 5.1 
Numbers of named extraordinary officers 
410s 400s 390s 380s 
22 32 32 13 
370s 
19 
These figures have some value in indicating that foreign 
postings were already developing apace in the 420s and in 
confirming that their peak came in the 400s and 390s when 
Sparta's overseas campaigning was at its greatest extent. But 
in those central decades in particular they are a very poor guide 
to global numbers, not only because they omit cases where we know 
of the presence of Spartiate officers but do not know their 
names; but, more fundamentally, because the sources fail to 
cover all the theatres of war and to give full details of the 
personnel involved even in those theatres they do cover. For 
example, during the Ionian war the sources' heavy focus on the 
Eastern Aegean means that only through a passing mention (Xen. 
Hell. 1.4.22) of a Lakonian garrison on Andros, presumably under 
a harmost, do we glimpse the possibility that there were 
otherwise totally unmentioned harmosts stationed throughout the 
Aegean during the 400s (Parke 1930, 49f.; cf. Dunant 1978, 47f. 
no.124, for a Lakedaimonian grave stele at Eretria (PB 220a), 
possibly evidence for a garrison on Euboia). Similarly, only in 
a few, semi-retrospective general references does Xenophon reveal 
the presence of numerous harmosts on both the Asian and European 
mainlands whose existence he otherwise completely ignores in his 
account of Sparta's campaigns between the years 400 and 389 
(Hell. 4.8.1, 5, 39; cf. Diod. 14.84.4). Likewise, a single 
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reference in a speech set in the year 369 (Xen. Hell. 7.1.12) 
provides the invaluable information that the trierarchs of ships 
from Lakonia were normally Spartiates, 5 and possibly some of the 
marines too. 6 
These considerations do not advance the cause of accuracy 
very much because to estimate throughout our period the likely 
number of poleis under a Spartiate harmost or the number of 
Lakonian ships in Peloponnesian fleets are both problematic 
tasks; but I should not be surprised if we should have to triple 
the number of named Spartiates to get the right order of 
magnitude for the total numbers abroad during the 400s and 390s -
possibly up to 100 separate individuals in each decade. This 
is, however, still a very small proportion out of a total citizen 
population of perhaps some 2,000-4,000. 
(b) The frequency and duration of posts abroad 
To determine the significance of these figures we need to ask how 
often and how long Spartiates were normally abroad. We know the 
names of 67 ~partiate extraordinary, non-royal officers active 
during the peak years of empire (412-386) whose careers are not 
known to have been terminated by premature death (other than by 
execution). 7 Of these officers 67% (45 men) are attested in 
only a single post, but at least 33% (22 men) were given a 
second. (Full lists and discussion of problems of inclusion and 
categorization are given in Appendix 2 & Note to Appendices 1 & 
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2.) This figure for two-time officers is a minimum, since 
several men are likely to have held additional commands 
unrecorded in the evidence. 8 The careers of the 22 men attested 
as holding at least two posts are itemized in Table 5.2. 9 At 
least four had their careers prematurely terminated by death 
after their second post; but at least 10 of the remaining 18 men 
(56%) were given a third position. Of these three-time officers, 
at least one died prematurely; but at least six out of the 
remaining nine men received a fourth post. The evidence suggests 
that among the limited number of men chosen for foreign service 
a relatively high proportion were given multiple periods abroad. 
Sparta had indeed long pursued a similar policy of iteration of 
posts in the case of diplomatic personnel by often selecting the 
same men or their descendants as envoys to particular states 
(Mosley 1973, 50ff.). 
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TABLE 5.2 
Officers active 412-386 attested as holding 
two or more military posts 
Name ( PB no. ) 
Gylippos (196) 
Philippos (725) 
Eteonikos (283) 
Hippokrates (391) 
Klearchos (425) 
Agesandridas (5) 
Derkylidas (228) 
Lysander (504) 
Thorax (380) 
Kleandros (422) 
Pharax (717/8) 
Panthoidas (585) 
Anaxibios (86) 
Thibron (374/5) 
Herippidas (349) 
Pollis (621) 
Euxenos (310) 
Peisandros (601) 
Teleutias (689) 
Gorgopas (193) 
Antalkidas (97) 
Nikolochos (564) 
Years of separate posts (& fate) 
414-12 
412 
412 
412/11 
412-10 
411/10 
411-07 
407/6 
406 
406 
405 
403/2 
401/0 
400/399: 
399 
396/5 
395/4 
395/4 
392/1 
389/8 
388/7 
388/7 
405 (exile) 
411 
409 
411-10: 
410-08: 
409/08 
399-7 
405/4 
405 
406 : 405 : 400: 
pre-390: 390/89: 389/8 
410-08 (death) 
406 403 (exile) 
396/5 394-89 
403 396/5 : 395 (death) 
404/3 (execution) 
400 
398/7 396/5 
377 (death) 
389/8 
390 (death) 
396-4 : 393/2 
393/2 : 377/6 
394/3 
394 (death) 
391-89: 387/6 
388 (death) 
387 
376/5 
379 (execution) 
382/1 (death) 
N.B. The chronology of these years is often uncertain and some 
of the dates given above are subject to minor variations 
according to different modern chronological schemes. 
For how long were Spartiate officers committed to service 
abroad? As Table 5.2 indicates, sometimes a person's foreign 
posts were separated by a significant intervening period when he 
will have returned to Sparta . In at least 15 of the 22 cases, 
however, the close temporal juxtaposition of certain posts 
suggests that officers often served continuous (or near-
continuous) spells abroad, moving from one post to another. The 
most extreme case is that of Eteonikos, who seems to have served 
as a kind of all-purpose, often subordinate, officer loyally 
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fulfilling a variety of tasks. In addition, tenure of a 
particular post could sometimes last for a number of years, as 
in the cases of Gylippos, Hippokrates, Klearchos, Derkylidas, 
Herippidas and Teleutias. As a consequence several commanders 
spent significant periods abroad in relation to their time in 
Sparta - Eteonikos, for example, at least 8 years out of 24; 
Hippokrates seemingly continuously abroad for the 4 years 
preceding before his death; Klearchos 6 years out of 10 before 
his exile; Teleutias 5 out of 11 years; and, above all, 
Derkylidas abroad for at least 14 years out of 22 between the 
years 411 and 389. 
(c) The social background of officers 
The comparison made above between the patterns of employment of 
military and of diplomatic personnel raises the question whether 
Sparta's officers, like her ambassadors, typically came from the 
leading families. What can we say of the social backgrounds of 
these men? 
A major - obstacle to answering this question is the paucity 
of prosopographical information about individual Spartiates, 
especially the frequent failure of the sources to provide 
patronymics. Consequently, several of the more prominent 
officers (for example, 14 of the 22 men listed 1n Table 5.2) are 
to us just names whose family affiliations are unknown. In 
Tables 5. 3 & 5 . 4 , however , I have collected some suggestive 
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evidence which can, I would argue, stand proxy for the large 
number of cases in which evidence is lacking. 
TABLE 5.3 
High status indicators of officers in Table 5.2 
Commanders 
Gylippos 
Klearchos 
Agesandridas 
Lysander 
Pharax 
Peisandros 
Teleutias 
Antalkidas 
Family affiliations & status indicators 
Son of Kleandridas (PB 420), adviser to King 
Pleistoanax. 
Son of Ramphias (PB 654), ambassador & commander; [K. himself was proxenos of Byzantion]. 
Son of Agesandros (PB 6), ambassador. 
Son of Aristokritos (PB 129) & brother of Libys (PB 490); family claimed descent from hero 
Herakles & had links with Libyan King of the 
Ammonians (Malkin 1990). 
Grandson of Pharax (PB 717), adviser to King Agis 
II; [the younger Ph. was proxenos of Thebes]. 
Son of Aristomenidas (PB 134), judge at Plataia 
& ambassador; brother-in-law of King 
Agesilaos II. 
Half-brother of King Agesilaos II; cousin of 
Antalkidas (cf. below). 
Son of Leon (PB 482), colony founder, ephor & 
Olympic victor. 
Table 5.3 shows that of the eight men listed in Table 5.2 
whose family affiliations are known all ~ave indications of high 
social status. Table 5.4 provides evidence (based largely upon 
those few passages in which Thucydides provides patronymics) 
concerning several men prominent in the late 430s and 420s whose 
sons later appear as military commanders. 
overlaps with Table 5.3.) 
( There are a few 
1 __ _ 
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TABLE 5.4 
Father-son roles in the late 5th & early 4th centuries 
Father 
Sthenelaidas (PB 664), ephor 
Agesandros (PB 6), ambassador 
Ramphias (PB 654), ambassador 
& commander 
Leon (PB 481), colony founder, 
ephor & Olympic victor 
Son(s) 
Alkamenes (PB 56), harmost 
Sthenelaos (PB 665), harmost 
Pasi telidas ( PB 592) , harmost 
Agesandridas (PB 85), vice-
admiral & naval commander 
Klearchos (PB 425), harmost 
Pedaritos (PB 599), harmost 
Antalkidas (PB 97), admiral, 
ambassador & ephor 
N.B. For fuller discussion of these cases, Ch.l, Section II(d). 
The kinds of prominent family affiliations indicated in 
these tables can be documented in several other cases outside the 
central period selected for detailed scrutiny. The foreign 
connections of Brasidas (PB 177) have already been noted (Ch.l, 
Section II ( d)) . The brothers and fellow-commanders Eudamidas ( PB 
295) and Phoibidas (PB 734) appear to have been connected by 
patronage and later by marriage to the Eurypontid royal house 
(Cartledge 1987, 147f.). Similarly, Sphodrias (PB 680), harmost 
of Thespiai iri 378, was a close associate of King Kleombrotos I. 
The names of several officers also provide clues to their high 
status, even when their family affiliations are unknown. Names 
derived from foreign places, such as Chalkideus, 'the Chalkidian' 
(PB 743), Samios, 'the Samian' (PB 659), and Skythes, 'the 
Skythian' (PB 686), indicate ties with leading families in other 
states . Names which include the word hippos (horse) suggest a 
-
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wealthy, horse-breeding background; for example, Gylippos, 
Philippos, Hippokrates and Herippidas (all four of whom appeared 
in Table 5.2), not to mention Kratesippidas (PB 456), Lysippos 
(PB 506), Mnasippos (PB 538), ·orsippos (PB 582) and Pasippidas 
(PB 591), as well as Polos, 'the foal' (PB 653). 
Limits of space prevent discussion of several other cases 
of officers for whom there are indicators (of varying degrees of 
certainty) of high social status. Solely on the basis of the 
evidence considered above, however, the conclusion that foreign 
posts were generally dominated by men from the leading families 
seems inescapable. 
(d) Methods and criteria of appointment 
How were these commanders chosen? Appointments to foreign 
commands are likely to have been normally ratified by an official 
body, but the significance of that procedure is another matter. 
Only occasionally are we able to glimpse the formal appointment 
procedures, but those few glimpses are suggestive. One occasion 
on which the -procedure for the choice of a nauarchos is described 
is when King Agesilaos, on campaign in Asia Minor, was given the 
power to select an admiral of his choice (Xen. Hell. 3.4.27-9). 
The situation was unusual, but it does indicate the absence of 
a principle of popular election, or at least the temporary 
suspension of effective ratification. Already in 403 Lysander, 
seemingly speaking at an official meeting in support of the 
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ambassadors from Eleusis and Athens, had managed to arrange a 
harmostship for himself and the appointment of his brother Libys 
as nauarchos (Xen. Hell. 2.4.28). 
Evidence for the selection of harmosts, indeed, parallels 
that concerning nauarchoi. King Agis !I's proposal to send a 
force to Chalkedon and Byzantion in c.410 under the command of 
Klearchos seems (to judge from the tenor of Xenophon's account: 
Hell. 1.1.35-6) to have been made in an official meeting. The 
reference to the fact that Klearchos was proxenos of Byzantion 
sounds like a reason given by Agis for suggesting his 
appointment, which implies that his name was advanced as part and 
parcel of the overall plan. So, despite the formal opportunity 
for genuine choice of personnel, in practice the available 
options were circumscribed by the influence of the king who 
proposed the expedition. An even more blatant example of the 
manipulation of an appointment is that worked in 389 by 
Anaxibios, who "owing to the fact that the ephors had become 
friends of his, succeeded in getting himself sent out to Abydos 
as harmost" (Xen. Hell. 4.8.32) . Similarly , in 382 the commander 
Eudamidas, according to Xenophon (Hell. 5.2.24), persuaded the 
ephors to give an auxiliary command to his brother Phoibidas -
Diodorus (15. 19.3; 20.3) gives a different account, but it is 
at the very least indicative that Xenophon should believe in the 
possibility of such family influence. 
In these instances the decisions were taken in Sparta; but 
on many occasions harmosts were selected by commanders in the 
¥ 
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field from among their own associates or staff officers. For 
example, in winter 413/12 King Agis II at Dekeleia summoned 
Alkamenes and Melanthos from Sparta on his own initiative (Thuc. 
8.5). A few months later, ·however, the commanders of the 
Peloponnesian fleet appointed Philippos, one of their own number, 
as harmost at Miletos (Thuc. 8. 28). After the victory at 
Aigospotamoi in 405 Lysander had a free hand to appoint his aides 
as harmosts of several important cities: Sthenelaos as harmost 
at Byzantion and Chalkedon; Eteonikos to an area command in 
Thrace; and Thorax, later, as harmost at Samos (Xen. Hell. 2.2.2, 
5; Diod. 13.106; 14.3). In the early fourth century Kings 
Agesilaos and Kleombrotos both took advantage of their foreign 
campaigning to leave favoured supporters behind as harmosts when 
they themselves returned to Sparta (e.g. Euxenos in Asia Minor 
in 394; Sphodrias and Phoibidas at Thespiai in 378 and 377, 
respectively: Xen. Hell. 4.2.5; 5.4.15, 41). 
In spite of the formality of public ratification, the 
dominant principles of selection were not election but 
appointment and co-optation ( cf. Finley 1986, 166). Royal 
patronage, for example, might influence entire careers, 
(Cartledge 1987, 139ff.). The rise of Lysander up to his 
appointment to the nauarchy was probably due to the support of 
the Eurypontid royal family with whom· he had been associated 
since the time (no later thqn the early 420s) when as a young man 
he had become the erastes of Agesilaos (Plut. Lys. 22.3; Ages. 
2.1; Cartledge 1987, 28f.). Lysander was a suitable candidate 
for the exercise of patronage, owing to the reputed poverty of 
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his family (Plut. Lys. 2.1) and his possible mothax status while 
young ( Phylarchos FGrH 81F43) . A similar case is that of 
Agesilaos' half-brother, Teleutias ( PB 689) . The poverty of 
Teleutias' family led the king to give them half the estates he 
had inherited from his elder brother, King Agis (Xen. Ages. 4.5; 
Plut. Ages. 4.1). Owing to the influence of Agesilaos, Teleutias 
rose to the position of nauarchos and held several subsequent 
commands (Plut. Ages. 21.1; Cartledge 1987, 145f.). 
Some men of course were sufficiently influential in their 
own right to attain positions without the help of patronage and 
regardless of merit. Anaxibios' cultivation of the ephors' 
friendship shows one means by which it could be done. The well-
born Pedaritos achieved his harmostship at Chios, despite failing 
in his twenties to gain selection to the elite corps of 300 
hippeis (Plut. Lyk. 25.4; Mor. 231B). The roles of patronage and 
of inherited social status will have been important reasons for 
the tendency observed above towards the limitation of access to 
foreign positions and the iteration of posts for those few men 
who were selected. 
(e) Competing sub-imperialisms and personal ambitions 
The pattern observed above according to which officers from 
prominent backgrounds frequently spent several years abroad 
provided the optimum conditions for the exercise of personal 
ambitions . There were some restrictions, to be sure, since the 
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home authorities were evidently alert to the dangers of over-
independence. On receipt of the first complaint about the 
actions of Astyochos, the nauarchos of 412/11, a high-powered 
commission was sent with powers ·to replace him - the fact that 
the complainant was the well-born Pedaritos is no doubt relevant 
(Thuc. 8.38-9). So too in the early 390s the authorities 
intervened at least three times to redirect or check upon the 
activities of the area harmosts in Asia Minor, Thibron and 
Derkylidas (Xen. Hell. 3.1.7; 2.6, 12). In addition by no means 
all Spartiates abroad operated independently. Fellow commanders 
often had to co-ordinate their activities; trierarchs, staff 
officers and sometimes even harmosts had to work under the 
command of admirals or other superior officers. We should not 
overdraw the picture of the autonomous Spartiate abroad. 
These restrictions did not, however, prevent officers from 
initiating their own 'sub-imperialisms' ( a phenomenon whose 
importance is well attested in the history of modern 
imperialism) , 10 attempting to exert their own stamp upon the 
direction of military strategy and policy in the pursuit of 
personal ambitions. The most notable example is of course that 
of Lysander who exploited his naval commands to create a personal 
following among his fellow Spartiate officers and partisans in 
the Greek states of the Eastern Aegean. Following his decisive 
victory at Aigospotamoi he . was able, albeit temporarily, to 
impose his personal settlement upon Athens' former allies and 
wielded great influence over Spartan policy-making until his 
death in 395 (Rahe 1977; Bommelaer 1981). 11 But Lysander's 
' 
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independent exploitation of his military commands was exceptional 
only in its scale and degree of success. Many more petty sub-
imperialisms can be observed throughout Sparta's period of 
foreign engagement. Despite ·the interventions from Sparta, 
Derkylidas in Asia Minor was able to pursue his personal revenge 
against the Persian satrap Pharnabazos and he even used 
information gained from a Spartan supervisory commission to pre-
empt the home government's intended expedition to the Thracian 
Chersonese by mounting his own privately-planned campaign (Xen. 
Hell. 3.1.9-27; 2.8-11; Diod. 14.38.7). Similar unauthorized 
action is evident in the notorious cases of Phoibidas' seizure 
of the Theban Kadmeia in 382 and Sphodrias' attack upon the 
Peiraieus in 378. (It is possible, however, that they had the 
covert support of, respectively, Kings Agesilaos and Kleombrotos: 
discussion and refs. in Ste. Croix 1972, 134ff.; Cartledge 1987, 
156ff.) 
Furthermore, precisely because officers were not always 
autonomous, there was frequently a clash of ambitions. For the 
insight it provides into the endemic conflict between officers, 
the most illuminating episode concerns the varying reactions of 
Spartiate officers to the appearance of the mercenary army of the 
'Ten Thousand' in North-Western Asia Minor (Xen. Anab. 6.6-7.2). 
Kleandros, the harmost at Byzantion, would but for unfavourable 
sacrifices have taken them into his service. But the nauarchos 
Anaxibios adopted an antagonistic attitude. Acting in collusion 
with the Persian satrap Pharnabazos in return for the promise of 
personal favours , he compelled the Ten Thousand to depart from 
I I 
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Asia into Thrace. He also ordered that any mercenaries remaining 
in Byzantion be sold as slaves. Kleandros ignored this order, 
but it was later carried out by Aristarchos, Kleandros' successor 
as harmost. Then Anaxibios · altered his policy after being 
snubbed by Pharnabazos on the expiry of his term of off ice. 
Despite his lack of authority, Anaxibios ordered the people of 
Perinthos to transport the Ten Thousand back into Asia; but then 
Aristarchos, who had himself now entered into collusion with 
Pharnabazos, came in person to prevent this manoeuvre. Finally, 
however, when Thibron arrived a few months later as the new 
supreme regional harmost, he brought the Ten Thousand into Asia 
and recruited them into his forces. In this episode we see in 
microcosm the kind of personal ambitions and conflicts and the 
consequent twists and turns in policy which characterized much 
of the Spartan war effort. 
Such competing sub-imperialisms became evident at the very 
start of the Ionian war with the "private empire-building" of 
Pedaritos on Chios (Andrewes in Gemme et al. 1981, v. 83f.) and 
his challenge to the authority of the nauarchos Astyochos. They 
flared up again over much larger issues in the clash of 
personalities and policy towards Persia between the retiring and 
succeeding admirals Lysander and Kallikratidas (Proietti 1987, 
llff.; Gray 1989, 22ff. & 8lff.), in the conflict between 
Lysander and King Pausanias over the settlement of Attica in 403 
( Ste. Croix 1972, 144), and then between Lysander and King 
Agesilaos in Asia in 396 (Cartledge 1987, 151ff.). In the late 
380s and 370s this type of conflict became institutionalized as 
i 1 
300 
there developed a permanent policy struggle between the kings of 
the two royal houses (cf. esp. R.E. Smith 1953/54) who used their 
prerogative of commanding the regular citizen army to implement 
their mutually contradictory sub-imperialisms. The final 
consequence of this conflict came in 371 when King Kleombrotos 
was compelled to fight the battle of Leuktra, despite 
unfavourable religious omens, for fear of condemnation to death 
(Xen. Hell. 6.4.4-8; Cicero, De divinatione 1.34.76; 2.32.69). 
IV. The impact of overseas campaigning 
(a) Socio-political transformation and property concentration 
In this section I shall draw upon the insights of the previous 
section to examine precisely how involvement in foreign warfare 
and empire contributed to Sparta's internal crisis. 
Several interconnected developments can be identified. The 
fighting of a new type of war, major controversies regarding 
policy and the choices involved in the maintenance of empire all 
raised fresh issues of a significance and difficulty surpassing 
any that Sparta had previously had to tackle. These entailed 
fundamental and often new sources of domestic strife which raised 
the temperature of political conflict to an unparalleled level, 
as is attested by the number of 'political trials' in this 
period: seven out of nine known trials of non-royal citizens in 
the Classical period fall between the years 404 and 378 (lists 
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in Ste. Croix 1972, 133 & Appendix XXVI, to which add the trial 
of Thorax in 404: Plut. Lys. 19.4). 
Overseas campaigning also meant an unprecedented extension 
of influential and independent positions open to leading 
citizens. Although there were traditionally many officerships 
within the regular Lakedaimonian army, these operated within a 
strict chain of subordination under the king in which independent 
action was effectively squashed (cf. Thuc. 5.71-2). In contrast, 
some officers abroad could take independent military and even 
political decisions which diverged from the reactions of home 
authorities. Indeed, as we have seen, for many officers the 
chance to enhance their reputations before returning to the 
relative anonymity of life at home proved irresistible. 
The effects were especially destabilizing because these 
extraordinary officers came from a different age grade from that 
which had traditionally exercised the most important collective 
influence upon Spartan political life. Traditionally , political 
debate was heavily influenced by the powerful conservative lobby 
of old men, especially through the Council of Elders , the 
Gerousia, whose members were aged 60 or over (cf. Pindar, fr. 199 
Maehler, apud Plut. Lyk. 21.6; Forrest 1980, 113; Ste. Croix 
1972, 137). Extraordinary officers, however, were typically 
younger men - usually in their 40s or 50s, but sometimes even 
younger (Chapter 1, n.rq = Hodkinson 1983, 251 & n. 28). 
Although the 30-59 years age grade was the one from which what 
Xenophon calls "the greatest offices" were filled (Lak . Pol. 4.7; 
1,I 
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cf.2.2), there was a large number of eligible men. The most 
important office, the ephorate (and possibly others too), was 
distributed across a wide social spectrum ( cf. Arist. Pol. 
1270b6-34) and was only a temporary, non-repeatable position 
(Westlake 1976). This must normally have meant that there was 
little opportunity for even prominent persons to perform more 
than spasmodic political roles. 
Xenophon's comment (Lak. Pol. 14.4) that the ambition of 
leading Spartiates was continuous harmostships abroad makes 
perfect sense for prominent men in this age grade who had the 
opportunity for foreign commands. The attitude of Derkylidas 
( Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 2), who "always liked being abroad", is not 
surprising; but it is striking that he was prepared thereby to 
incur the disgrace deriving from his failure to marry and have 
children which, among other things, forced him to forfeit his 
right to deference from younger men (Plut. Lyk. 15.2). Part of 
the tension between commanders and home authorities was probably 
a more overt conflict between age groups as the overall control 
of Spartan policy by a gerontocracy was threatened by the 
decisions of younger officers abroad and also by the increased 
influence at ·home of men of military prowess. The consequent 
partial undermining of traditional deference to the elders may 
also have led to an increased role for other sources of 
influence, such as patronage and wealth. 
A related point is that the traditional political system 
involved a natural rotation of office-holding. There were always 
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many leading families taking a temporary 'back seat' because they 
lacked males over age 60 to be eligible for the Gerousia. 
Excessive competition was thereby reduced and access to office 
shared more evenly. The availibility of foreign posts for men 
in their 40s and 50s will have upset this natural regulation of 
competition because leading families were considerably more 
likely to have males in their 40s or 50s than over age 60. The 
importance of family influence is also likely to have increased. 
Family influence upon elections to the Gerousia must always have 
been limited by the elementary biological fact that a candidate 
aged 60 or over would only rarely have had elder relatives alive 
to provide support. Supporting senior relatives will have been 
available far more frequently for men in their 40s or younger 
competing for foreign positions. This may in part explain the 
pattern observed earlier in which sons of prominent men are 
frequently found holding important posts. 
The availability of commands for younger men thereby 
exacerbated two weaknesses of the political system identified by 
Finley (1986, 168f.): first, the absence of a unified leadership 
principle, the outcome of which was permanent rivalry, now 
broadened by the increased numbers of individuals and families 
involved in competition for positions; and, secondly, the 
conflict between men of energy and ambition and the rest, now 
intensified by the greater opportunities available for officers 
abroad, including opportunities for extended tenure of foreign 
posts which meant the possibility of monopoly in place of 
rotation. 
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In addition, the selection of officers through appointment 
and personal influence stands in stark contrast to the procedure 
used for the Gerousia - and probably for the ephorate also -
whose members were elected in open assembly through shouting for 
each of the candidates (Plut. Lyk. 26.2-3; Arist. Pol. 1270b26-7; 
1271a9-10). It is true that the democratic appearance of this 
procedure gives a somewhat misleading impression in that, as was 
noted in Chapter 1, Section II(d), most of the candidates were 
probably men from the most distinguished lineages who had already 
held major positions in their earlier careers, having benefited 
from the advantages of birth, wealth and the operation of 
patronage. Nevertheless, the development of foreign commands was 
an oligarchic trend which worked against the cohesion of the 
citizen body. The traditional ambition of leading men to gain 
election to the Gerousia must have restrained their behaviour 
towards their fellow citizens, since it was upon such men that 
their election depended. The ambition for foreign posts, 
however, made no such demands, but depended rather upon the 
possession of influence or a patron's goodwill. There was less 
need for moderate behaviour towards ordinary Spartiates; on the 
contrary, there was a built-in incentive for would-be officers 
and patrons · to increase their personal status through the 
acquisition of additional property, even at the expense of poorer 
citizens. 
Solidarity within the citizen body probably also suffered 
from the exclusion of ordinary citizens from the forces of 
officers abroad . Cartledge (1987, 40) is right to emphasize the 
't 
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importance of this "serious breach in the principle of the 
citizen militia". In traditional Lakedaimonian warfare 
individual glory could be gained by rank-and-file soldiers as 
well as by commanders (Chapter I, Section II(c) = Hodkinson 1983, 
259f.). The absence of rank-and-file citizens from most of 
Sparta's overseas campaigning meant that military glory now 
accrued solely to a few leading men. The classic example is that 
of Lysander and his fellow commanders who vaunted themselves 
through personal statues on the victory monument at Delphi after 
the victory at Aigospotamoi (Paus. 10.9.4; Meiggs & Lewis 1989, 
no.95). Moreover, the fact that it was upon non-citizen troops 
or rowers that commanders depended for their ambitions may have 
contributed to the attitude that their fellow citizens were 
irrelevant and dispensable in the scramble for personal position. 
The developments discussed above can be linked to the three 
causes of property concentration and oliganthropia referred to 
earlier in this essay - individual property accumulation, the 
failure of Sparta's leaders to provide remedies and the breakdown 
in solidarity between rich and poor. The traditional political 
system had through its varied checks and balances acted as a 
powerful force in restraining the destabilizing potential of 
growing inequalities in wealth. But the aforementioned 
developments added powerfully to the transformation of the socio-
political context discussed in Chapter 4 whereby the pressures 
towards the acquisition of status-defining wealth and its 
deployment through patronage increased in significance. 
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Existing trends towards the concentration of landed property 
in a few hands are likely to have been intensified by the 
heightened level of competition for foreign positions. 
Aristotle's comment (Pol. 1307a35-70) on the Spartan notables' 
grasping after wealth is perfectly intelligible in this context. 
As he implies (Pol. 1270a21-9), leading men could acquire land 
through manipulation of ordinary citizens' rights of gift and 
bequest and the freedom of guardians to choose any husband for 
an heiress. This could have been achieved without any necessary 
use of coined wealth, through channels of patronage and offers 
of subsistence help to citizens whose reduced holdings put them 
in a difficult position in years of poor harvests. But, if the 
ban in 404 on individual possession of currency was not 
completely effective and quantities of foreign wealth did come 
into the hands of leading men, it is likely to have stimulated 
and facilitated a higher volume of transactions in landed 
property. Purchase and sale of most land, al though traditionally 
deemed dishonourable, were not illegal (Herakleides Lembos fr. 
373.12 Dilts= Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians, fr . 
611.12 Rose; cf. Hodkinson 1986, 388). Currency could also be 
employed in transactions which were nominally ones of gift, 
bequest or the betrothal of an heiress . We must be cautious 
about the danger of over-speculation; but, I would contend that 
even on a minimal interpretation, ther'e are sufficient reasons 
to conclude that the developments discussed above will have 
accelerated the process of property concentration and hastened 
the decline in citizen numbers. 
ii 
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Some scholars (e.g . Cawkwel l 1983 , 385ff.; Flower 1991, 
88f.) would dispute this conclusion on the grounds that Sparta's 
manpower decline took place at a steady rate between 480 and 371 , 
with no dramatic drop in the 50 years before Leuktra . This view 
depends upon the assumption that Thucydides did not inadvertently 
halve the number of Spartiates at the battle of Mantineia in 418; 
but even, if it were correct, it would not afford reliable 
grounds for challenging my conclusion. Knowledge that more 
Spartiates became Inferiors through deepening poverty in one 
period than in another would not necessarily indicate a more 
rapid concentration of land. This is partly because of the 
intrusion of extraneous factors such as the earthquake of c.465 
and differential mortality in warfare. More fundamentally, the 
precise relationship between the degree of property concentration 
and the extent of citizen population decline would be likely to 
vary from period to period, depending upon unknown factors, such 
as the numbers of men at the start of each period who were 
already close to the 'poverty line' and differential degrees of 
subsistence help offered by richer citizens . It would be 
perfectly possible for there to be a smaller drop in citizen 
numbers in a period of greater property concentration 
The key issue is not whether the rate of citizen manpower 
decl i ne after 431 was more rapid than , before that date , but 
whether i t was fas t er than it would otherwise have been without 
the i mpact o f war a nd e mp i re . This l atter point seems s ecurely 
establ ished by the powerful c ombination of factors discussed in 
this section. Furthermore, the transformation of political life 
44' 
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which I have outlined helps to explain the breakdown in the 
solidarity of the Spartiate citizen body and the consequent lack 
of intervention by Sparta's leaders who were themselves the 
beneficiaries of the new developments. 
(b) Agesilaos and the crisis of Spartiate society 
The momentum of these developments seems to have been maintained, 
if not intensified, during the 380s and 370s by the personal 
dominance of King Agesilaos II. Agesilaos' dominance was a 
product of Sparta's crisis. He represented a backlash against 
the independence of foreign commanders. Indeed, he did much to 
resolve tensions between commanders abroad and the home 
authorities, especially between harmosts and Gerousia, by 
bringing both under his control. Most of the harmosts after 386 
were his personal associates - Eudamidas (PB 295), Phoibidas (PB 
734) , Teleutias ( PB 689) and Herippidas ( PB 349); and his 
mediation between harmosts and Gerousia is demonstrated, 
appropriately enough, in his successful interventions at the 
trials of two errant harmosts, Phoibidas and Sphodrias (PB 680), 
both of whom would otherwise probably have been condemned to 
death ( Ste. Croix 1972, 134ff. ; Cartledge 1987, 156ff.). His 
austere personal life (Xen. Ages. passim) and deferential 
attitude to officials (Xen. Ages. 6.4; 7.2; Plut. Ages. 4.2-4) 
seemed to restore traditional Spartan values. Unlike other 
commanders he identified his career interests with those of the 
state , cushioned by the fact that he could rely upon the 
I 
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traditional power base of his kingship. In this way his power 
increased, and he was no doubt supported by those Spartiates who 
yearned for a return to old ways after the upheavals of rec e nt 
years . 
The problem was that, although his values were traditional, 
Agesilaos' political methods followed the new circumstances of 
power. As Cartledge ( 1987, 140f.) has reminded us, social 
scientists have often observed that at times of change and crisis 
networks of patron-client relationships tend to coalesce into 
more solid factions. Without accepting the rather mechanistic 
view (Hamilton 1970; 1979; 1991) according to which Spartan 
political life was permanently dominated by a conflict between 
three enduring factions, the emergence of more solid groupings 
can be identified as a genuine development during this period. 
The emergence of the faction around Lysander (e.g. Xen. Hell. 
1.6.4-6; Ages. 20.2-4) is of particular importance. The 
influence of Lysander's faction and its persistence even after 
his death ( Plut . Ages . 20 . 4) meant that Agesilaos' rise to 
dominance was by no means unopposed . He achieved it only through 
his own faction-building which relied upon the deployment of 
large amounts o f wealth (Xe n. Ages . 4 ; 11 . 8; Plut. Ages . 4 . 4 ; 
Cartledge 1987 , 132ff . ). 
Agesilaos was also affected by his own experience as the 
first Sparta n k i ng to comma nd mer cenary armies during h i s 
c ampaigns i n Asia Minor . In Spar ta he cemented and increased his 
personal following through gift-giving, just as in Asia he had 
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built up his army through abundant supplies, incentives, prizes, 
pay and plunder (Xen. Ages. 1.18-20, 25, 33; Hell. 3.4.16; 4.2.5-
8; cf. Hamilton 1990, 59ff.). The episode in Asia (Xen. Ages. 
1.17-19) in which he made huge ·profits for his friends through 
the manipulation of booty stands as a model for his wealth-based 
patronal polities at home. One might say without too much 
exaggeration that he applied the politics of commanding a 
mercenary army to the politics of leading his fellow citizens. 
Despite his claim to be a loyal servant of the polis, 
Agesilaos' politics were fundamentally divisive of the solidarity 
between rich and poor which had traditionally underpinned the 
polis' survival and success. Relying, as it did, upon the 
deployment of significant economic resources, his mode of 
politics probably intensified the growing pressures towards 
individual acquisition of property and deflected still further 
the attention of the authorities from the plight of poor 
citizens. 
In addition, the magnitude of his personal power led to a 
sharper polarization than ever before among leading men, with a 
clustering of opposition around the kings of the other royal 
house, especially King Kleombrotos whose partial success in 
frustrating Agesilaos' anti-Theban polic1es during the 370s (R.E. 
Smith 1953/54) provoked in .turn severe counter-opposition, as 
evidenced by the threat of judicial condemnation ·which forced him 
into fighting the fatal battle of Leuktra. The revolutionary 
plotting of Spartiates during the Theban attack on Sparta in 
f"lf 
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winter 370/69 (Plut. Ages. 32.6; cf. David 1980, 304ff.) is 
intriguing. Were they poor Spartiates desperate for an escape 
from the threat of loss of citizen status? Or leading men, 
including former associates of Kleombrotos, frustrated after the 
death of the one leader who had challenged the dominance of 
Agesilaos? 
of those 
How many persons were involved outside the small core 
executed is unknown; but the alienation of the 
conspirators was symptomatic of a widespread malaise of disunity 
then current among the citizen body (Plut. Ages. 30-31) .1.2 
There was outrage among the older men and many citizens called 
to mind the oracles which had warned them about appointing a lame 
king. Agesilaos' personal role - dominant, but deleterious for 
Sparta's interests - was at the fore of the complaints of a 
citizen body ill at ease with itself. This prevalent mood of 
disunity and conspiracy must have exacerbated Sparta's inability 
to defend her territories and to resist the dismantling of her 
power. 
V. Sparta and Rome: comparative considerations 
This chapter has attempted to define more precisely than has been 
hitherto attempted the ways in which prolonged foreign warfare 
and the experience of empire precipitated the crisis of Spartiate 
society in the early fourth century which led to her decline to 
the status of a second-rate power. But how important were the 
factors of war and empire in relation to the longer-term , 
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underlying developments which were already threatening the 
Spartiate social order? 
Comparative analysis is often helpful not only in 
highlighting trends shared by societies undergoing comparable 
experiences but also in isolating distinctive features which are 
of critical significance. Comparison with the Roman Republic, 
another society in which prolonged foreign warfare and imperial 
expansion - in this case over several centuries - culminated in 
socio-political crisis, may illuminate important aspects of the 
Spartan crisis. ( For the Roman comparandum I have drawn 
especially upon Hopkins 1978, lff.; Harris 1979, 9ff.; Hopkins 
& Burton 1983; Rich 1983; Astin 1989; Cornell 1989; Staveley 
1989). Similarities with Sparta abound: the resort to iteration 
of office at times of emergency, the creation of new positions 
(principally the promagistracy) for the maintenance of empire, 
the emergence of talented individuals who gained unusual terms 
of command and extraordinary fame during periods of exceptional 
warfare, tensions between senior senators and younger generals , 
endemic political prosecutions, the destabilizing impact of new 
foreign wealth and the concentration of land in the hands of the 
rich . 
The contrasts between the internal impact of Spartan and 
Roman imperialism are equally, if not more, significant. As 
their empire expanded over the long period from the fourth to the 
first century B. C. , the Romans made important adaptations to 
their social structures , especially in the extension of 
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citizenship. Consequently, in spite of certain fears about a 
decline (real or supposed) in the numbers of the free population, 
Rome did not have a serious shortage of assidui (Rich 1983). The 
Spartiates proved less ad~ptable, attempting to preserve 
unchanged their exclusive citizenship with its ever-diminishing 
numbers of men who were able to meet the concealed property 
qualification of the mess contributions. Furthermore, there was 
at Rome always a fair degree of mobility into and out of the 
office-holding elite, partly in response to the weight of 
military and administrative responsibilities incurred during 
imperial expansion. In contrast, at Sparta the evidence suggests 
a greater limitation of military posts to men from the highest 
backgrounds. An important reason for this was the allocation of 
such posts to appointees rather than, as at Rome, to men who had 
to achieve their positions through continuing success in 
competitive popular elections. 
Other structural differences had equally powerful effects. 
In the more tightly-controlled Spartan society, in which 
prohibitions against ostentatious living and display could be 
more effectively enforced, a larger proportion of foreign wealth 
may have been channelled into the acquisition of land. Since 
Spartan territory was also more modest in extent than that of 
Rome and all private land was citizen-owned, such acquisition was 
even more directly at the expense of poorer citizens, especially 
given the concealed property qualificatio~ of compulsory 
contributions to the messes. Again in contrast with Rome, no 
compensatory material benefits of empire were passed on to 
I ' 
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ordinary Spartiates. Moreover, in spite of the resulting 
hardships and loss of rights, there is no evidence that in the 
Classical period the concentration of land and impoverishment of 
the poor ever became a live political issue as it did at Rome 
owing to the role of the tribunes and the popular influence upon 
elections and (to a lesser extent) upon legislation. 
Although overshadowed by the dominance of the senatorial 
oligarchy, the significant level of popular influence in Roman 
politics is an important point of differentiation from the 
character of Spartiate political life. This is signalled by the 
fact that none of Sparta's foreign commanders displayed any 
tendency towards espousing populist causes against the 
established leadership as did several Roman generals in the late 
second and early first centuries. Nor did the Lakedaimonian army 
become a political force in the hands of independent military 
leaders, owing to the exclusion of rank-and-file citizen troops 
from most foreign campaigns due to the position of the Spartiate 
citizen body as an elite dominating a much larger servile 
population. 
Another point of differentiation was that the Roman socio-
political system was not as sharply divided along age class 
lines. Roman commanders had a permanent political position as 
members of the leading official body, the Senate. This meant 
that susceptibility to adaptation and change in response to the 
experience of foreign warfare and empire was embedded in Roman 
political life to a far greater extent than at Sparta where 
I"" 
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returning commanders had no political roles and formal authority 
lay, until the time of Agesilaos, with men without direct 
imperial experience. The power of the hereditary dual kingship , 
another factor alien to the Ro~an Republic, was also crucial in 
the hands of Agesilaos as a source of authority in inhibiting 
tendencies towards change and in imposing collective cohesion. 
For all these reasons the divergent outcomes of Roman and 
of Spartan imperialism were that Rome's empire expanded and her 
society adapted and survived at the expense of a fundamental 
change in her political system; whereas Sparta lost her empire 
and her territorial integrity, and her social institutions (the 
upbringing, the common meals and her austere way of life) went 
into decay while her formal political structures survived for 
another century and a half. 
This comparison suggests two complementary points: first, 
that the character of Sparta's response to involvement in foreign 
warfare and empire diverged from that of Rome because of 
fundamental differences in her social and political structure; 
but, secondly , that the particular nature of that response itself 
had important implications for the future development of her 
society. Involvement in war and empire should not be seen as the 
root cause of Sparta's crisis. As has been indicated in earlier 
chapters, several components of the crisis were developing 
strongly beforehand. In particular, the ever-present potential 
helot threat combined with the decline in Spartiate numbers led 
to the government's resort by the 420s at the latest to the 
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cosmetic solution of solving army manpower problems through 
increased reliance upon non-citizen troops (cf. Thuc. 4.38, 80; 
5.34). The fact that these prior developments helped condition 
the character of Spartan warfare and imperialism means that we 
should not treat Finley's striking aphorism (1986, 177) that "her 
greatest military success destroyed the model military state" as 
literal truth. We should not, however, fall prey to the 
determinist view that these prior developments would have 
destroyed the model military state regardless of the experience 
of war and empire. That would be counterfactual history at its 
most pointless, since (owing to the heavy concentration of late-
fifth- and early-fourth-century sources) the only Sparta we know 
in any detail evidentially is the one which was undergoing that 
experience. As we have seen, involvement abroad introduced 
important socio-political changes with significant implications 
for Spartiate landownership and manpower. Sparta's sixty years 
of foreign warfare and empire were a major factor which 
accelerated the onset of her internal crisis and conditioned the 
particular form in which it evolved . Without that prolonged 
external engagement and the consequences it produced, the timing, 
the circumstances and the international repercussions of the 
Spartiate crisis would surely have been considerably different . 
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Footnotes to Chapter 5 
1. In his Life of Agis (5.1-3) Plutarch further claims that 
this greed impelled the Spartiates to pass the so-called law of 
Epitadeus' which supposedly ended a previous system of 
inheritance by unigeniture and led to the concentration of land. 
Despite the attempt of David (1979/80, 44f.; 1981, 71f.) to treat 
this as authentic history, it is merely a house of cards since, 
as has recently been demonstrated (Ch.2 above= Hodkinson 1986, 
379ff.; Schutrumpf 1987), the supposed system of inheritance by 
unigeniture and the law of Epitadeus are both pure fiction. 
2. Whether or not the ban included bullion as well as coinage 
is uncertain; the sources are vague on the point. Criticizing 
the view of Finley (1986, 168) that the ban applied to coinage 
only, Flower (1991, 92) asks, "would it not have been pointless 
to ban coinage and allow bullion, when the latter easily could 
have been melted down into the former?" But how would an 
individual Spartiate easily obtain the stamp of a foreign polis 
upon his melted down bullion to transform it into coinage? 
3. Hamilton ( 1990, 82f.) has recently advanced an idiosyncratic 
version of the deleterious impact of foreign wealth. The 
increased supply of capital, following on from the disruption to 
the system of distribution of material goods during the 
Peloponnesian war, supposedly led to price increases, especially 
in imported raw materials and manufactured goods. Taking the 
example of the basic commodity of iron, Hamilton argues that a 
steady annual increase in its price would have had a severe 
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impact on all the homoioi, thereby reducing a sizeable number to 
the position of Inferiors. 
This account, which Hamil ton admits is hypothetical, is hard 
to credit. First, his assumption that the "normal laws of supply 
and demand" operated in the singular conditions of the Spartan 
state is highly dubious. Secondly, he assumes a level of private 
dependence 
plausible. 
upon imported i terns which is neither proven nor 
Thirdly, why should we believe that there were in 404 
serious problems with the distribution of materials or goods when 
Spartan territory had not been subject to significant incursions 
and the Athenian navy had ceased to control the Aegean for 
several years? Fourthly, his assumption that Spartiates had to 
supply their own iron weapons is hazardous, since public supply 
is a distinct possibility (cf. Cartledge 1979, 184f.). Finally, 
Hamilton acknowledges the abundance of iron available locally; 
but his claim that "local availability does not mean that the 
commodity would not be affected by general changes in the local 
economy more broadly conceived" is the vaguest of assertions. 
It founders on the failure to specify how increased costs of 
imports would affect the price of an abundant local resource. 
4. Ollier (1?33, 270f .), followed by Flower (1991, 89), claims 
that Plato's timarchic state is not a realistic depiction of 
fourth-century Sparta on the grounds tha,t contemporary changes 
in Spartan history are not reflected in his account. The 
conclusion, however, does not follow. Quite apart from the 
specific references to the Spartan politeia at 544C and 545A, the 
central point about this part of Plato's account is that he 
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concentrates upon the essential long-term nature of Spartiate 
society. 
5. Even here there is some ambiguity because the word used, 
'Lakedaimonios', can include perioikoi; but the context suggests 
that it is Spartiates the speaker is concerned with. Note that 
Brasidas appears as a trierarch already in 425 (Thuc. 4.11) and 
in 388 the eight Spartiates who "happened to be with" the harmost 
Gorgopas on Aigina probably represent most of the trierarchs from 
the 12 ships under his command (Xen. Hell. 5.1.6 & 11). Spartan 
practice was not always consistent. Perioikic naval commanders 
are attested during the Ionian war (Meiggs & Lewis 1989, 289 no. 
95 (k)). Thucydides' specification (8.22.1) that Deiniadas, the 
commander of the 13 ships that attacked Lesbos in 412, was a 
perioikos may, however, indicate a departure from the norm; and 
the fleet he commanded was Chian rather than Lakonian. 
6. The marines ( epibatai) referred to here are not to be 
confused with the indi victual epibates who appears in Thuc. 
8.61.2; Xen. Hell. 1.3.17; Hell. Oxy. 22 (17).4. The latter 
appears to be a technical Spartan term for a detachable 
subordinate officer of a nauarchos (Gomme et al. 1981, 150). I 
am grateful to the late Professor A. Andrewes for his advice on 
the substance of this footnote. 
7. Men whose careers were terminated through exile or execution 
by the Spartan authorities are included in the figures below 
because what is at issue is the Spartans' reactions to their 
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officers in terms of the likelihood of reappointment to 
subsequent posts. 
8 . Some additional cases of multiple posts might also have been 
added with a less strict attitude to the evidence. For example, 
Aristos (PB 135) and Aristoteles (PB 137), both sent on missions 
to Syracuse within a space of eight years (Diod. 14.10.2 & 78.1) 
may be the same person - as claimed by Cavaignac (1914) - given 
the Spartans' frequent habit of sending the same man back to 
particular locations and Diodorus' capacity for misrepresenting 
exact names. In this case Aristos is clearly the dubious name, 
especially as Diodorus at one point (14.70.3) calls him Aretes. 
9. The ancient evidence for these men's careers may be 
consulted via the Lakedaimonian prosopography of Poralla-Bradford 
1985 (henceforth PB). My reconstruction of the military career 
of Pharax (PB 717/18) follows that of Mosley (1963). 
10. Fieldhouse (1973, esp. 80f. & 98f.); cf. the definition of 
'sub-imperialism' given by the Japanese historian Beasley (1987, 
198): "initiatives taken by men in positions of responsibility 
overseas, confident that a successful fait accompli would be 
ratified by .their government at home". The activities of 
Japanese commanders in the 1930s - especially the independent 
actions of the Kwantung Army, the riva~ry between it and the 
Tientsin garrison (later renamed the North China Army) and the 
conflicts within the North China Army - could provide interesting 
comparative material for a more extended study of Spartiate sub-
imperialisms. 
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11. I have deliberately omitted reference to Lysander's alleged 
machinations to obtain the kingship, the authenticity of which 
is doubtful (cf., most recently, Flower 1991, 8lff., with refs. 
to earlier studies). 
12. Plutarch refers to this conspiracy as being meidzon in 
comparison with an earlier conspiracy of non-citizens which 
involved 200 persons. He probably means "more serious" rather 
than "larger". As Flower (1991, 87 n.46) argues, "given that ... 
the Spartiate population had dropped to as few as 800, it is 
prima facie impossible that more than 200 Spartiates were 
involved in this second conspiracy which met 'in a house'"· We 
should bear in mind, however, that the number at the core of the 
conspiracy tells us nothing about the overall scale of 
disaffection. Most conspiracies, however widespread, rely upon 
a small organizational core; and what other, larger venues than 
a private house were there in Sparta for an illicit, secret 
meeting? Moreover, it would be wrong to conclude with Flower 
(1991, 88) that the failure of the conspiracy signifies that "the 
majority of Spartan citizens were either satisfied with the 
status quo or, for whatever reasons, did not desire change or 
reform". ~owever widespread the sympathy for the aims of the 
conspiracy, it would have been surprising if it had continued 
without its leaders. 
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PROSPECTS 
Repetition of the detailed conclusions in the body of this 
dissertation would seem otiose. The Introduction has already 
outlined the general purpose of each chapter and its place within 
the overall scheme of argument; and the concluding section of 
Chapter 5 has discussed the relative significance of the specific 
long- and shorter-term factors examined earlier in the 
dissertation in the development of the Spartiate crisis. 
Definitive 'conclusions' are also inappropriate because of the 
provisional, exploratory character of the research presented 
here. It may, however, be helpful to suggest a few brief general 
points which emerge from the above chapters and to outline some 
directions in which future work might develop these exploratory 
studies . 
This dissertation has emphasized a dual but integrated 
approach to its subject-matter. For the purpose of analysis 
'property' 
categories. 
and 'society' have been treated as separate 
This distinction has been justified, at least in 
part, by the fact that public controls upon property ownership, 
although not non-existent, appear to have been significantly 
fewer than upon other aspects of the lives of Spartiate citizens. 
Yet this study has also revealed the interpenetration of the two 
spheres. Issues of P.roperty ownership, especially of 
differential levels of wealth, have been seen to affect not only 
the operation of public institutions (such as the choice of 
pederastic partners, the functioning of the messes and the 
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emergence of military leaders), but also the patterns of more 
personal activities such as marriage-making and procreation. 
Conversely, the prescriptions of the Spartan state and the 
character of Spartiate society exercised an important impact upon 
the role of property and especially upon the economies of citizen 
households, influencing such basic elements as the extraction of 
a surplus from their labour force and the use of produce 
extracted from their estates. It was state policies too which 
contributed to the increasing deployment of wealth through the 
intensification of patronal relations between citizens. 
It is hoped that the confrontation and integration of these 
two spheres has illuminated some of the diverse 
interrelationships between different aspects of Spartiate life 
and the complicated processes of continuity and change which 
characterized Sparta's historical development in the Classical 
period. In modern scholarship Sparta is often treated either as 
an ultra-conservative society or (more analytically) as a 
surviving exemplar of a relatively undifferentiated 'archaic' 
polis (e.g., with qualifications, Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977, 
eh. 4) . This dissertation may serve to suggest that, though 
clearly less pluralistic in character, Sparta's internal society 
was in its own way as internally complex and subject to 
transformation as those of most other contemporary Greek states. 
These explorations into the field of Spartiate property and 
society do not as yet constitute an exhaustive survey. First, 
my discussion of the character of land tenure in Chapter 2 
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requires extension in two directions: through more explicit 
consideration of the tenure of other forms of property, such as 
livestock and other types of moveable wealth than gold and 
silver, and of communal rights of use over individually-held 
property (cf. esp. Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-4; Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7). 
Secondly, there is need for a systematic examination of the 
'balance sheet' of Spartiate household economies, embracing such 
factors as the composition and subsistence requirements of 
citizen households, including the range and scale of agricultural 
production required for the provision of the mess dues. Issues 
concerning the location and productivity of Spartiate estates 
constitute a thicket of unknowns which are more difficult to 
penetrate; but the forthcoming publication of the Laconia Survey 
and the work of the newly-commenced Pylos Survey in Messenia may 
begin to shed some additional light upon the agrarian 
exploitation of the different regions under Spartiate control, 
including the currently unresolved question of the residential 
patterns of helot communities. A more thorough discussion of the 
geography and archaeology of those regions under Spartiate 
landownership and helot cultivation is indeed another 
desideratum. · 
A further new area of investigation would concern the 
engagement of citizen households in exchange and other economic 
activity, building upon my brief remarks in Chapter 5, Section 
2. The need for each Spartiate to deliver an exact and unvarying 
quantity of specified i tems of produce monthly to his mess must 
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surely have meant that in most months a number of men were 
lacking in one product or another (quite apart from those 
sufficiently impoverished to be suffering from a general 
shortfall). This must have drawri many citizens into market or 
other exchanges with those fortunate enough to be in possession 
of surplus produce. Such exchanges might of course have a range 
of social as well as purely economic implications, as was 
suggested towards the end of Chapter 5. Similarly, one might 
also consider the polis' need for livestock and arable products, 
especially for purposes of sacrifice (e.g. Hdt. 6.57), and the 
potential role of Spartiate estates in supplying this 
requirement. Such studies would also necessitate close 
reexamination of the precise scope of the ban on citizen 
participation in money-making and banausic activities (cf. Xen. 
Lak . Po 1 . 7 . 2 ) . 
If the above topics seem to lie mainly on the 'property' 
side of the dual approach advocated in this dissertation, there 
are also several 'societal' issues in need of further 
examination. The suggestive article of Holladay (1977) ought to 
be extended into a more systematic analysis of state controls 
over the use of -surplus wealth, including study of prohibitions 
of specific forms of consumption, of the channelling of 
expenditure and display into officially-sanctioned spheres. 
In this context greater use could be made of the limited, 
but as yet historically unexploited, range of surviving material 
evidence which , covering the entire period of this study , can act 
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as a partial control on the literary sources, which date from the 
late-fifth century and later (cf. Fitzhardinge 1985, for an art-
historical study). Analysis of the published material evidence 
in different media might illuminate more clearly certain 
restrictive patterns imposed by the state to complement my value-
oriented discussion in Chapter 1, as well as indicating a wider 
range of permitted expenditures than are known from the literary 
sources. Through the exploitation of non-Spartan literary and 
epigraphic material, there also remains more to be said than is 
attempted in this dissertation concerning a range of attested 
socio-political uses of wealth: such as the likely costs of the 
dedications of Spartiate chariot victors, the extent of Spartiate 
xeniai and their material implications (cf. Herman 1987) and the 
role of bribery in political life (cf. Noethlichs 1987). 
Finally, no thorough study of the role of property holding 
in the Spartan early-fourth-century crisis would be complete 
without a concluding analysis of its enduring aftermath in the 
later fourth and third centuries . The recent publication of 
illuminating general studies of this period (e.g. David 1981; 
Cartledge & Spawforth 1989) merely highlights the need for more 
specialized analysis of significant issues such as the impact on 
Spartiate landowners of the loss of Messenia and the formation 
of the stratified citizen body of the Helienistic period. 
As these brief programmatic statements indicate, several of 
the above topics for further study emerge from issues raised in 
the course of this dissertation . If my explorations into 
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Classical Spartan property and society can lead on to a more 
systematic appreciation of the socio-economic character of the 
Spartiate polis, then the long years involved in the making of 
this dissertation may yet prove t6 have been time well spent. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Named Spartiate extraordinary officers (with PB No.) 
grouped according to decade (cf. Table 5.1) 
Alkidas (62) 
Ameinias (71) 
Aristeus (118) 
Autocharidas (172) 
Brasidas (177) 
Damagon (209) 
Epikydidas (272) 
Eurylochos (329) 
Thrasymelidas 
(378) 
Ischagoras (400) 
Klearidas (424) 
Knemos (448) 
Leon (482) 
Lykophron (500) 
Makarios (508) 
Meleas (519) 
Menedaios (526) 
Xenares (567) 
Pasitelidas (592) 
Polydamidas (626) 
Ramphias (654) 
Salaithos (657) 
Tantalos (684) 
Timokrates (689) 
N = 24 
Agesandridas (5) 
Agesippidas (16) 
Alkamenes (57) 
Antisthenes (104) 
Astyochos (169) 
Gylippos (196) 
Derkylidas (228) 
Ekkritos (258) 
Epikles (269) 
Eteonikos (283) 
Eualas (291) 
Thermon (366) 
Therimenes (371) 
Hippokrates (391) 
Klearchos (425) 
Leon (482) 
Mindaros (536) 
Xenophantidas 
(571) 
Pasippidas (591) 
Pedaritos (599) 
Philippos (725) 
Chalkideus (743) 
N = 22 
Agesandridas (5) 
Agias (22) 
Anaxibios (86) 
Arakos (106) 
Aristarchos (117) 
Aristos (135) 
Bion (174) 
Gylippos (196) 
Derkylidas (228) 
Epikydidas (274) 
Eteonikos (283) 
Thibron (374/5) 
Thorax (380) 
Hippokrates (391) 
Kallibios (405) 
Kallikratidas 
(408) 
Kleandros (422) 
Klearchos (425) 
Kratesippidas 
(456) 
Kyniskos (460) 
Labotas (462) 
Libys (490) 
Lysander (504) 
Nausikleides ( 550) 
Panthoidas (585) 
Polynikos (630) 
Polos (653) 
Samios/Pythagoras 
(659) 
Sthenelaos (665) 
Pharax (665) 
Charminos (750) 
Cheirisophos (759) 
N = 32 
I Z:::,: 
Alexandros (50) 
Aristoteles (137) 
Archelaidas (146) 
Gylis (199) 
Derkylidas {228) 
Diphridas {243) 
Ekdikos (256) 
Eteonikos {283) 
Euxenos (310) 
Herippidas (349) 
Thibron (374/5) 
Idaios {382) 
Kallias (404) 
Lysander (504) 
Megillos (513) 
Menaskos (525) 
Milon (535) 
Mygdon (541) 
Xenokles (569) 
Orsippos {582) 
Fankalos (584) 
Fasimachos (590) 
Feisandros (601) 
Fodanemos (616) 
Follis (621) 
Fraxitas (638) 
Skythes (668) 
Teleutias (689) 
Fharax (717/18) 
Fhilodikos (726) 
Fhylopidas (726) 
Cheirikrates (758) 
N = 32 
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Anaxibios (86) 
Antalkidas (97) 
Gorgopas (193) 
Derkylidas (228) 
Eteonikos (283) 
Eudamidas (295) 
Therimachos (370) 
Hierax {383) 
Nikolochos (564) 
Folybiades (625) 
Folycharmos {634) 
Teleutias {689) 
Tlemonidas (381) 
Fhoibidas (734) 
N = 13 
Alexandros (51) 
Alketas (59) 
Alkidas (63) 
Aristodamos (126) 
Aristokrates (128) 
Arkissos (142) 
Gorgoleon (191) 
Herippidas (349) 
Theopompos (364) 
Therippidas (372) 
Ischolaos (401) 
Lysanoridas (505) 
Mnasippos (538) 
Nikolochos (564) 
Fanthoidas (585) 
Follis (621) 
Sphodrias (680) 
Hypermenes (711) 
Fhoibidas (734) 
N = 19 
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APPENDIX 2 
Extraordinary officers, 412-386, (with PB Nos.) 
grouped by number of posts held 
A 
B 
C 
= 
= 
= 
Only one attested post & no evidence of premature death. 
Only one attested post, but career known to have been 
prematurely terminated by death (other than by execution). 
More than one military post. 
Agias (22) 
Alexandros (50) 
Antisthenes (104) 
Arakos (106) 
Aristarchos (117) 
Aristos (135) 
Aristoteles (137) 
Archelaidas (146) 
Astyochos (169) 
Bion (174) 
Diphridas (243) 
Ekdikos (256) 
Epikles (269) 
Epikydidas (274) 
Eualas (291) 
Thermon (366) 
Idaios {382) 
Hierax {383) 
Kallias (404) 
Kallibios {405) 
Kratesippidas (456) 
Kyniskos (460) 
Libys (490) 
Lysippos (506) 
Megillos (513) 
Menaskos (525) 
Milon (535) 
Mygdon (541) 
Nausikleides (550) 
Nikandros (556) 
Xenokles (569) 
Xenophantidas (571) 
Orsippos {582) 
Pankalos (584) 
Pasippidas (591) 
Polynikos (630) 
Praxitas (638) 
Polos (653) 
Samios/Pythagoras (659) 
Sthenelaos (665) 
Skythes (668) 
Philodikos (726) 
Phylopidas {739) 
Charminos {750) 
Cheirikrates (758) 
N == 45 
Alkamenes (57) 
Gylis {199) 
Therimenes (371) 
Therimachos {370) 
Kallikratidas {408) 
Labotas {462) 
Mindaros (536) 
Pasimachos {590) 
Pedaritos (599) 
Podanemos (616) 
Chalkideus {743) 
Cheirisophos {759) 
N = 12 
Agesandridas (5) 
Anaxibios {86) 
Antalkidas {97) 
Gorgopas {193) 
Gylippos (196) 
Derkylidas {228) 
Eteonikos (283) 
Euxenos {310) 
Herippidas {349) 
Thibron {374/5) 
Thorax {380) 
Hippokrates {391) 
Kleandros (422) 
Klearchos {425) 
Lysander {504) 
Nikolochos {564) 
Panthoidas (585) 
Peisandros {601) 
Pollis {621) 
Teleutias (689) 
Pharax {717/18) 
Philippos {725) 
N =22 
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Note to Appendices 1 and 2 
The above lists aim to include in principle all named, non-royal 
military officials in positions of responsibility in campaigns 
outside Lakonia and Messenia which were not under the command of 
a king at the head of regular Lakedaimonian forces. Such 
positions of responsibility include harmosts, nauarchoi, staff 
officers under the above ( and those under Agesilaos in Asia 
Minor), officers sent to command forces of foreign communities, 
non-royal commanders of Lakedaimonian and Peloponnesian forces 
(including, for example, officers at various levels in the 
expedition against Olynthos in the late 380s and early 370s, and 
polemarchs and hipparmosts of detached Lakedaimonian morai). 
Such an all-embracing compass is justifiable on the grounds that 
all such officers had, at least to a limited degree, either the 
capacity for personal policy or military initiatives or the 
susceptibility to foreign influences beyond the regular control 
of the Spartan polis. 
Nonetheless, construction of the above lists is to a certain 
extent an arbitrary affair. First, certain individuals have 
necessarily had to be excluded from one or both Appendices on a 
variety of grounds: 
(i) Melanchridas (PB 517) & Melanthos (PB 518). These men were 
initially appointed to positions but did not in the event ever 
exercise their office. They are omitted from both Appendices. 
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(ii) Leonymos (PB 485) & Hippokratidas (PB 393). The former was 
a soldier who died at Kunaxa (Xen. Anab. 4.1.18), but it is 
unclear that he held any responsible position . The evidence 
concerning the latter (Plut. Apophth. Lak. 222A-B) leaves it 
uncertain both whether he was in office abroad or in Sparta and 
whether he should be dated within our period or not. Both are 
omitted from both Appendices. 
(iii) Aristomenes (PB 133) & Euphratas (not in PB; Aineias 
Tacticus 27.7; cf. Whitehead 1990, 175f.). These men's posts are 
dateable with certainty neither to a particular decade nor, more 
generically, to the period 412-386. They are omitted from both 
Appendices. 
(iv) Lysippos (PB 506) & Nikandros (PB 556). There is 
uncertainty concerning the exact decade of tenure of these men's 
posts, but they lie certainly within the period 412-386. They 
are hence omitted from Appendix 1, but included in Appendix 2. 
(v) The identity (all one person or more?) of the several Leons 
( PB 482) known in the late fifth century is notoriously uncertain 
(Ch.l Section II(d)). This causes no problems for Appendix 1 
which is not concerned with problems of identity; but the 
uncertainty makes it necessary to omit him/them from Appendix 2. 
Secondly, certain men held annual posts which commenced in 
the last few months of one decade and continued into the first 
few months of the next (e.g. a post held in the year 410/09). 
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It was judged excessively inflationary to include such men under 
both decades in Appendix 1. Instead, they have been allocated 
only to the decade within which they were appointed. The men 
(and years of office) in question are as follows: Xenares 
(420/19); Aristarchos; Bion; Nausikleides; Polynikos; Polos; 
Charrninos (all 400/399); Polybiades (380/79). 
Finally, it should be noted that the seer Agias (PB 22) is 
included in both Appendices owing to the significance of this 
office in Spartan military campaigning (cf. Hdt. 9.33). 
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